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Introduction
Transition countries are markets with less advanced, but growing economies. The
group ranges from large countries like Russia, with extensive resources to much smaller
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The change of their planned economic sys-
tems to market economies can be regarded, as one of the biggest socioeconomic trans-
formations in the human history. This new macroeconomic policy was related to free
movement of goods and capital across borders, strengthening the role of the private sec-
tor and structural reforms aiming at a sustainable growth. Furthermore, the inßation
was stabilized and the Þscal and monetary policies were orientated towards long-term
price stability. The process of transition, however, was not as fast and without frictions
as initially expected due to conßicting policy objectives and macroeconomic imbalances.
The recovery from the initial downturn in output and employment has been long, and
took almost a quarter of a century before the initial convergence of incomes to Western
European standards became a reality. Nevertheless, the current economic indicators
show that transition countries are on the right track and that further improvement of
living standards and high growth rates could be expected in the future.
The beginning of the 21st century was marked by the official membership of eight
Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) in the European Union (EU). The
next step towards full integration with the EU is the adoption of the euro, which is an
obligation under acquis communautaire. It is also a challenging task, which will increase
the beneÞts and the opportunities of the EU accession. The homogeneity of Þnancial
markets in Europe, since the introduction of the euro has encouraged investors to search
for novel proÞt opportunities. Central and Eastern European markets, especially those
that position themselves for prospective entry into the European Monetary Union
(EMU), are more and more at the focus of attention.
Among the main analytical tasks undertaken by the current research is an analysis
of the monetary and exchange rate policy in transition countries. Our objective is
to evaluate how well prepared are Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) for
participation in a common currency area, whether an early participation is optimal, as
well as how sustainable the currency union will be after accepting new members.
In contrast to CEE countries, the magnitude of Russias economic transition shows
that, in spite of the common communist past, transition experience can vary consider-
ably. For Russia, transition has been slower and depended on political and institutional
reforms for building stable macroeconomic environment. In the last years, supported
by favorable external conditions, Russia has shown remarkable economic growth and
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focused on developing a liberal democracy and a market economy. Nonetheless, re-
cent economic growth slowdown suggests symptoms of a Dutch disease, a relevant
problem for resource-rich economies.
It bears great importance to analyze and understand the complex process of tran-
sition in order further to develop market institutions and to advance in the European
integration. As a consequence of being a new and dynamic area of research, empirical
studies on transition countries often reach controversial results. The explanation for
these controversies can be attributed to the poor quality of the data, the lack of country-
level harmonization of statistical reporting, and Þnally the relatively short transition
period. Therefore, the aim of this dissertation is to employ a sophisticated economet-
ric methodology to improve on the current empirical literature on economic policy in
transition countries. More speciÞcally, we focus on the following contributions:
 We use high frequency time series data to increase the number of observations
and to provide a more detailed picture on the development of the macroeconomic
transition indicators.
 The structural vector autoregressive (VAR) approach of Clarida and Gali
(2001) is applied to analyze how asymmetric shocks inßuence the optimal monetary
policy in acceding countries.
 By using Markov regime switching VAR model we estimate empirically the
credibility of the non euro zone central banks in comparison to that of the euro zone
central banks, sharing a common currency.
 The Dutch Disease model of Russia, used in this study, provides an expla-
nation of the impact of high resource prices on the countrys weak long-term growth
performance.
 We use cointegration procedure and vector error correction (VECM) model
to estimate the long-run elasticities of the real exchange rate in Russia.
The Vector autoregressive model (VAR) is a starting point for empirical modelling
in the current study. Since the original work of Sims (1972 and 1980), VAR was used
as a primary time-series methodology to study the interaction among the monetary
variables and the real economy. Theoretical models for the effect of exchange rates
on output were tested to be consistent with the empirical evidence. In particular, the
lag structure of the VAR model allows determining, whether real and monetary dis-
turbances have played a role in output ßuctuations during the transition. The simple
VAR approach, however, has been criticized to suffer from overÞtting and identiÞca-
tion problems. To address these issues, we adopt more sophisticated structural and
Bayesian VAR approaches, where the alternative speciÞcation allows imposing theo-
retical restrictions on the contemporaneous correlations among the variables.
While the above methods assess the effects of the exogenous shocks, they cannot
identify the endogenous responses of the monetary policy to the economy i.e. the role
played by the monetary policy rules. By using non-linear regime switching model,
we aim at estimating the reaction function of the central banks monetary policy in
transition countries. The changes in the stabilization behavior, allow us to draw conclu-
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sions about the central banks credibility and the desirability of alternative monetary
strategies.
The cointegration and vector error correction approach presented in the last chapter
are suggestive about the long run equilibrium between the real exchange rate and the
oil prices. The results provide evidence for the role played by a positive supply shock
on the production structure of the economy.
The rest of this dissertation consists of three independent essays, studying the
empirical implications of transition, and is organized as follows:
CHAPTER 1 studies the dynamic responses of three variables  real effective ex-
change rate, prices and output - to an identiÞed supply, demand and monetary shocks
on the economic policy of Central and Eastern European countries. We employ the
structural VAR model of Clarida and Gali (1998) to a sample of transition countries in
order to assess the importance of these different types of externalities. In particular,
we are interested in how much of the variances of the output, real effective exchange
rate and prices are explained by the three types of shocks on the way in the period
before the euro adoption.
CHAPTER 2 employs Markov regime switching VAR model to determine, whether
CEE countries put emphasis more on stabilizing inßation or on output during the last
decade of transition. We Þnd that the monetary policy depended on the country-
speciÞc structure. Therefore the attention in transition countries was more on the
output stabilization. This is of particular relevance for their prospective participation
in a monetary union, where in contrast, the main focus will be on the union-level price
stability.
Consequently CHAPTER 3 focuses on the impact of the high oil prices on the real
exchange rate in Russia and answers the question, whether Russia exhibits symptoms
of Dutch Disease. We start with a three-sector model in which an increase in oil prices,
by raising oil sector wages, results in real appreciation of the currency, a shrinking
manufacturing sector, and a booming services sector, through a combination of classi-
cal resource allocation and spending effects. Then, the predictions of the model
are tested by a detailed sectoral analysis, and a number of cointegrating vectors are
determined according to the results from the Johansen procedure. Furthermore, we
estimate vector error correction model, in which real exchange rate depends on the oil
price, productivity differential, government consumption, and corruption. Finally, in
the conclusion, we present estimates of the long-run exchange rate elasticity in Rus-
sia and summarize our main theoretical and empirical Þndings. The discussion of the
results aims at providing relevant policy implications and a consistent framework to
advance in the analysis of transition economies.
Part I
ERM II Participation and Euro
Adoption
Chapter 1
Cost - Benefit Analysis
1.1 Introduction
All Central European countries (CECs) consider strategies to become full members
of the European monetary union (EMU), hence to adopt the euro in the near future.
From the countries perspective, determining when to adopt the euro, depends on the
costs and beneÞts of giving up their monetary independence. Thus, the timing of entry
is determined by the overall macroeconomic stabilization and the vulnerability of the
speciÞc economy to external shocks. The last depends on how ßexible or rigid is the
exchange rate regime.
Macroeconomic stability depends on the ability of the exchange rate regime either
to act as a shock absorber, or to propagate shocks. In particular, exchange rate ßex-
ibility could be a good instrument to absorb shocks or may propagate shocks, thus
increasing macroeconomic instability. Therefore, the costs of joining a monetary union
depend on the extent to which a more ßexible exchange rate regime serves, as a tool
for macroeconomic stabilization, which absorbs shocks. Shocks are often accompanied
by higher interest rates and low investment level which create a potential for Þnancial
instability 1. Alternatively, if the ßexible exchange rate is a source of macroeconomic
instability, than giving up a monetary independence will be beneÞcial from the per-
spective of macroeconomic stabilization. In the last case, abandoning the independent
monetary policy will bring more beneÞts than costs.
Shocks have permanent or temporary asymmetric effects depending on their mon-
etary transmission mechanisms. Therefore, decisive are the types, frequency and cor-
relation of shocks between the new members and the Euro area. In its analysis of
taxonomy of shocks, the European Commission (1997) distinguishes: between ex-
ogenous and policy-induced shocks, between real and Þnancial shocks, between tem-
porary and permanent shocks, between country-speciÞc and sector-speciÞc shocks. In
EC (2004) is applied a broader classiÞcation of shocks: demand and supply, symmetric
1Exogenous shocks are events, over which the authorities in particular country have no direct
control but which can have permanent or temporary asymmetric effect depending on the economic
structure.
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and asymmetric, temporary and permanent, policy-induced and exogenous.
Despite the insightful literature on the subject, the question of the interdependence
of the monetary regime and the exposure to exogenous shocks during the process of
Enlargement has, so far, been underestimated. The purpose of this chapter is to
analyze how the existence of asymmetries inßuences the optimal monetary policy in
acceding countries. This will answer to the question, if the exchange rates in CECs
were absorbing shocks or were amplifying shocks, as well as which shocks explain the
variance of the real exchange rate.
This paper empirically investigates the link between a credible monetary policy and
the external shock transmission in small open economies. It evaluates the importance of
external shocks and seeks to identify the type of monetary regime to avoid instability
in the pre EMU phase2. We separate the effects of supply, demand and monetary
shocks and compare the consequences of the destabilization risk under various monetary
and exchange rate regimes. The emphasis is placed on the role of the exchange rate,
as well as on the external disturbances in relation to different monetary targeting
mechanisms. The present chapter examines the main challenges that the acceding
countries will have to confront and the policy measures that will ensure successful
monetary integration. It answers the key question of how well prepared the economies
of the new EU members are to join EMU. The chapter is organized as follows: Section
1.2 discusses the implications of the ERM II membership. Section 1.3 introduces the
theoretical debate around EMU. Section 1.4 presents an analysis of the beneÞts of the
monetary union.. Sections 1.5 , 1.6 and 1.7 discuss the link between the monetary
regimes, the shock correlation and the transmission mechanisms. Section 1.8 presents
the theoretical model followed by the empirical tests in section 1.9 and 1.10. Section
1.11 concludes.
2According to the Article 124 of the Treaty of Rome, countries with derogation for the introduction
of the euro have to treat their exchange rate polices as a matter of common interest.
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1.2 Exchange Rate Mechanism II
In May 2004 ten countries have entered EU and at some point in time will join
EMU3. Some of the acceding countries adopted a rapid strategy and clearly announced
their desire to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) , hence to adopt the
Euro, as soon as possible4. ERM II is an agreement with a central rate and a standard
ßuctuation band of +/-15%. Participation in ERM II is one of the four Maastricht
convergence criteria and is a prerequisite for the adoption of the euro5. It requires
setting a central parity rate of the domestic currency against the euro, as well as
participation in the mechanism for a minimum of two years without devaluation. After
this period the European Central Bank and the European Commission prepare parallel
convergence reports, which examine, if the requirements for entry have been fulÞlled,
and if the country has achieved high degree of convergence with the euro area.
From the current EU members, which are not yet EMU members, seven countries
participate the ERM II: Denmark joined on 1 January 1999, Estonia, Lithuania and
Slovenia joined in June 2004, Cyprus, Latvia and Malta joined in May 2005 and Slo-
vakia has joined in November 2005. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom (UK) do not participate in the mechanism. Only the UK is
granted a permanent derogation. None of the other Þve member states has the pos-
sibility to opt-out and therefore will all have to join the Exchange rate mechanism in
the future (see Table 1.1 ).
The central parity is based on a multilateral agreement. The country may choose
its national currency to vary within a maximum of 15 percent or to commit to an
unchanged exchange rate against the euro during ERM II, as in the case of Estonia,
Lithuania and Malta. The central parity may in fact be revised, but only after mutual
agreement. Once set, the intention for the central parity is to be maintained until the
country joins the euro area with the irrevocably conversion rate. The rate is proposed
by the European commission after consultations with the ECB and decided by the euro
area member states and the national authorities. The long term beneÞts of joining a
currency area are related to lower transaction costs and exchange rate and Þnancial
uncertainty, resulting in lower risk premium on interest rates. Available empirical evi-
dence (Frankel and Rose,2002) favors the hypothesis, that there are large trade gains
and technology transfers, resulting in a signiÞcantly positive effect on the economic
growth. In addition, there are beneÞts from pursuing a common, prudent macroeco-
nomic policy, which strengthens credibility by facilitating anti-inßation measures. A
3The ten countries are Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania Malta and Cyprus.
4See the respective Central Banks announcements.
5Maastricht criteria for EMU Membership Inßation: no more than 1.5% above average of three
lowest inßation countries. Nominal interest rate: no more than 2.0% above the average of the three
countries with the lowest interest rate. Nominal exchange rate: respect normal ßuctuation margins
for ERM II without severe tensions for at least 2 years before the examination. Council of Ministers
decides conversion rate. Fiscal criteria: the budget deÞcit should not be higher than 3% of GDP and
public debt should not be higher 60% of GDP. The Central Bank should be independent.
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comparison of business-cycle correlations across US regions and across EMU countries
suggests, that a common monetary policy is itself a source of cyclical convergence (i.e
the optimum currency areas are endogenous) (Buiter, 2000).
Maastricht criteria,however, have not predictive power, as the long term sustain-
ability of the union is concerned. Leaving aside the undisputable gains of sharing a
common currency, the governing council of the ECB also warns about "the risks im-
plied by premature rigidity of the exchange rate" and recommends, that "it might
be appropriate for some new Member States to only consider applying for ERM II
membership after a further degree of convergence has been achieved". In addition, the
Governing council states that this is particularly advisable when an early rigidity could
precipitate disorderly realignments with potentially disruptive economic consequences,
including for the credibility of the mechanism as a whole6.
The main goal of the ERM II is to enhance the macroeconomic stability by fostering
real and nominal convergence with the EU. On the one hand, the period after EU
accession and before joining ERM II cannot be inÞnitely prolonged; countries have to
consider their timetables for joining the EMU. On the other hand, once in the ERM
II in the event of idiosyncratic shocks, the monetary policy tools of the central banks
will be restricted, which reduces the possibilities for country-speciÞc adjustment. The
question remains, as to whether the new entrants in ERM II will be stable against
speculative forces, such as the attack in 1992, which forced Finland, Italy, Norway,
Sweden and the UK out of the mechanism in place at the time. Therefore, the role of
ERM II is viewed as a testing phase for both the domestic currency stability and the
convergence level.
The Asian crisis of 1998 and the oil price shocks of 2000 and 2004 have demonstrated
that adjustment to shocks still remains a difficult issue in the euro area. Adverse
macroeconomic developments continue to play an important role in EMU, because
Þxed exchange rate cannot be used to prevent shocks 7. In addition, the value of
the national currencies will vary according to how the euro ßuctuates against other
international currencies, mainly the dollar. Apart from the exchange rate, the costs
could materialize in high volatile interest rates, credit spreads and local equity markets.
In addition, the real appreciation of the national currency is a natural consequence of
the high growth rates in CECs. This implies that compare with the slower growing
EU members, the new ERM II entrants may have either real appreciation against the
euro or higher inßation rates. Early EMU membership will, therefore, make it difficult
to restrain inßation to the EU levels.
Hence, there is need for an empirical understanding of the dynamic behavior of
the macroeconomic variables in transition in the period before joining the EMU. The
key questions are, whether the structural adjustments will be speeded up or slowed
down by an early participation in EMU and what is the optimal monetary strategy
6See "Policy position of the governing council of the ECB on the exchange rate issues relating to
the acceding countries" http://www.ecb.int/press/03/pr031218en.htm
7Modern exchange rate theory also regards the exchange rate as a source of instability and doubts
its effectiveness to deal with regional shocks (for an excellent review see Schelkle, 2001)
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for the new EU members: to follow a strictly rigid regime or to hold on to ßexibil-
ity in the pre EMU phase. The timing of entry depends mostly on the progress of
Þnancial restructuring and the real macroeconomic stabilization. SigniÞcant structural
reforms, ability to advance convergence through sound economic policy and exchange
rate regime compatible with ERM II, are all viewed as prerequisites for participation
in the mechanism.
During the ERM II period, there will be only limited exchange rate ßexibility in
the context of full capital mobility. Hence, the probability of Þnancial crises increases.
This implies, that countries should assess the probability of asymmetric shocks vis-à-vis
the EMU members before they eliminate their national monetary and exchange rate
instruments. Furthermore, to what extent the macroeconomic situation is robust and
the Þscal policy is capable of responding to shocks should be carefully scrutinized.
The choice of monetary strategy (and the exchange rate arrangement, as a part
of the monetary regime) after EU accession is a responsibility and prerogative of the
Members States concerned8. The probability of Þnancial convergence, as speciÞed by
the Maastricht criteria, depends on the monetary regime the CECs have chosen in
the pre-accession phase, as well as, on the Þscal instruments applied at the national
level. In order to achieve an early membership, acceding countries must Þne-tune their
monetary policy, to target low inßation rates. Naturally, there is no superior exchange
rate regime that can be applied to all acceding countries, which differ greatly in their
economic structure9. Hence, during the transition to EMU there will be considerable
latitude open for monetary policy and a country speciÞc approach will be employed.
On the one hand, a certain degree of ßexibility is necessary because output does not
respond efficiently to external shocks in the presence of sluggish prices and wages10. On
the other hand, the exchange rate stability with the euro is a priority for all acceding
countries, and is subordinated to the primary objective of price stability. The intra-
marginal interventions, used by the countries that have chosen to participate in ERM
II from the very beginning, are decided by their national central banks. However, a
formal decision of narrowing the ßuctuation band below the current level of +/-15%
(related to the marginal interventions) is to be treated as an exceptional case and
could only be considered at a very advanced stage of convergence11. This emphasizes
the importance the ECB places of exercising a certain level of ßexibility within ERM
II before locking the exchange rate permanently and adopting the euro12.
Macroeconomic transition in Eastern Europe is characterized by volatility in capital
8Report by the ECOFIN Council to the European Council in Nice on the exchange rate aspects of
enlargement, Brussels, 8.11.2000, Council of the European Union press release no 13055/00
9Note that there was not in the past single path for the current EMU members either. Incompatible
with ERM II are the cases of free ßoating or managed ßoats (without mutually agreed central rate),
crawling pegs and pegs against anchors other than the euro.
10Driver and Wren-Lewis (1999) conclude that adjustment to shocks in the Euro area may be costly
due to real wage rigidity and price-setting inertia.
11Denmark participates in ERM II with multilaterally agreed bands of +/- 2.25%, Estonia, Lithua-
nia and Malta committed to maintained Þxed exchange rate.
12During the transition period CEE countries will be highly vulnerable to Þnancial instability, which
could be avoided by full euroization, although it is not allowed by Treaty.
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ßows, high terms of trade shocks and large structural transformations. Real and/or
Þnancial shocks (reversal of capital ßows allocation, increase of international interest
rates, Þnancial contagion) have signiÞcant implications on the economic policy of CEE
countries. Moreover, as a uniform response to common shocks will not yield a uniform
impact, enlargement itself acts like an exogenous shock leading to variations also in
the EU, especially due to the regional differences within the Union. This could disturb
the process of business cycle synchronization, and might impair monetary policy in the
euro area after the euro adoption.
The impact of shocks can be asymmetric on both country, and regional level. By
increasing volatility, external shocks can increase the probability of Þnancial crises and
postpone the euro adoption. An establishment of common institutions and policies
has to smooth the existing structural asymmetries. Credible institutions, including
sound Þscal discipline and Þnancial regulations, adequate legal framework regarding
bank defaults, as well as the implementation of the necessary structural changes could
speed up the process of convergence.
1.3 Review of the Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literature distinguishes between two main concepts, concerning the
relationship of the exchange rate and the shock exposure  exchange rate is considered
either as an absorber of shocks or as a source of shocks.
Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961) introduce the traditional view of the ex-
change rate, as an absorbing mechanism, which isolates the economy from external
price shocks. In case of a sudden increase in international prices, only the appreciation
of the domestic currency will prevent the economy from importing the foreign inßation
level. Abandoning the exchange rate adjusting capacity has been regarded, as one of
the main drawbacks of the common currency areas. This important question was re-
viewed in the optimum currency area theory (OCA) by Mundell (1961), Kenen (1969)
and McKinnon (1963)13.
According to the OCA theory,conditions for creating a currency union are favor-
able,when individual countries face symmetrical disturbances (concerning the type,
direction and speed of adjustment), if their bilateral trade is signiÞcant and if the
factors of production are mobile. Sharing of these
properties would reduce the role of the nominal exchange rate, as an adjustment tool
i.e. business cycle ßuctuations would be outweighed by the gains from sharing a single
13The theory of OCAs addresses the question whether a common currency is optimal for a group of
countries. The aim is to Þnd a set of various economic indicators determining which country should
participate in a monetary union and how the currency area will function after bilateral exchange rates
are Þxed. The most famous criteria of the OCA are:
degree of factor mobility and similarity of production structures (see Mundell, 1961), openness of
the economy (see McKinnon, 1963), degree of commodity diversiÞcation (Kenen, 1969), price and
wage ßexibility (Eichengreen, 1993), low inßation rates differentials (Haberler,1970; Fleming,1971)
The latter criteria served as a background for the Maastricht convergence criterion on price stability
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currency. In contrast to the traditional OCA approach, Buiter (2001) has argued that
the exchange rate is not only a shock absorber, or part of the transmission mechanism
for fundamental shocks originating outside the foreign exchange markets, but also a
source of excess volatility, unnecessary shocks, instability and misalignment. Fidrmuc
(2002) analyzes the optimality of the currency unions using two types of criteria. First,
countries exposed to symmetric output shocks will tend to have synchronized business
cycles. Second, if shocks are largely asymmetric, effective adjustment mechanisms can
facilitate the slipovers of shocks to the rest of the union and thus mitigate their negative
effect.
In order to distinguish between different types of shocks, Khan (1986) analyzes
the behavior of the real exchange rate in a group of several developing countries. He
considers a combination of exogenous shocks, such as worsening term of trade, falling
growth rates in industrial countries and sharp changes in the costs and availability of
external Þnancing (e.g. rise in international real interest rates). Studies on externa
disturbances include Eichengreen, Rose and Wypolsz (1995) and Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (1999) among others, focusing on the country speciÞc variables. The impact of
supply and demand shocks also related to the monetary policy (e.g. the slopes of IS,
LM and BP curves) has been studied in dateail by Fry and Lilien (1986), Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993), Gross (2001), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003).
Devereux (2002) reports the signiÞcance of three sources of shocks - interest rate
(or capital ßow) shocks, terms of trade shocks and domestic demand shocks in the
non - traded goods sector. A study by Artis and Ehrmann (2002) analyzes, if shocks
are symmetric or asymmetric in order to identify if the exchange rate acts as a shock
absorber, or a source of shocks. Using structural vector autoregression (SVAR) tech-
nique, they look at how strongly the exchange rate responds to asymmetric supply and
demand shocks and Þnd weak results for the UK, Sweden and Denmark. The study
Þnds that the exchange rate is driven by shocks in the exchange rate market, although
these shocks have weak potential to distort output or prices.
Acceding countries are likely to face increased vulnerability of their Þnancial systems
before joining the EMU. Moreno and Trehan (2000) Þnd that common external shocks
explain between sixty to eighty percent of the variation in the total number of currency
crises over the post-Bretton Woods period. Begg et al. (2002) warn of the danger of
enlarged capital ßows that can increase the probability of crises, if reversed or the
probability of overheating and disinßation, if not reversed. Capital inßows lead to a
lending boom, which deteriorates the quality of assets and increases the fragility of the
Þnancial system in the face of economic shocks. Such Þnancial crises would slow the
process of transformation and the counties integration process to the European Union.
On the empirical side, Clarida and Gali, (1994) Þnd that real shocks tend to explain
majority of the variance of the real exchange rates for the industrial countries  Japan,
Germany, the United Kingdom and Canada. Yet, for Canada, Enders and Lee (1997)
Þnd that nominal shocks tend to explain half of the variability of the nominal exchange
rate. Studies on smaller open economies, however, Þnd that the exchange rate (nominal
and real) plays a less signiÞcant role as a shock absorber. Canzoneri at al (1996) Þnds
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that monetary shocks explain larger part of the variability of the nominal exchange
rates. Yet, empirical studies on CEECs yield conßicting and inconclusive results. Based
on VAR model for Czech republic, Poland and Slovakia, Süppel (2003) Þnds that the
real exchange rates is sensitive to supply shocks and acts as a shock absorber. Borghijs
and Kuijs (2004) Þnd that the exchange rate has responded little to output shocks.
The monetary shocks however, have contributed signiÞcantly to the nominal exchange
rate ßuctuations.
In summary, the academic debate around the European Monetary Union enlarge-
ment has mainly focused on several issues:
The Þrst aspect deals with the appropriate monetary strategy for acceding coun-
tries in the pre-EMU phase. The main conclusions are related to the country speciÞc
approach in dealing with the appropriate monetary policy before euro adoption.
The second aspect is related to a cost - beneÞt analysis for participation in the
euro area. Long term gains are envisaged; however the loss of independent monetary
policy increases the costs in the Þrst years after the introduction of euro. The costs
are also related to the extent of similarity of business cycles and the types of shocks,
most likely to follow in the euro area and the acceding countries. The type of exchange
rate regime is regarded, as an important absorption mechanism of external shocks. It
plays a crucial role, when shocks are largely asymmetric. In contrast, abandoning the
monetary policy adjustment tools brings about welfare gains, but leaves the economy
vulnerable to external shocks. Another question is when the acceding countries will
be able to fulÞl the Maastricht criteria. An equally important issue is the difficulty
of fulÞlling both the inßation and exchange rate stability criteria, due to the higher
productivity growth in addition to the real appreciation.
1.4 The Benefits of the Monetary Union
Conditions for common monetary policy within the Union require countries to
share price stability, similar inßation rates and similar operation of the monetary policy
transmission mechanisms. The beneÞts are associated with higher share of trade to
GDP ratio, especially if the country joins a currency union with important trading
partners. A currency union increases not only the trade openness but also delivers
higher income growth, as a result of lower inßation (discipline effect), greater stability
and credibility. Compare to the beginning of transition, all acceding countries have
made considerable progress14. However, the macroeconomic situation in transition is
characterized by real sector structural adjustments and unstable Þnancial sector (see
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 for the macroeconomic indicators in CEE countries).
Table 1.4 shows that there is still distance from the EU average, concerning inßation
and budget deÞcit criteria. The growth rate of GDP is higher, than the EU average.
Nonetheless, the relatively bigger agriculture and industry sectors imply large Þscal
14The annual Transition Report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
provides continuous monitoring
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requirements. This has an inßuence on the monetary policy. Most often, the money
growth and inßation were fuelled by the considerable need of seigniorage. Large current
account deÞcits and the considerable amount of non-performing bank loans suggest
higher probability for currency and banking crises. There is a clear trade off between
the stabilization of output (relative to its natural level) and the inßation stabilization.
Hence, the choice of monetary instruments gains special signiÞcance to avoid Þnancial
instability in the transition economies during the pre-EMU phase.
The economic transformation, that followed in the economies of CEE, came along
with frequent changes in the exchange rate regimes (Table 1.6 and Figures 1.1 - 1.4 ).
Among the reasons are the relatively high exposure to volatile capital ßows, the risk of
real shocks, the lack of consistency in the monetary policy and the inability to success-
fully control inßation. In the Þrst years of transition, most countries opted for ßexible
exchange rate. After experiencing Þnancial crises and instability, some countries transi-
tioned to more rigid regimes, which served to increase macroeconomic discipline, in line
with the economic theory. As countries become more developed, they move to increas-
ingly ßexible exchange rate regimes. Husain et al (2005) present evidence suggesting
that for advanced economies, ßexible rates offer signiÞcantly greater durability and
higher growth without generating higher inßation. The results for the emerging mar-
kets (where CEE are classiÞed), are not as robust; apart from being more crisis prone,
emerging markets do not show signiÞcant relationship between economic performance
and exchange rate regime.
Cost-beneÞt analysis emphasizes the importance of similarity between the business
cycles in the euro area and the acceding countries. The empirical evidence by Eco-
nomic Forecasting Network (EFN) can be summarized as follows: During the nineties
the economic cycles of most acceding countries were strongly correlated with those of
the euro area. However, the synchronization with the euro zone has been worsened
by the economic slowdown 2000-2003. The EFN report provides evidence that the ac-
ceding countries business cycles (except Slovenia) are less synchronized with the euro
area aggregate relative to the business cycles of the current monetary union members
before their introduction of the Euro. Also the correlation of the business cycles is
lower compare to that of the non - EMU members  the United Kingdom, Denmark
and Sweden. The ßuctuations of inßation and growth rates in the acceding countries
were higher on average than those in the EU. The comparison between two sub pe-
riods (1996.1  1999.4) and (2000.1-2002.4) shows that there is a positive increase of
business cycle correlation for Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia, and decrease in
the correlation for Hungary, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic (see Table 1.7 )15.
The short transition period, however, implies that only a single business cycle can
be identiÞed, which casts doubt on the reliability of the results. Also based on the
Lucas critique, it is troublesome to analyze ex ante policies based on ex post data,
because economic policies can lead to changes in the economic structure. Moreover it
could be expected that the cycle synchronization with monetary union will increase in
the years before entering in the EMU, given the example of countries such as Italy and
15See EFN Autumn Report  Annex ch. 5, www. efn.uni-bocconi.it/Annex _to_chapter_5.pdf
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Spain, which suggests that OCAs may well be endogenous.
The differences in the business cycle synchronization can be due to the exposure to
different shocks or to the different transmission mechanisms. Some exogenous shocks,
for instance an oil shock, as shown in Chapter 3, can have long-run effects depend-
ing on the exchange rate regime. Asymmetric supply shocks have arguably been the
reason behind the collapse of the most Þxed exchange rate systems. Unarguably, how-
ever, there exists shock asymmetry between current EMU members and the transition
countries (see Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2003; Horvath, 2002).
Table 1.8 and Table 1.9 show, that EMU candidate countries continue to encounter
supply shocks, that are weakly correlated or uncorrelated with those affecting the core
EMU (with the exception of Hungary). A general conclusion is that the correlation
of shocks is low compare to EMU countries. Most of the coefficients for CECs are
close to zero with positive or negative variation. In addition, the countries on the
EMU periphery (Greece, Ireland) also show low coefficients. Indeed, this implies that
countries, which couldnt meet OCA criteria ex ante can not meet it, so far, ex post
and need a longer period for convergence.
It is natural to compare the correlation between the supply and demand shocks in
the prospective members of the EMU with that in currency board countries, which
had already Þxed their exchange rates to euro for several years. The Þgures show,
that Þxing the exchange rate is of secondary importance for shock correlation in the
short run. Moreover, smaller EMUmembers (Austria, Belgium or the Netherlands) are
much further ahead in their economic convergence compared to acceding countries. In
support of this argument Babetski, Boon and Maurel (2002) Þnd that demand shocks
have become more similar over time, whereas supply shocks have diverged.
Frankel and Rose (2002) point out that the OCA criterion of symmetry of shocks
should not be considered as static, because it is endogenous in the degree of economic
integration. This implies that costs and risks will be gradually reduced, as asymmetries
will disappear over time. However, the timing for potential gains is also unsure. After
joining EMU there will be fewer monetary instruments at countries disposal to deal
with asymmetric shocks. Moreover, if the labor markets cannot adjust easily to shocks
(given the low responsiveness of labor mobility to regional unemployment and wages),
then an early participation in EMU will need stronger adjustment efforts in short term.
Hence, it could make the monetary union more fragile and turn out to be potentially
costly both in economic and political terms not only for the new entrants, but also for
the current members.
1.5 Monetary Regimes and Shock Exposure
From the theoretical point of view (see Friedman, 1953; Poole 1970; DeGrauwe
1996; Chang and Velasco, 1998) Þxed exchange rates are more vulnerable to external
shocks. In case of shocks when exchange rates cannot adjust easily, the real interest rate
or output has to adjust. According to the theory, real shock leads to more variability
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in the output at Þxed exchange rate and Þnancial shock are better offset at a Þxed
exchange rate. On the one hand, it is hard to guarantee soft pegs once capital mobility
is liberalized. On the other hand choosing a more ßexible regime can affect monetary
credibility. The trade-off between higher ßexibility (and hence less shock exposure)
and the credibility gains of Þxed exchange rate regime is an important question in the
light of EMU enlargement.
The theoretical model of Rogoff (1995) supports the hypothesis, that there will
be a trade-off during the pre-EMU phase between higher ßexibility (hence less shock
exposure, more real stabilization) and the credibility gains of a rigid exchange rate
regime. Certainly, an incidence of asymmetric shocks, differences in the economic
structure or swings in the foreign Þnancing might bring serious deviations from the
Maastricht criteria if countries rely only on credibility of Þxed exchange rate.
The ability to respond to idiosyncratic disturbances without independent monetary
policy is seriously compromised for the new members. On the one hand, monetary pol-
icy coordination has been strengthened in order to promote closer integration. On the
other hand, so far long lasting monetary unions without strong political integration has
never been observed. Another argument challenging the "optimality" of the common
currency area between the CEE countries and EU countries is the long term real ap-
preciation of the national currencies of the Þrst vis-à-vis the euro (Balassa-Samuelson
effect), caused by the different productivity growth during the catching-up period. Fur-
thermore, price liberalization strengthens the convergence to the EU price level. An
analysis of the main macroeconomic indicators shows that under currency board the
real exchange rate appreciation results in an increase in the level of inßation, higher
than the EU average, which cannot be offset by depreciation of the real exchange rates.
This leads naturally to problems in meeting the inßation convergence criteria, as stip-
ulated in the Maastricht treaty. Additionally, external changes may affect the foreign
trade transactions in the EMU-11 and CEEC comparably. But different in scale and
a presumably passive reaction of the ECB are likely to result in a de facto asymmetric
character of these shocks.
Growth and Stability Pact also restricts the possibility to implement independent
Þscal policy and further reduces the ability to respond to asymmetric shocks. A coun-
try hit by a large asymmetric shock has to rely on its Þscal policy to deal with the
negative effects. Growth and Stability Pact imposes limits on the public deÞcit and
debt levels. For the countries close to violating these limits it introduces a pro cyclical
bias into national Þscal policy16. Further asymmetries will be reduced by the Þnancial
integration. The question is which monetary instruments will increase the prospects
for ex-ante real convergence in each country.
The type of the monetary regime is one of the major determining factors of how
external shocks are transmitted to the economy17. On the road to EMU, CECs are
facing possible beneÞts and challenges in terms of optimal exchange rate policy. The
16For details on the Þscal risk sharing in the EMU, see Fidrmuc (2002).
17The deÞnition of monetary transmission mechanism follows Taylor (1995, pp.11) "the process
through which monetary policy decisions are transmitted into changes in real GDP and inßation".
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greatest challenge is for those countries, that have certain ßexibility in their exchange
rate regimes. An appropriate arrangement guarantees stability and enhances chances
for fast accession. The choice decision of optimal path and time strategy for Euro
adoption lies between managed ßoating, Þxed peg or currency board. Monetary policy
targeting offers also scope for diversity  real product changes inßation vs. price level
targeting.
This is particularly important for the small open economies, as most of the acceding
countries are considered to be. It also gains a special signiÞcance for avoiding Þnancial
instability. The difference between the monetary transmission mechanisms of CECs
also can constitute a source of asymmetric shocks. Dehejia and Rowe (2001) model
Þxed exchange rates vs. inßation targeting vs. price level targeting. They point out
the differences in terms of unforeseen observed price shock. Under price level targeting
the central bank will try to push the price level back in the period following the shock.
Under inßation targeting, the price level will follow a random walk (or a random walk
with drift under a positive inßation targeting). In contrast to the traditional literature,
the authors do not emphasize the source of shocks, but rather focus on whether a
given shock is observed or unobserved. Price level targeting best stabilizes output and
the expected real exchange rate and enables the central bank to respond to observed
shocks. Before entering the EMU, as required, transition countries will choose system
that combines capital mobility with Þxed but adjustable regimes. CEE countries will
try to operate in the environment of common monetary policy, idiosyncratic shocks
and independent Þscal policies. ECB do not want to impose any monetary regime.
Higher level of heterogeneity is consistent with the enlarged ERM II. The observed
trend implies moving to more Þxed regimes, as stability with the euro is a central
priority for acceding countries.
Gali and Monacelli (2003) employ a version of Calvo sticky price model to analyze
the implications of shocks on two alternative monetary policy regimes: inßation tar-
geting and an exchange rate peg. Results show, that the inßation targeting regime
achieves full stabilization of output gap and inßation, but only at the cost of larger
volatility of nominal and real exchange rates (nominal volatility is associated with high
real exchange rate volatility). Both CPI targeting and the exchange rate peg imply
large welfare losses, as the exchange rate peg ampliÞes both the output gap and the
inßation. Higher degree of openness requires stable relative prices, and has a negative
effect on the volatility of the real exchange rate. Indeed, the exchange rate channel op-
erates very fast in small economies and the changes in the exchange rate affect directly
domestic prices of imports and with a short lag the prices of domestic goods, contain-
ing imported inputs. In response to shocks, under inßation targeting, when nominal
exchange rate appreciates, the overall inßation falls. However, with Þxed exchange
rates, the real appreciation is achieved only by domestic price inßation. The key con-
straint (see Devereux, 2002) is that with differences in productivity performance across
countries, the Þxed exchange rate cannot achieve inßation convergence (see Table 1.9 ).
A calibrated model by Devereux (2002) illustrates the effect of price and wage rigidi-
ties on the economic volatility. In case of non-traded goods price rigidity, an inßation
targeting rule is the fully optimal rule. In case of wage rigidity, the performance of
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Þxed exchange rate is related to a lower volatility of output, but higher volatility of
inßation in comparison to Taylor rule, or inßation targeting. The conclusion is that
wage rigidities mitigate the trade off associated with output stability versus inßation
stability. Moreover, having a Þxed nominal exchange rate does not imply a constant
real exchange rate or stable prices. CEE economies are also not sheltered from ex-
change rate variability from the non- EMU trading partners or variations between G3
countries (see Krugman and Obstfeld 2003). Therefore what matters is the real con-
vergence, i.e. a similarity of economic cycles in the countries whose intention is to peg
their exchange rates to each other. The real convergence is also related to the conver-
gence of per capita incomes, market structures and the scope of the government. It is
especially necessary to reduce country speciÞc shocks and instability. An appropriately
chosen monetary regime paves the way to the fulÞlment of the Maastricht criteria and
allows the possibility for EMU participation as early as possible.
In this sense, a currency union represents the most credible Þxed exchange rate
regime. Alesina and Barro (2000) argue that the membership in a currency union is an
efficient way to address credibility. According to McCallum (1995) sharing a common
currency can be seen as a much more serious and durable commitment than having an
independent central bank. A uniform currency area has costs (as the omission of some
stabilization instruments), as well as advantages - the reduction of transaction costs
and the possibility to gain credibility by following stable monetary policy. It is a form
of signal to international Þnancial markets, which can foster foreign direct investments
and business cycle synchronization ex post. Moreover, the credibility issue relates the
de facto exchange rate regime with the prudent monetary policy. Hence, the main issue
for CECs is not to choose the most credible regime but rather to choose the monetary
regime that will ex ante increase the prospects for real convergence, taking into account
the vulnerability to external shocks.
To what extent operating such a regime is close to reality? As stated by all acceding
countries, full membership in EMU is the target regime once EU membership has been
achieved. On the one hand, in the two-year period before EMU membership introduc-
ing 15% ßuctuation bands can affect credibility and sustainability of current regimes.
On the other hand, CEE countries are facing Mundells "incompatible holy trinity"
- which states that independent monetary policy, perfect capital mobility and Þxed
exchange rates are mutually exclusive. Speculations, as far as the central parities are
not announced long before, can ruin stability and introduce high expectation margin.
Flexible exchange rates are regarded as an instrument of dampening the real shocks in
economies with rigid prices where resource reallocation effect takes place. Levy-Yeyati
and Edwards (2003) Þnd that rigid regimes are unable to cope with real shocks, which
lead to lower growth in less developed economies. Therefore how to switch to a more
ßexible exchange rate without losing credibility in the years before EMU is the most
relevant question for the new EU members.
In this sense, EMU participation requires stronger adjustment efforts, than that of
EU. Buiter and Grafe (2001) regard that the achievement of the whole set of Maastricht
targets is not under the control of the national monetary authority. The argument
is that the interest rate and inßation targeting puts restrictions on the real interest
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rate; and the nominal exchange rate targeting put restrictions on the real exchange
rates. These real values are affected by the developments on the international Þnancial
markets and are only partly under the control of national monetary authorities. Hence,
external economic shocks are part of the costs, which the membership in a currency
union brings about for the acceding countries.
1.6 Types of Shocks and Channels of Monetary Trans-
mission
In accordance with the Mundell-Flemming framework and the new open econ-
omy macroeconomic theory (Obstfeeld, 2001), the importance of the ßexible exchange
rate, as a shock absorber can decline depending on the type of shocks. Asymmetric
shocks are classiÞed as supply, demand and monetary shocks, as well as permanent and
temporary shocks. Following Clarida and Gali (1994), we distinguish between three
structural shocks: relative supply (AS), relative demand (IS) and relative monetary
(LM) shocks. The following long term properties apply:
A positive supply (AS) shock has a permanent positive long-term effect on the
relative output and ambiguous impact on the real exchange rate. In the short run
prices should fall but the impact on the nominal and real exchange rate is ambiguous.
A positive demand (IS) shock has a permanent long-term effect on the real exchange
rate, but not on the output. In the short run the nominal and real exchange rates
appreciate (resulting from sticky prices) and the relative output increases. In the long
run, however, prices also increase, relative output falls and the real exchange rate
appreciates.
A positive monetary (LM) shock reduces the relative interest rate. It does not have
long run effect neither on the output, nor on the real exchange rate. In the short run
capital outßow leads to both real and nominal exchange rate depreciation and lower
output. In the long run, the equilibrium is restored and the output returns to its
pre-shock level.
In the case of real (supply or demand) shocks, the ßexible exchange rate generates
adjustment in international relative prices, thus absorbing the shock and preventing
from output losses. For example, a negative demand shock would reduce relative
demand, which under ßexible exchange rate would cause depreciation, which in turn
would restore the demand thus returning to the equilibrium (Mundell, 1964).
If, however the exchange rate pass-through to import prices is weak, and does not
trigger an adjustment in the international relative prices, then the ßexible exchange
rate will be of little use, as a shock absorber. In the case of monetary and Þnancial
shocks, exchange rate ßuctuations would amplify the effect of the shock and would
cause undesired adjustments in the relative prices away from the equilibrium. For
example, a negative monetary shock would increase the interest rate, which leads to
real appreciation and higher relative prices. In the opposite case under Þxed exchange
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rate, such shock would cause capital inßows, which would put downward pressure on
the interest rate. In a nutshell, the higher the occurrence of asymmetric monetary
shocks, the less important the exchange rate ßexibility is for absorbing shocks. The
higher the occurrence of real shocks, however, the higher the beneÞts of the exchange
rate ßexibility.
Based on the above considerations in addition to the shock asymmetry, EU and
CEEs have to take into account the most important channels of shock transmission in
order to be able to conduct comprehensive monetary policy. Mishkin (1996) presents
an overview of the channels of monetary transmission starting with traditional interest
rate channels, going on to the asset prices channel, and then on to the so-called credit
channels. The transmission can be conducted in two ways:
 From the monetary environment to some intermediate variable, such as mon-
etary deposit rates or lending rates.
 From the intermediate variables to the aggregate macroeconomic variables,
such as inßation, GDP and external balances.
The link between the changes in the monetary policy and the economic process has
to be examined carefully by CECs in order to guarantee sustainable growth and to
reduce the convergence costs. External disturbances mainly affect trade and FDI, but
also capital and labor markets. Foreign trade is usually regarded as the most impor-
tant channel of external shock transmission. Therefore, the degree of trade openness,
i.e. the share of imports and exports relative to GDP, determines the impact of ex-
ternal disturbances on domestic economic activity. On the one hand, the more open
the country, the more vulnerable it is to external shocks. On the other hand, trade
openness suggests increasing business cycle correlation, and thus reducing asymmetry
among union members. In an analysis of ten transition countries, Ganev at al. (2002)
Þnd that exchange and interest rate channels operate in all countries, but the exchange
rate channel is generally stronger and more stable. For most countries the response
of inßation of disturbances in exchange and interest rates was in line with the the-
ory  inßation was low with rising interest rates and was boosted by exchange rate
depreciation. In the majority of countries output was boosted by depreciation.
Besides real external disturbances, which are common for emerging market (for
example external oil shock), transition countries may also face speciÞc risks and shocks
related to their accession in EMU. These risks can be divided in two types:
Exchange rate risks, can result in exceeding the limits of the 15 percent band
required by the ERM II. The negative consequences are loss of credibility, increased
probability of changes in the central parity and spending longer time than the minimum
two years in ERM II. The last is problematic because of the perceived instability of
ERM II before the adoption of the euro. Capital inßows, whose magnitude increases
due to accession, result in real appreciation and may be viewed as a pure portfolio shock.
The convergence play is stimulated by the interest and exchange rate expectations of
the investors. Holders of debt instruments expect higher prices, because the lower
currency risk premium. The increased prices allow them to reap their rewards in terms
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of capital gains. This will require interest rate reduction in the country exposed to
capital inßows. The related problem is twofold: On the one hand an interest rate
reduction will enter into a conßict with the inßation target, on the other hand if the
monetary authority does not intervene; the large capital inßows will lead to currency
appreciation and balance of payment problems. Once in the ERM II, the central banks
of CECs will be unable to use their exchange rate policy to close the uncovered interest
rate parity. In the event of shocks, the interest rates used at national level can not differ
signiÞcantly from the ECB rates. The capacity of Þscal policy and the labor markets
should be explored in this case, which are not as ßexible as the monetary policy.
Macroeconomic risks, on the other hand can increase the volatility of the macroeco-
nomic variables (increased inßation, budget and balance of payment deÞcits). Increase
in trade openness, capital inßows or productivity of the tradable sector as well as the
shift of government spending from tradable to non-tradable goods could be thought of
as a supply shock in the domestic economy. Lower interest rates and higher credibility
can cause an increase in the aggregate demand, higher inßation, real appreciation of
the national currency and higher balance of payment deÞcit. The increase of the trade
openness, which is a speciÞc feature of the transition countries, means that the exports
increase faster than the imports relative to the GDP. This can be viewed as a sup-
ply shock, which causes trade imbalance and requires appreciation of the REER. The
productivity growth, which is a characteristic feature of transition economies, also pro-
duces real appreciation by nominal appreciation or higher inßation. In the case of Þxed
exchange rate, the real appreciation is achieved by an appreciation in the non-traded
sector. This could be interpreted as a productivity shock, which increases the prices of
non-tradables due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. It can be viewed as a sustainable
equilibrium phenomenon, which does not require monetary policy response. However,
with sharp differences in the productivity performance among countries and Þxed ex-
change rates, inßation convergence cannot be achieved in the short-run. Therefore, the
key constraint for CECs is the setting up of the post  accession inßation targets18.
1.7 Theoretical Model
Here we set out the theoretical framework of our empirical analysis on a sample
of transition countries based on the model by Clarida and Gali (1994). The structure
is that of a two-country stochastic rational expectations open macro model in the
spirit of Dornbush (1976) and Obstfeld (1985). The structural shocks are identiÞed
using the approach pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (1989). We study the dynamic
responses to these shocks to three variables  real effective exchange rate, prices and
output. In particular we are interested in how much of the variances of the output,
real effective exchange rate and prices are explained by the three types of shocks. The
following exogenous variables are speciÞed in the model:(i) aggregate supply shocks;(ii)
real demand shocks and (iii) nominal shocks. The model presents short run results
18For a detailed discussion, see Devereux (2002)
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with sluggish price adjustment to supply, demand and monetary disturbances but also
includes long run macroeconomic equilibrium, when prices adjust fully to all shocks.
The framework of the model has been often used in literature therefore we will only
brießy discuss it.
In the standard IS equation (1.1) the demand for home output relative to foreign
output yd is increasing in both the demand shock dt to home absorption and the
real exchange rate st − pt. All variables are in logs (except the interest rate) and are
expressed in relative terms  home to foreign levels. The output is decreasing in the
real interest rate differential it −Et(pt+1 − pt):
yd = dt + η(st − pt)− σ(it − Et(pt+1 − pt)) (1.1)
The price setting (1.2a ) and the standard LM (1.2b) equations take the following
form:
pt = (1− θ)Et−1pet + θpet (1.2a)
mst − pt = yt − λit (1.2b)
where mt represents relative money supply shocks and shocks to relative demands
for real money balances. The equation (1.2a) is the average between the expected in
the past period market clearing price and the actually prevailing price in the current
period. In the case, when θ = 0, prices are Þxed and known one period in advance. In
contracts when is θ = 1, prices are ßexible and output is determined. The interest rate
parity is given by equation (1.3):
it = Et(st+1 − st) (1.3)
The solution of the model for the real exchange rate in the ßexible price equilibrium
is presented by the following three relations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6):
yet = y
s
t ; (1.4)
qet = (y
s
t − dt) /η + [η (η + σ)]−1 σγδt; (1.5)
pet = mt − yst + λ (1 + λ)−1 (η + σ)−1 γδt. (1.6)
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where the real exchange rate appreciates in response to demand shocks and depre-
ciates in response to supply disturbances. Here, the relative supply of output yst , the
real exchange rate qet and the relative national price levels p
e
t and relative moneymt are
driven by three shocks  to supply zt, demand δt, an money νt. The model speciÞes a
random walk stochastic process for the shocks to supply and money. This means that
shocks to supply and money are assumed to be only permanent. However, the relative
demand shock has a permanent, as well as a transitory component. A fraction γ of
any shock to the relative demand is expected to be reversed in the period t+ 1 (1.7).
yt = yt−1 + zt (1.7)
d = dt−1 + δt + γδt−1
mt = mt−1 + νt
The solution for the sluggish price equilibrium is given by the following equations
(1.8), (1.9) and (1.10):
yt = y
s
t + (η + σ) ν(1− θ)(νt − zt + αγδt); (1.8)
qt = q
e
t + ν(1− θ)(νt − zt + αγδt); (1.9)
pt = p
e
t + ν(1− θ)(νt − zt + αγδt. (1.10)
After a positive monetary or demand shock prices also increase but by less then in
the ßexible equilibrium (1.10). The same with an opposite sign is valid for the response
to a positive supply shock. Equation (1.9) shows that the real exchange rate under
sluggish prices is inßuenced by the monetary shocks, although this is not the case under
ßexible price equilibrium .
Clarida and Gali (1994) model has important long-run implications for the impact
of the disturbances. It shows that only supply disturbances can have long term effect
in the level of output. In addition, the real exchange rate is determined in the long
run only by aggregate supply and real demand disturbances. To sum up, the model
imposes three long-run restrictions: only supply shocks affect output in the long run,
while real exchange rate is affected by both supply and demand shocks. Hence, nominal
disturbances have no long run effect on output and real exchange rate, and the effect
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of real demand disturbances on the output in the long run is also zero. In the case
of sluggish prices, shocks to the money supply inßuence the real exchange rate, even
though they do not have an inßuence at the ßexible price level. Compared to the
ßexible price real exchange rate level, the sluggish price adjustment implies, that the
real effective exchange rate undershoots in response to real supply and demand shocks.
1.8 Structural VAR Analysis
This section presents an empirical analysis of the impact of external shocks on Þve
East European countries (Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Czech Republic)
with comparable available data and different nominal exchange rate regime19. The
sample of countries has been chosen according to the availability and reliability of
comparable economic time series data. On the basis of the presented above theoretical
model, we would expect real demand and nominal disturbances to have only short run
effect on the level of output and to be neutral in the long run. We also expect nominal
disturbances to induce transitory depreciation of the real exchange rate. Thus, we can
compare the theoretical assumptions from the model with the empirical estimations in
order to see if the results of the model are reasonable.
The VAR model sets the relationship between the past lagged values of all variables
and the current value of each variable. This allows the variation of each variable to
be explained by the past variation of the variable itself, as well as by the variation of
other variables included in the model (1.11).

y1t
y2t
...
ynt
 =
 A11(L) ... A1n(L)... . . . ...
An1(L) ... Ann(L)


y1t
y2t
...
ynt
+

C1
C2
...
Cn
+

²1t
²2t
...
²nt
 (1.11)
²nt denotes the disturbances or innovations, the Cn is the constant and ynt the n
number of variables included in the model. The model parameters Aij(L) include the
lag operator L is deÞned by (1.12)
Lkyt = yt−k (1.12)
The question we answer is how different monetary regimes in the Þve CECs interact
with external shocks and what are the sources of ßuctuations in the output, prices and
the real exchange rates 20. The economic theory cannot measure qualitatively the size
19Due to data restrictions Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia could not be included in the analysis.
20Following (Sims, 1980 ) we also modelled Cholesky decomposition with three dependent variables
 REER, the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves and the trade openness (export+import/GDP).The
results show that trade openness is the most important transmission channel for the sample transition
countries.
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of the transmission effects and cannot tell the speed of adjustment to the steady-state
position after shocks. We try to Þnd empirical evidence for the dynamic behavior of
the variables, the effects of which are delayed or persist over time. The response to
shocks is distributed through several periods.
There are some difficulties, however, to apply this method to the CECs, where the
sample size is relatively small. This inßuences on the dimensionality of the estimated
autoregressive model. Countries were chosen in order to represent a broad classiÞcation
of nominal regimes as currency board (ultimately Þxed), intermediate and ßoating21.
Under managed ßoating we understand a direct central bank targeting of the in-
terest rate on the domestic markets and the real exchange rate targeting on the forex
market. So far, such a regime was followed only by Hungary (unfortunately not strictly)
and by Slovenia during the researched period. We empirically estimate the effect of
the external shocks applying structural VAR (SVAR) approach on a cross sectional
data set with reported observations over time for the same countries. SVAR is a type
of VAR where economic theory is used to impose restrictions on the contemporaneous
correlations into orthogonal components. This is a reduced type model where identi-
Þcation restrictions moved by theoretical hypotheses are needed to derive meaningful
policy conclusions. The choice of econometric methodology is based on the power-
ful performance of SVAR in smaller systems. It has been an important tool in the
recent research following Doan, Litterman, Sims (1984), Blanchard and Quah (1989)
and Amisano and Giannini (1997). The beneÞt of employing SVAR is its ability to
describe the dynamics of the data that are not changing even in cases of interventions
- the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances contains all contemporaneous cor-
relations among the variables. In this case the lagged values for at least one year
should be included on the right-hand side of the regression. SVAR investigates how
shocks affect the dynamic behavior of the variables. It has also been widely used for
its predictive abilities in forecasting.
The structural form is given by (1.13):
A(IK − A1L−A2L2..− ApLp)yt=Bet (1.13)
A = (IK − A1L− A2L2..− ApLp)
yt = Ā
−1Bet
Ā−1B is the matrix of the long-run responses to the orthogonalized shocks. SVAR
methodology models the dynamic behavior of economic variables by considering several
21De jure classiÞcation of the IMF is as follows: Fixed - currency board, conventional peg, narrow
band, Intermediate  tightly managed, broad band, Float - managed ßoat and free ßoat.
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endogenous variables together each explained by its own lagged values, as well as the
lagged values of other variables. Sims (1986) considers six variables  GNP, Investment,
Price index, Money supply, Unemployment and Treasury rate. He ran VAR imposing
the above ordering in the cause and effect. Green (2000) views VAR model as a
reduced form of the dynamic structural model. There are two different strategies: the
traditional Blanchard and Quah (1989) methodology, as well as the more recent one,
based on sign restrictions (see Peersman 2002). The difference is that the latter does
not impose neither contemporaneous restrictions on the matrix nor shocks with long
run effects. As shown by Faust and Leeper (1997) in the absence of a theoretical model
such restrictions can be highly misleading. The structural errors are assumed to be
uncorrelated, such that the covariance matrix
X
= BBb4 of the resulting innovations
is diagonal.
We proceed to estimate SVAR in Þrst differences of the logs. In this three variable
case, the matrix C is a three by three matrix and if Y t = (∆y, q,∆p), where y, q and
p are the relative output, the REER and the relative prices with ε = (zt, δt, vt) where
the three shocks would be supply, demand and nominal shocks, then the restrictions
are C12 = C13 = C23 = 0 (1.14)
 ∆y∆q
∆p
 = ∞X
i=0
 c11 0 0c21 c22 0
c31 c32 c33
 ztδt
vt
 (1.14)
Here, we estimate a three dimensional structural VAR model (see Hamilton, 1994,
Green, 2003) with three dependent variables  Industrial production, Consumer Price
Index, real effective exchange rate (REER) (see Table 1.11 ) 22.
Germany is taken as a benchmark. Variables are in relative terms, since we are
analyzing the sources of exchange rate ßuctuations. Therefore, we take the logarithms
of the data, as well as the difference between the respective log variables and the
Germany log variables. This is also the way to capture asymmetries between the
benchmark country and the transition countries.
All series are expressed at constant prices and monthly sampled over the period
1994Jan  2003Dec (see Figures 2.1 and 2.4). Before proceeding, we have adjusted time
series seasonally and took out the missing values. The data were taken from Interna-
tional Financial Statistics and Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW).
An important issue is to determine the appropriate lag length to avoid model mis-
speciÞcation and/or waste in the degrees of freedom. In order to determine how many
lags to use, several selection criteria were applied as the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion (SIC/BIC/SBIC). The SVAR
model is speciÞed with 4 lags according to the results using Likelihood Ratio (LR) test.
Some of the series were found to be non- stationary for the Þve countries. According to
Phillips-Perron and Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests the data series were found
to be integrated in order one, i.e. I (1) at 5% signiÞcance level (see Table 1.12 ).
22It is constructed from the relative price variable and the real exchange rate variable
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We also perform Granger causality Wald test in order to see if the lagged values
of our independent variable have explanatory power in a regression of the dependent
variable on the lagged values of the dependent and independent variables. We Þnd
that only in the case of Poland the lagged values of the dependant variables have no
explanatory power (see Table 1.13 ).
1.8.1 Results
The simulation properties of the structural VAR model were assessed by conduct-
ing an impulse response analysis with respect to innovations in the relative output,
real exchange rate and the relative prices. According to the theory, the impulse re-
sponse of the output level on the supply shocks should be positive, and that of the
price level should be negative. Nominal and demand shocks should increase the level
of output and inßation. In addition nominal shocks should lead to depreciation of the
real exchange rate. In all countries there is a positive response in the relative output
as a result of supply shocks. In Poland however the response of the relative prices is
not properly identiÞed. The relative output in Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia
decreases in response to a positive nominal shock and the effect wears after time, as
expected (Table 1.14 ).
There is an initial increase in Poland and Slovenia. A positive demand shock leads
to decrease in the relative output in Czech Republic and Hungary. There is an initial
increase in Poland and Slovenia, followed by a decrease. In Estonia a positive demand
shock is not properly identiÞed for the relative output. A positive demand shock leads
to an initial appreciation of the real exchange rate in all transition countries and to
a slight permanent appreciation only in the Czech Republic. As a consequence of a
positive nominal shock, the real exchange rate depreciates in the short run in Poland,
Slovenia and Estonia but as expected returns to its initial level in the long run. There
is, however, initial appreciation in Hungary and the Czech Republic. On the other
hand, a positive nominal shock leads to an increase in the relative prices, and the effect
dies out in the long run. The nominal shock is not properly identiÞed for relative
output of the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia as the output decreases. However,
the effect disappears in the long run as expected. There is also unreasonable reaction
of the relative inßation due to nominal shock in Hungary and Slovenia  the inßation
decreases. An increase in the output in transition countries relative to Germany is
accompanied with a decline in the relative price level on Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia.
This response is consistent with the predictions of the Clarida - Gali model  a supply
shock drives output and prices in opposite direction. In the Czech Republic prices are
very weakly affected, and in Poland relative prices even increase. The real exchange
rate appreciates slightly in response to a supply shock in the Czech Republic and
Hungary without following long-run deprecation predicted by the model. We observe
long-run depreciation in Poland and Slovenia, which is consistent with the theoretical
model. The impulse response analysis demonstrates that the demand disturbances
have the strongest impact on the real exchange rate in transition countries. In contrast
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to the Czech Republic and Poland, nominal shocks appear to have a strong effect on
the REER in Hungary leading to a depreciation.
In our impulse response analysis we especially concentrate on Estonia, which fol-
lowed currency board regime until 1992. It is expected that the shock symmetry is
higher as Estonia follows fully Þxed exchange rate regime. Demand shocks lead to
long-run appreciation of the real exchange rate, compared to nominal shocks, which
are stabilized after 16 months.
Figure 1.4 plots the response to a positive real, demand, and monetary disturbance.
In the Czech Republic, Hungary and Estonia there is an increase in the output level
due to a demand shock. In all transition countries there is an initial real exchange rate
appreciation followed by a depreciation as predicted by the model.
Supply shocks explain most of the variability in relative output at all horizons,
while nominal shocks contribute to the variability up to Þve months. Almost all the
variation is in the real exchange rate is explained by demand shocks. Nominal shocks
do not account for any variation in the real exchange rate. As demand shocks could
possibly lead to higher appreciation, it is important for transition countries to target
the real exchange rate in order to maintain the competitiveness in their exports.
The Argentinean, Russian and Asian crises dummies were found to be signiÞcant at
10 % level for the price endogenous variable and the Argentinean dummy at 5% for the
output variable in Hungary. The Argentinean crisis dummy is signiÞcant at 5% level
for the real exchange rate equation in Poland. The Russian crisis dummy is signiÞcant
at 5% level for the output equation in Estonia. This result is consistent with previous
Þndings.
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have moved from a pegged to a more
ßexible exchange rate regime during the transition process, and have adopted inßation-
targeting monetary policies. We control for the shift in the exchange rate regime
and test to what extent the exchange rate regime matters for the long-run response
to shocks. As suggested by the empirical results inßation targeting comparatively
performs better than pegged monetary regimes, and reduces the shock asymmetry in
higher extent in the short term. This shows that the two corner solutions are preferable
only in the presence of very restrictive conditions and not in the presence of shocks.
Inßation targeting in some of the bigger transition countries like the Czech Republic
and Poland will help to meet the Maastricht criteria and to alleviate the main risks in
the pre EMU phase. In addition, the central banks of transition countries learn how
to operate in an inßation targeting regime, which will help them to play more active
and positive role at the ECB once they adopt the euro.
1.9 Bayesian VAR Analysis
Many of the previous studies on CEE transition countries have suffered of re-
stricted data sample, which did not allow presenting conclusive evidence. The main
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drawback of VAR is its inefficient parameterization. Additionally, the lagged values
yt−1.... yt−n , which appear as independent variables, tend to be highly correlated,
which, in turn, leads to biased parameter estimates. In order to have more efficient
and reliable estimates, and because of the relatively shortness of the transition period
we use Bayesian VAR (see Litterman 1979, Doan, Litterman and Sims, 1984). These
types of models also improve out-of sample performance. They combine historical data
with a-priori statistical and economic data. We would like to examine how Bayesian
VAR can be used to improve the estimates of the SVAR equations by incorporating
this prior information. Moreover Bayesian VAR is closely related to SVAR because it
introduces prior beliefs by excluding theoretical restrictions by not assigning weights
on any of the parameter values (e.g zero restrictions on certain coefficients) and con-
structing a structural model. Additionally it reduces the probability of overÞtting (so
called curse of dimensionality) due to the good performance with smaller number of
variables, short data sample and shorter lag length. The essentials of a Bayesian set-up
require specifying a probability model with a prior knowledge about the parameters,
which are unknown. In a Bayesian setting, data is combined with prior beliefs in order
to produce a posterior probability density function (pdf) for the parameters. The pdf
incorporates the uncertainty over the exact value of the parameters in the model as a
probability distribution of the parameter vector. If there is difference, the uncertainty
introduced by the pdf can be altered by the information in the data. The risk of over-
Þtting is reduced because such change can be due only to signal but not by a noise
contained in the data (Ciccarelli and Rebucci, 2003). Introducing prior information in
the VAR model will help to recover more precisely the shock transmission mechanism
in transition countries. The model is conditioned on the observed data. The value
of parameters is considered as random and unobservable. The "prior" information is
formalized as a density p(αi,Σ), where αi, Σ are the unknown parameters, introduced
explicitly into the model. Consider
yt = αxt + ²t t = 1, ...T (1.15)
where xt = (In
NWt−1) is n × nk,Wt−1 = (yb4t−1,....yb4t−p, zt)b4 is k × 1, and α =
vec(A1,A2...Ap) is nk × 1.Sample information is represented by a density, which can
be seen as a likelihood of α once the data y is observed. We know the the probabil-
ity density function (pdf),conditional on the information in the form of a likelihood
function
L(y | α,Σ) ∝ |Σ|−T/2 exp©0.5P(yt − αxt)b4Σ−1(yt − αxt)ª (1.16)
The real and prior information are combined by the means of the Bayes theorem
to obtain the joint posterior distribution (1.17) 23.
23Bayes theorem states that the probability that event A occurs, given that event B has occurred,
is equal to the probability that both A and B occur, divided by the probability of the occurrence of
B.
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P (α,Σ | y) = p (α,Σ)L (y | α,Σ)
p(y)
(1.17)
∝ p (α,Σ)L (y | α,Σ)
where L(y) =
R
p (α,Σ)L (y | α,Σ) dα is the predictive density, P (α,Σ | y) is the
posterior density. The posterior pdf is used to obtain the point estimate. A basic
assumption is to specify a parametric form for the unknown parameters. The value of
the model is found in the parameter distribution in the probabilistic terms (see Figures
1.11.1 and 1.11.5).
The BVAR literature deals with a prior distribution called Minnesota (Litterman)
prior, which has unit prior mean for the Þrst lag coefficient of each equation, whereas all
other parameters are given zero prior mean. The a priori beliefs are based on statistical
inference. The prior means and variances take the following form (1.18):
βiN (1, σ
2
βij
) and βiN (0, σ
2
βij
) (1.18)
where βidenotes the lagged dependent variable in each VAR equation and βj rep-
resents any other coefficient. The lagged dependent variables are believed to have high
explanatory power. All other coefficients are viewed as less important. Because of the
large number of parameters, the standard deviations are generated by a small set of
hyper parameters - κ, τ and a weighting matrix ψ(i,j).The idea is that not only the data,
but also the parameters have a distribution by assumption. The second moments of the
prior distribution are speciÞed according to a formula for κ, τ ,ψ, which are assumed
to be uncorrelated a priori (1.19).
σi,j = κψ(i,j)k
−τ
·
(σuj)
(σui)
¸
(1.19)
where κ is the standard deviation of the prior on the Þrst lag of the dependant
variable. The k−τ term is the lag decay function, where τ reßects the shrinkage of the
standard deviation with increasing lag length. The idea is that the more distant the
lags are, the less important is the variable for the model. The standard Minnesota
prior has values κ = 0.1, τ = 1.0 with the following weighting matrix (1.20):

α11 α12 ... α1k
α21 α22 α2k
...
αk1 αk2 .... αkk
 (1.20)
with weights on the diagonal α11...αkk equal to one and the rest equal to 0.5.
This approach reduces the dimensionality by imposing a probability distribution on
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the models coefficients, which reduces dimensionality and uncertainty. The impulse
response functions are similar to SVAR responses to supply, demand and nominal
shocks and support the robustness of the results (see Figure 1.5 ).
Bayesian VAR deserves further investigation. We would like to know, whether
we should apply different prior variance (uncertainty) for important and unimportant
variables as well as to variables with different lag length. This requires computation of
the Bayesian VAR with means other than the Minnesota prior mean, which we use in
this paper as a starting point for further investigations.
Further research questions in this Þeld will be to consider a prior based on the
theoretical model by Clarida and Gali (1994) and to estimate structural BVAR. In
addition we can compare the forecasting performance of the three types of models,
which can yield an answer if theoretically based prior works as good as statistically
based using Theil-U statistics . We would like also to calculate the correlation between
different exchange rate regimes, as well as to estimate the model with different lags for
different countries. In addition we would like to measure the persistence and the size
of the three types of shocks for transition countries.
1.10 Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that CECs continue to be exposed to asymmetric shocks.
Moving to a relatively Þxed regime in the pre-EMU phase is likely to increase the asym-
metries, as the theory suggests. After joining EMU CECs will be further restricted in
using an independent monetary policy as an adjustment mechanism to shocks. More-
over, the official proposal for decision making in EMU restricts the possibility of small
countries to promote speciÞc monetary policy measures. The Stability and Growth
Pact additionally conÞnes their counter cyclical policy through Þscal policy. The ev-
idence suggests that mobility is very low and will be restricted for several years after
joining EU, which reduces the available adjustment mechanisms. Finally, there is no
Þscal risk sharing among EMU countries. This suggests that entering in EMU, as soon
as possible after joining EU is not the optimal exchange rate strategy for some of the
acceding countries. Thus, a Big Bang is not an option. Moreover there is no one size
Þts all monetary policy. Fast entry in EMU is recommended only for countries with
inßation bias where Þxed peg is better in order to gain from importing low inßation
and credibility. However in order to gain real stabilization in countries without inßa-
tion problems, the exchange rate channel and external shocks adjustment shouldnt be
underestimated. The case-by-case approach is especially important, because acceding
countries differ in the nominal and real convergence already achieved. We estimate
structural long-run VAR in line with the economic theory. We Þnd empirical support
for the hypothesis that the higher the extent of convergence among candidates before
the entry, the lower are the costs of their participation in EMU as the volatility caused
by the shocks can be regarded as a major cost. These costs will be outweighed by the
long-term positive beneÞts of sharing a common currency.
ERM II and the Euro adoption 31
For transition countries joining the euro area is an intermediate step towards the
main goal, namely sustainable improvement of living standards within functioning
market economies. EMU is a result of long historical process. It combines both su-
pernatural and institutional framework. CEE acceding countries have the chance to
integrate and to share the underlying principles of these institutions. They will beneÞt
from the monetary credibility and trade openness of the union. However, they are also
expected to contribute to the euro area macroeconomic stability. Therefore costs for
the transition countries as well as for the current members should be minimized (ex
ante) before entry into EMU, which coincides with the official position of the governing
council of ECB.
Part II
Monetary Credibility of the Euro
zone Candidates
Chapter 2
An Application of a
Regime-Switching Autoregressive
Model
2.1 Introduction
Monetary policy credibility has been studied extensively in the last decides. This
research agenda was motivated by the monetary integration of the European Union.
In addition, the costs and beneÞts of alternative institutional arrangements for credi-
ble monetary policy were reassessed in view of several Þnancial crises in the emerging
markets 1. New analytical instruments have been applied to contribute to institu-
tional development and to extend the limits of our understanding of how institutional
structure affects policy outcomes2.
Despite the abundance of theoretical models, only few studies have explored em-
pirically the determination of output and inßation policy of countries on the run up to
the monetary union 3. The goal of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and empirical
link between the institutional arrangements (rules or monetary policy mechanisms) and
the credibility of the central banks in the period prior to the monetary union. To test
the consistency of monetary policy empirically and to Þnd if there is switching in the
monetary policy regime, we employ a Markov switching VAR model. Using monthly
1The term "institutions" here is understood as formal and informal monetary policy mechanisms,
rules or legal contracts with certain properties which central banks follow in order to ensure price
stability and sustainable output growth
2Traditional analysis in macroeconomics studies how private agents respond to the
choice of different policy rules and policy instruments. The new approach treats policy as endoge-
nous, by specifying the policy makers objectives and constraints by borrowing methods from the
game theory. The incentives of the policy maker affect economic policy choice and help in considering
which type of policies are credible and politically feasible (for details see Persson-Tabellini, 1994).
3None of these studies have attempted to explain the trade-off between inßation variability and
output variability in Eastern Europe in comparison to the core EMU countries.
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time series data from 1994 to 2004 we analyze the probability of changes in credibility
as a function of inßation, output gap and the interest rate differential. In particular,
we are interested if the CEE central banks have assigned changing weights to inßa-
tion and to output. The chapter analyzes regime switching and hence differences in
approaches between the central banks concerning the trade-off between stabilization
of output variability and inßation variability. To our knowledge, reaction functions
with coefficients has not be estimated for CEE countries yet. Therefore, our aim is
to estimate the consistency of the monetray policy in CEE countries and to compare
it with the results for the countries, belonging previously to the European Monetary
System (EMS). If central banks preferences and approaches differ, a stronger pressure
on ECB could be expected in the future, once the acceding countries join EMU.
In the real world, policy instruments are chosen sequentially, whereby the time-path
of the monetary policy is determined on the basis of different political and economic
preferences. Different members within the union, as well as the new entrants may have
different preferences about the conduct of the monetary policy. Where do the asym-
metries come from? First asymmetries in the preferences reßect the speciÞc economic
situations in different countries and might be due to higher inßation, unemployment or
asymmetric shocks (Kenen and Meade, 2003)4. Second, asymmetry can be linear, and
thus place more weight on output than inßation variability (empirically tested in the
chapter), or can be non-linear due to a bias of over caution in policy i.e stabilization
of the exchange rate over the target in greater extent than stabilization of inßation
below the target. Third, depending on the economic cycle, in expansionary phases the
central bank will react more to inßation than in recessions.
A widely accepted view is that central banks in the 1970s put higher weight on
stabilizing output, while inßation was led to increase. On the contrary, countries that
had experienced hyperinßation in the past, had created monetary institutions (e.g.
Deutsche Bundesbank) that target low inßation and react less to output variability.
This policy gradually led to the foundation of the European Monetary Union.
The chapter studies different stages of credibility, through which monetary institu-
tions go through, as the policy is perceived to be credible in some periods and not in
others. We analyze the appropriate institutional arrangements, which commit central
banks to welfare increasing behavior. A set of credible arrangements is shown to reduce
the costs related to future collective decisions in a monetary union. By emphasizing the
role of the central banks and the role of the economic structure, the chapter provides
policy recommendations on the design of the monetary institutions in transition coun-
tries. It is organized as follows: In section 2.2 we discuss the relevant literature on the
monetary policy credibility. Section 2.3 empirically analyzes credibility of monetary
policy using Markov regime switching VAR model. Section 2.4 outlines the key re-
sults of the model with respect to the preferences and the optimal institutional choice.
4Once transition economies join the monetary union, the symmetric shocks will be dealt with using
a union-wide monetary policy. Yet, this might be inefficient to respond to idiosyncratic shocks, or
even to the aggregate shocks because of their relatively different impact. In addition, the ongoing
structural reforms also require using the monetary and Þscal policy as stabilization tools. Therefore,
the more the economy embarks on structural reforms; the more it is resilient to asymmetric shocks.
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Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Existing Theoretical Literature
2.2.1 Models of Credibility
Economic theory has, so far, not agreed upon a single deÞnition of credibility.
Drazen and Masson (1993) deÞne it as the expectation that the announced policy
(both desired and within policymakers ability) will be carried out in the future5. Faust
and Svensson (2001) measure credibility as "the negative of the absolute value of the
deviation of the inßation expectations from zero". In the present context, credibility
is deÞned as the capacity of the policymakers to announce a policy, which is trusted
by the private agents, who base their current behavior on rational expectations6. The
credibility problem arises from the sequential nature of the policy-making as the policy
maker has incentives to deviate from the announced policy rule7. That is because mon-
etary arrangements cannot be made binding, and the optimal conditions can change
depending on the state of the world8. During the post war period, monetary authorities
in many countries searched for an optimal balance between inßation and unemploy-
ment. Some succeeded in achieving lower inßation, but very often at the expense of
higher short-term unemployment. Economic literature attributes these costs to the
lack of credibility. In addition, instead of pre committing to certain monetary targets,
monetary authorities gradually started using the interest rate as a policy instrument
in a discretionary manner. This made the link between the monetary growth and the
inßation unpredictable and resulted in higher inßation rates (for details see Goodhart
,1993). The idea to separate legal institutions and create an autonomous central bank,
whose main objective is to achieve price stability, has been seen theoretically as a solu-
tion to the credibility problem. The procedure is to assign to the central bank a certain
loss function for minimization designed to bring the equilibrium under discretion closer
to the optimal equilibrium under commitment 9.
The importance of credibility was Þrst put forward by Kydland and Prescott (1977)
5The authors distinguish between the toughness of a policy and the credibility of a policy maker.
They assume that the policy maker type changes through time due to "external circumstances".
Though policies may make devaluation more likely if there is persistent effect on output and employ-
ment. Blinder (1999) deÞnes credibility as "deeds are expected to match the words".
6This study measures credibility as the negative of the absolute value of the deviation of the
inßation expectations from zero, see Cuckierman and Meltzer (1986) who call it "average credibility
of announcements".
7The credibility problem has been profoundly studied in the monetary theory literature. Neverthe-
less, its basic arguments are crucial for the institutional arrangements and the current study cannot
move on without mentioning them.
8Policy rules can always be abandoned or suspended, and the central banker Þred.
9The folk theorem states that there is a multiple equilibrium in a repeated game with perfect
information. Different institutional arrangements contribute to choosing unique equilibrium which
improves upon the discretionary solution.
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in a seminal political economy model10. Their key result is that monetary policy should
be based on rules rather than discretion, because discretion may result in the so called
inßation bias" (when the unconditional mean of inßation exceeds the target inßation).
Barro and Gordon (1983) extended the framework to a non-Markov trigger strategy
equilibrium to explain the stagnation experienced by many countries in 1970s. They
modeled the optimal central banking, which involves a trade-off between credibility and
ßexibility and introduced the dynamic-inconsistency problem as an explanation of the
positive inßation rates. Barro-Gordon model emphasizes the need for credible commit-
ment, which will minimize the incentive for surprise inßation. Rogoffs (1999) extended
model analyzes the preferences of the central banker, which may differ from those of
the government. The objective function has quadratic form with linear constraints:
Lt =
1
2
£
(1 + ²) (πt − π∗)2 + χ(yt − y∗2
¤
(2.1)
and the optimal preferences are given by
π = π∗ +
χ
1 + ²
y∗ − χ
1 + ²+ χ
µt (2.2)
where o < ² <∞. A larger weight (relative to societys loss function) is assigned
to inßation stabilization, because it is always optimal for the society to appoint a
conservative central banker. Rogoffs equilibrium is to appoint a central banker, who
has stronger low inßation preferences. Later Walsh (1995) challenged this result by
modeling a simple optimal contract between the central bank (as an agent) and the
government (as a principle) where the novelty is that the agent delegates power to a
central banker with the same preferences. The last is being punished if the inßation
exceeds the target (or awarded in the opposite case). He changed the central bankers
loss function to (2.3):
V =
1
2
£
(1 + ²) (πt − π∗)2 + χ(yt − y∗)2
¤
+ χy∗πt (2.3)
where χy∗πt is a is a transfer which eliminates the inßationary bias and also enters
the central bankers utility function. The optimal policy rule is given by (2.4)
πt = π
∗ − χ
1 + χ
µt (2.4)
The model achieves Þrst best solution: optimal output stabilization and no inßa-
tion bias. Svensson (1997) proposed another optimal solution by assigning an explicit
inßation target to the central banker
10Nobel laureates for 2004
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πb = π∗ − χy∗ (2.5)
which offsets the inßationary bias. The central banks loss function is given by (2.6) :
Lt =
1
2
£
(πt − πb)2 + χ(yt − y∗)2
¤
(2.6)
Svensson Þnds, that it is possible to eliminate the inßation bias, without losing
ßexibility and stabilization. His proposal for Þrst-best institutional arrangement is a
central bank with both an inßation target and an output target equal to the potential
output rate, rather than exceeding it.
A Þnal argument in the discussion is that establishing a targeting rule by higher
inßation country, can be viewed as an attempt to import credibility. In the view of
this, pegging to euro is used to transfer credibility from union to non-union countries.
Target zone exchange rate systems or currency pegs can be seen as enforcing credibility
on behalf of the union central bank. The quadratic speciÞcation of the loss function
implies that an equal weight is placed on the positive and negative deviations of inßation
and output from the target. However, in contrast to the clear analytical tractability of
such model, this may not be the case in practice. Such a speciÞcation is questionable,
since it would imply that the central bank will be willing to accept any increase in
output variance for a marginal decrease in inßation. There are losses of different order
between positive and negative deviations of the state variable. As a consequence policy
makers respond more aggressively to either inßation or output deviations 11.
A new strand of the literature (Nobay and Peel, 1998 and Ruge-Murcia, 2001)
studies central bank preferences by Linex loss function in a Bayesian context assuming
that the preferences are asymmetric. A deßationary bias emerges due to a stronger
response to negative output (or positive inßation) deviations from the target. This
suggests a non-quadratic form for the loss function, with the quadratic form being a
special case (2.7):
L =
eα(π−π
∗) − α (π − π∗)− 1
α2
+ φ
eb(y−y
∗) − b(y − y∗)− 1
b2
(2.7)
They deliver the non-conventional results that committed policy maker is not un-
ambiguously preferred to his discretionary counterpart. Ruge-Murcia ( 2001) Þnds that
the central banks in UK, Sweden and Canada weight more heavily positive deviations
of inßation from the target than negative one.
The behavior of the central bank raises the issue of the publics uncertainty in
relation to the "type" of central bank (see, Backus and DriÞll 1985; Ball,1995).The
11Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Þnd that people tend to place more weight on future losses than
on prospective gains in the decision process under uncertainty.
Measuring credibility of the Euro zone candidates 38
type is related to the preferences between inßation and output, or to the ability to
commit to rules. The type can be classiÞed as a "hawkish" with higher weight on
inßation relative to the output or "dovish" with higher weight on output.The central
banks reaction function or "rule" describes its behavior and allows to analyze what
are the implicit goals and the importance it assigns to different economic indicators.
If the central bank (government) has a poor reputation, and her "self-perceived" type
is not believed by the public, a credibility problem may arise.
2.2.2 Institutions and Credibility
Credibility of the central bank policy requires combination of several institutional
features closely related to the central banks independence and accountability (op-
erational targets, appointment procedures, duration of governors mandate, incentive
schemes of the executives, structural reorganizations of supervisory systems, etc). The
set of institutional arrangements should be constructed in a way to reduce the costs of
the commitment problem. The main goal is to establish a central bank, which is both
credible, yields low inßation and maintains enough ßexibility to respond to shocks in
order to be able to pursue socially optimal monetary policy. The academic debate so
far could not reach a unanimous conclusion about an optimal institutional mechanism
to enhance credibility. There are two problems related to the theory of incomplete
contracts - the inability to enforce commitment and the inability to predict the future
state of the world (i.e. to know what will be optimal in the future). The role of the
institutions, therefore, is to increase the costs of abandoning the pre-announced policy
and to allow a leeway for "constrained discretion", by updating the policy goals.
The Þrst of three main monetary policy institutional arrangements is related to
the delegation to a conservative central banker with less weight on the output target.
This incorporates a reputation cost as in the basic repeated game version of the Barro-
Gordon model. The second option is to arrange institutional reforms in the form of
explicit contracts between the central bank and the government. One possibility is the
government to appoint an independent central banker who weighs inßation stabilization
heavily12. Another possibility is to appoint a central banker with a contract includ-
ing compensation penalty scheme, which raises the marginal costs of inßation. The
third option is to establish targeting rules on the macroeconomic variables, which limit
central bankers desire to inßate. Her credibility is judged by the ability to meet the
target. Rules deÞned over some intermediate targets, such as the exchange rates, seem
to be enforced in practice more strictly, than rules for other intermediate targets13.
12Using the standard terminology the central banker are stylized being hawk" or dove" type
(Siebert and Mihov, 2004), wet" or dry" type (see among others Backus and DriÞl(1985), Mus-
catelli (1998)) or "strong" and "weak", Ball (1995) , etc. The classiÞcation is done on the basis of
inßation and output (unemployment) stabilization.
13A problem that follows from the folk theorem is that there is no unique equilibrium between com-
mitment and discretion. Credible monetary rules can, however, help to Þnd an optimal solution. Thus,
reputation is essential, given that there is incomplete information and the central banks preferences
are not directly observable.
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A general conclusion is that by reducing principles interference, central banks be-
come more independent, private sector better estimates the preferences and hence the
policy is more credible. The most of the work, so far, has been concentrated on the link
between the central bank independence and the inßation rates in different countries.
In general, there is negative correlation between central bank independence and the
average inßation rates. SigniÞcant research has focused on developing escape clause
models (among others Flood and Isard 1989, Obstfeld, 1991). Lohmann (1992) showed
that certain institutional settings can lead to strong welfare increasing effects. She pro-
posed that a conservative central banker should run monetary policy in normal times.
In case of large shocks, the government might dominate the central bank if the latter
does not stabilize inßation and output. This possibility enters into the societys loss
function as a strictly positive and Þnite cost:
Lt =
1
2
h¡
πt − πb
¢2
+ χ(yt − y∗)2
i
+ δc (2.8)
with δ being a binary variable taking values 1or 0. McCallum (1995) however,
doubts that punishing the central bank and closely monitoring it by the government
solves the dynamic inconsistency problem. Rather, it reallocates the problem from the
central bank to the government. Lohmanns model is interesting from institutional
point of view because it requires unlimited credibility granted by the private agents to
the government, and not to the institutions set by the government14.Also the inßation
targeting can be a type of an optimal contract. Another problem, related to the
monetary policy rules is that they cannot take into account the unexpected shocks,
which are one of the main reasons for inßation .
Committing central bankers to low inßation targets (and thus removing the inßation
bias) reduces their ability to respond to stochastic shocks. Hence, there is a trade off
between short-term credibility beneÞts, based on commitment to rules and limited
discretion, and the long-term costs, which may arise if rules are not optimal anymore
and discretion is required. This trade off is related to uncertainty and has an impact
on which instruments are chosen, and how actively they are being used. Goodhart
(1993) points another key aspect of the principle-agent relations:
...the Governments have never been willing to delegate to their Central Banks
the right to take the strategic decisions on the exchange rate regime [...] Cen-
tral banks have one major instrument, their ability to vary interest rates. As a
generality this cannot be used to hit two objectives simultaneously, e.g. an exter-
nal objective for the exchange rate and an external objective for price stability,
except by a ßuke."
It is well accepted, that Þnancial markets have multiple equilibria, and economy
passes through different levels of credibility (or devaluation expectation) (see also Jeane
14Such solution may lead to multiple equilibria and thus be destabilizing (see Obstfeld, 1991)
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and Masson, 2000). Devaluation expectations shifts are exogenously driven by uncer-
tainty (i.e. sunspots) and play an important role in generating cyclical ßuctuations.
This means that with time monetary rules can become sub-optimal because incen-
tives change, and the expected policy rules cannot update through learning and past
experience. Hence, there is clear inconsistency between on the one hand optimizing
monetary policy through learning, which requires ßexibility, and on the other hand
gaining credibility through commitment by Þxed rules.
Persson and Tabelini (1993) discuss a speciÞc problem related to the second best
institutional design", namely a central bank governed by legislative rules, or by targets
set up by the government. They propose two types of institutions that may help to
resolve the incentives problem a) legislative approach - to create by law an independent
central bank, (an example is the Deutsche Bundesbank) and b) targeting approach -
imposes explicit inßation targeting. They conclude that building credible monetary
policy institutions is a slow process, because credibility and reputation require clear
objectives and long term commitment. Such commitment needs sufficient reputation
as part of the institutional structure of the central bank.
Further theoretical developments concentrate on a comparison between backward-
and forward-looking rules, as well as rules with interest rate smoothing. The most
popular simple rule, due to Taylor (1993), was designed for a closed developed economy,
without taking into account the exchange rate transmission mechanism (2.9).
i = r + π∗t + β(πt − π∗t ) + α(yt − y∗t ) (2.9)
A Taylor rule is an instrument rule for setting the interest rate, as a function of
inßation and output gap. It assumes that the central bank reacts to the deviation of
inßation and output from the target. It describes how short-term interest rates could
be adjusted in a systematic way to keep inßation close to the target. The original
Taylor rule comprised a feedback parameter of 1.5 on inßation and 0.5 on the output
gap. The conclusions of the mainstream economic literature is that the Taylor rule
has characterized very well the behavior of the FED and the other central banks in
the developed countries. The empirical estimations proved to be robust and conformed
that in most of the time the inßation or output gap deviations from the target level were
stabilized. The main open economy alternatives are a rule by Ball (1999), based on a
Monetary Conditions (MCI) and the Monetary Financial Conditions Index (MFCI).
2.2.3 Monetary Policy Rules in Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries
The literature on monetary policy rules has grown substantially in the last two
decades resulting in vast volume of papers. The research on monetary policy rules in
emerging markets and transition countries, compared to developed countries, however
is parsimonious. The main reasons are that on the one hand very little research has
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been done on monetary policy rules in transition countries and on the other hand
Þndings often changed from study to study, depending on the data, the time period
and the model speciÞcation. Therefore there is not agreement between researchers on
the estimation of the monetary policy rules in transition countries. Some of the reasons
for the controversy in these studies are as following: low level of maturity of the Þnancial
markets; pegged exchange rate strategies adopted by most of the transition countries;
the process of transition itself related to changes in the economy as a whole and in
the monetary policy in particular; model speciÞcation difficulties and data problems.
Nevertheless the recent research conÞrmed that in practice central banks in transition
countries do follow some sort of Þxed rules in response to macroeconomic shocks.
Instead of assigning coefficients, the current theoretical models estimate weights for
the reaction function. Estimating monetary rules is very important for economies,
which have often faced high inßation and large exchange rate volatility. In the light
of the future euro adoption, countries have simultaneously to fulÞl all the convergence
criteria and to meet all the challenges related to participation in the ERM II. The
Þrst question to address for transition countries is whether the central bank follows
a contemporaneous (or an outcome-based) policy rule or whether the central bank
follows a forward-looking (or a forecast-based) policy rule. When the central bank
uses a contemporaneous policy rule, there is a problem of data uncertainty. Ex-post
data which is typically used in econometric estimations is often revised several times
so that it does not reßect the information at the time when the interest rates are set.
Real-time data solves this problem. Orphanides (2001) Þnds that traditional exchange
rate models consistently perform better using original release data, than using revised
data. Unfortunately, it is rarely available as time series, and therefore it has to be
constructed from the press releases of the statistical offices.
The other main open economy alternatives, (for example, the rule by Ball (1999)
based on a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI)), may perform poorly in the face of
speciÞc types of exchange rate shocks and thus cannot offer guidance for the day-
to-day conduct of monetary policy. Therefore at present we only have a choice of
ignoring the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission (Taylor rule) or including
it in an ad hoc way that may not always prove right (MCI-based rules) for transition
economies. Based on the above considerations and on the behavior of the central
banks in the advanced countries, we assume that preferences of the CEE central banks
are dependent on the likelihood of a recession. If the economy is in an expansionary
phase, the central bank will react more to inßationary pressure, than in recession. The
minimization of the loss function leads to two-state Taylor rule.
L(π, y) =
½
α(π − π∗) + (1− α)(y − y∗)
β(π − π∗) + (1− β)(y − y∗)
¾
(2.10)
where in the case of α > β, the state variable St which follows a Markov process is
in expansion and alternatively in the case of (1− α) < (1− β) the state variable St is
in recession. This is the base speciÞcation of the Markov-switching model, where one
regime is anti-inßationary, while the other one allowes higher weights on the output
Measuring credibility of the Euro zone candidates 42
stabilization and where the switching between regimes occurs with certain probability
and have certain persistence.
2.3 Markov Regime-Switching VAR Model
Macroeconomic time series often undergo signiÞcant changes and breaks in their
behavior, due to Þnancial crises or government switches (Hamilton 1989, Sims and Zha
2004), which is the case in transition countries. The hypothesis, that shocks to the
economy have larger effects during different regimes, implies that aggregates should be
modeled in a non-linear framework. Moreover, theoretical models based on asymmetric
central bank preferences imply a time varying reaction of monetary authorities to
economic variables. Therefore, Markov regime switching VAR (MS-VAR) approach
is an adequate and consistent instrument to assess the transition probabilities of the
information variables . The model is useful for its ßexibility, as well as in describing
variables that follow different time series process over different sub samples 15 This class
of models provides possibility to estimate VARmodels with changes in the regime. Such
changes are also predominant for the Þnancial data where Markov-switching models
capture the volatility dynamics (Haas, Mittnik and Paolella, 2004). In a speciÞcation,
subject to changes in the regime, the parameters θ of VAR can vary through time. But
the process st may be time invariant depending on the unobservable regime variable.
If m ∈ {1, ...M} is the number of regimes, then the pdf of the time series vector yt is
given by:
p(yt | Yt−1,st) =

f(yt | Yt−1,θ1) if st = 1
...
f(yt | Yt−1,θM) if st =M
¯̄̄̄
¯̄̄ (2.11)
where θm is the VAR parameter vector and Yt−1 are the observations. The time
series vector yt is generated by the vector autoregressive process of order p given by:
E [yt | Yt−1,st] = ν(st) +
pX
j=1
Aj(st)yt−j (2.12)
where the innovation ut = yt −E [yt | Yt−1,st] is assumed to follow a Guassian pro-
cess ut ∼ NID(0,
P
(st)). The change in the regime itself can be regarded as a random
variable (see Hamilton, 2003). MS-VAR allows to test whether macroeconomic vari-
ables affect the transition between different levels of credibility over different time series
15MS-VAR belongs to class of models that transfer a non-linear data generating process to be linear
in each regime. Detailed studies on MS-VAR include also Krolzig (1997), and Clements and Krolzig
(2002,2003).
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sub-samples. Their path depends on unobserved stochastic state variables, thereby en-
abling the unobserved component to follow a Markov chain. Another advantage is that
speciÞcation co-movements between macro aggregates can be better estimated by us-
ing MS-VAR. Jeane and Masson (2000) argue that in sunspot equilibrium the economy
passes through different states of devaluation expectations, each having own threshold
where the currency crisis could be foreseen. Transition across the devaluation expecta-
tions is governed by an unobserved state variable St which follows Þrst order Markov
process. The general speciÞcation takes form:
yt = ν(st) +A1(st)yt−1 + ...+Ap(st)yt−p + ut(st) (2.13)
which can be reformulated as the mean adjusted form of a VAR model
∆yt − µ(st) = A1 [∆yt−1 − µ(st−1)] +A2 [∆yt−2 − µ(st−2)] ... (2.14)
.+Ap [∆yt−p − µ(st−p)] +
X
u(st)
where yt = (y1t...ynt) is n dimensional times series vector, µ is the regime dependent
vector of intercepts µ = (Ik −
pX
j=1
Aj)
−1, A1..p are matrices with autoregressive param-
eters, s is the state variable which controls the switching between different states and
u is the white noise process with N [0,
X
(st)]
16. The conditional mean µ(st) switches
between the two states:
µ(st) =
½
µ1 > 0, st = 1
µ2 ≤ 0, st = 2
¾
(2.15)
where state 1 is the high credibility (low volatility) state and the state 2 is the
low credibility (high volatility) state. Thus, we take into consideration that the im-
pact of the output gap and the inßation on the monetary policy preferences is regime
dependent. The transition probability pij that the current regime st depends only
on the regime one period ago and event i will be followed by event j is given by
P {st = j/st−1 = i, st−2 = k..., yt−1, yt−2....} = P {st = j/st−1 = i} = pij . This is an ex-
ample of a Markov chain where the probability P a random variable s to be equal to
some particular value j depends on the most recent past value st−1. The same presented
in a transition matrix form
16The dynamic response of the regime shift in the intercept term is equivalent to a shock in the
white noise process ut
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P =

p11 p21 ... pN1
p12 p22 ... pN2
... ... ... ...
p1N ... ... pNN
 (2.16)
with
NP
j=1
pij = 1 where i = 1, 2....N and 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1.
The process of regime generating is assumed to be a two state hidden Markov chain
where p12 is the probability to switch from high credibility state to low credibility
state and p21 is the probability to switch to high credibility state. If the macroeco-
nomic variables are subject to shifts in the regime, the mean and other variables will
vary with the state St. Maximum likelihood estimation of the model is based on the
Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm proposed by Hamilton (1989), which Þrst
estimates smoothed probabilities of the unobserved state, and then conditional regime
probabilities are replaced with the smoothed probabilities. This technique (referred
to as expectation and maximization step) produces by iteration new joint distribution
that increases the probability of the observed data.
This section employs the heteroscedastic bivariate Markov switching VAR (MSMH
(2)-VAR(3)) model17. We test the credibility of monetary policy of central banks
in eight Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Romania) for the period 1994 - 2004. The paper
follows the methodology and is consistent with the work by Dahlquist and Gray (2000)
and Mouratidis (2003). These studies investigate the probability to switch across two
regimes of low and high credibility during the EMS period as a function of certain
macroeconomic variables - interest rate differentials, exchange rate in a band, output
gap variability and inßation variability. Based on their methodology, we evaluate the
preferences of the central banks in the euro area candidate countries over the conduct
of monetary policy. Chosen monetary policy concerns stabilization of the output-gap
variability, or of the inßation variability in the period before joining a monetary union.
The results derived in the paper allow a comparison of the preferences of the EMS
central banks on the basis of the results, reported by Mouratidis (2003). Asymmetry
will imply that transition countries have not been integrated economically. If this is so,
the preferences of the median voter may not be captured by the ECB regarding the for-
mulation of the monetary policy. This will imply pressures for different voting schemes
once these countries become fully ßedged members of the euro area.
2.3.1 Data
The study uses the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The three aggre-
gated series are industrial production (IP), taken from line 66, consumer prices index
17The Þrst bivariate MS-VAR model was analyzed by Phillips (1991). Filardo and Gordon (1994)
have extended it to the three-variety case using leading indicators to predict the turning points.
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(CPI), line 64 and money market rates (IR), line 66b for the eight Eastern European
countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia
and Slovenia) and Germany . The choice of Germany is justiÞed by the fact that it
was the leading country in the EMS and other members were following its monetary
and exchange rate policy. The data consists of monthly observations and covers the
period from 1994:1 to 2004:6 (see Table 2.1 )
IP, CPI, IR are seasonally adjusted by the additive moving average method. The
annualized inßation and the output-gap are measured using the twelve order difference
(IP-IP12)/IP12 and (CPI-CPI12)/CPI12. These measures are used mainly because cen-
tral banks concentrate on the annual inßation rate. The output gap series have been
measured assuming a random walk plus drift process. In order to achieve stationary
we take the natural logarithm of the time series. We also experimented with a model
with one lag, but we found that the value of the likelihood function increases when
three lags are used. Therefore, the preferred bivariate model is with three lags and two
regimes. Moreover, the non-linear speciÞcation of the bivariate VAR yields a higher
maximum likelihood function for each sample country than the linear VAR does. It
measures the goodness of Þt for the maximum likelihood estimator, which represents
the value of the models parameters most likely to have been observed. The normal
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test does not apply here, because of the existence of nuisance
parameters. The LR test statistics is compared to where the degrees of freedom r and n
are the nuisance parameters. In all sample countries, the LR test statistic exceeds the
critical value, thus the null hypothesis of linearity has been rejected at high signiÞcance
levels. As a result, the non-linear regime switching speciÞcation is more appropriate
compared to the conventional linear approach.
The speciÞcation of the two state Markov switching model is given as an extension
to a vector autoregression in the following form:
yt = ν +A11.iyt−1 + σiut with yt =
·
iH iG
xt
¸
(2.17)
where yt and xt denote either inßation variability or output variability. Equation
(2.18 ) also can be re-written in a matrix form as:
· ¡
iH − iG¢
t
xt
¸
=
·
α11.i α12.i
α21.i α22.i
¸ · ¡
iH − iG¢
t−1
xt−1
¸
+
·
σ11.i σ12.i
σ21.i σ22.i
¸
ut (2.18)
where ut NID(0, In), σit denotes the square root of the variance-covariance matrix
in regime i = 1, 2...n, Api is the (m × m) matrix of autoregressive coefficients with
p = 1, 2..j lags and iH is the interest rate at the home country and iG is the interest
rate in Germany.
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2.3.2 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of the Markov switching model speciÞcation MSM
(2)-BVAR(3) . We test the probability to switch between regimes as a function of
some macroeconomic variables. We study the variability of the interest rate differen-
tials between each country and Germany as the benchmark case 18. The size of the
differentials reßects the risk premium for the domestic central bank to deviate from the
target interest rate. It also reveals the central banks preferences concerning growth
and inßation stabilization. Asymmetries in the preferences are due to different weights
on the inßation and output gap in the national welfare function, as well as to struc-
tural differences and country speciÞc shocks. By assumption, analyzed countries follow
two different regimes of credibility throughout the estimated period - high credibility
regime and low credibility regime, where high credibility regime is characterized by ex-
pansion. The probability of regime switching is a function of inßation and output gap.
Also the operability of transition between regimes and inßation variability/output-gap
variability depends on the current regime. In the estimation, we use the variables in
the transition probability, Þrst to test whether they are signiÞcant, and second to inves-
tigate the preferences of the central bank regarding the stabilization of the output-gap
variability or the inßation variability.
High credibility regime: In the case of signiÞcant inßation variability, interest rate
differentials will be high and monetary authorities will react to stabilize inßation19.
If output gap variability is stronger, then monetary authorities will stabilize output.
The credibility depends not only on the signiÞcance of these variables in the transition
probabilities, but also on their signs. If both variabilities are signiÞcant with the same
sign, we compare the size of the coefficients in order to derive conclusions regarding the
central banks preferences. When the interest rate differential is in the high credible
regime, then an increase of inßation variability reduces the credibility of monetary
authorities, and therefore increases the probability to switch to a low credible regime.
A negative coefficient implies that with high variability of inßation, the transition
probability decreases20.
Low credibility regime: The low credibility regime is associated with recession due to
high inßation expectations. The variability is high and the central bank has incentives
to deviate from the common monetary policy. The output gap can be expected to be
signiÞcantly inßuencing interest rate differentials. In this case, high inßation variability,
reduces the probability to switch to high credibility regime. If output is signiÞcant,
monetary authorities put more emphasis on output stabilization, and the opposite is
18According to Drazen and Masson (1995) interest rate differentials provide a good proxy for the
expected devaluation and for the lack of credibility of Þxed parities.
19Small output variability in the high credibility regime might be due to the absence of shocks.
In expansion, inßation expectations are low (as well as incentives to inßate), which results in higher
economic growth.
20Clarida at al (1999) explains that such states are a consequence of high credibility. The central
bank is able to convince the agents that in the case of supply shocks inßation will not increase. This
reduces inßation expectations, thus lowering the probability to switch between regimes.
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true if inßation is signiÞcant. If both are signiÞcant, central bank preferences depend
on the relative size of the coefficients.
Table 2.2 presents equations estimated with respect to the output gap and the
interest rate differential. It combines statements about the durability of a regime for a
certain outcome at date t with information on its probability. The reported transition
matrices and the regime duration make it clear that the credibility regimes in transition
countries are characterized by different degrees of persistence. A general observation is
that the high credibility state has lasted much longer for almost all transition countries,
concerning the output gap. This indicates that the central European countries have
put more emphasis on the objective of stable output from its trend than inßation from
its target. Notable exceptions are Romania and Croatia, where the low credibility
state lasted longer during the period 1994-2004. For Romania and Croatia the output
gap variability is signiÞcant in all states. The results show that the probability to
stay in the high credibility state was the highest for Slovenia. Romania has the lowest
probability to switch from the high credibility state to the low credibility state, and the
highest probability to stay in the low credibility state. Romania had a high probability
to switch from high to low credibility state. The low transition probability of Croatia
suggests that there were no signiÞcant changes of the regime. Moreover, there are
differences between countries that are already EUmembers and the candidate countries
- Romania and Croatia in the last months before and after EU accession.
Table 2.3 shows the equations estimated with respect to the inßation and the in-
terest rate differential. In Hungary the output gap is signiÞcant, but not the inßation
in the high credibility state. This is probably due to the high inßation experienced by
Hungary during the researched period, and the speculative pressure on the Hungarian
forex market, which decreased the transparency and accountability. Poland and Hun-
gary have the highest probability to stay in the low credibility state. In the case of
Romania, inßation has a signiÞcant effect on the interest rate differentials while the
output gap was not signiÞcant. An important characteristic of the bivariate speciÞca-
tion is that relative to the univariate speciÞcation it captures the temporal persistency
for the low credibility state stronger. Transition probabilities point out an expected
duration of 15.12 months for the high credibility state and 2.97 months for the low
credibility state in Germany. The results show that Germany enjoyed high credibility
during the researched period. At such circumstances, the central bank can stabilize
inßation without increasing output variability. Expected durations for Romania are
1.39 months for the high credibility state and 10.16 months for the low credibility state.
Figure 2.1 gives graphical representation of the smoothed and Þltered probabilities of
the high and low credibility regimes for industrial production (IP) and interest rate
differential (IR) in different countries.
Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland display highly persistent upswings in the
high credibility state concerning output-gap stabilization. Romania displays persis-
tent downswings in the low credibility regime. We also have estimated the Þt for the
MSMH(2)-VAR(3) model with Þltered and smoothed probabilities of the high credi-
bility regime (regime 1) and the low credibility regime (regime 2) for inßation (CPI)
and interest rate differential (IR) in various countries. The results show that smoothed
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probabilities determine longer periods with recession for Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.
It can be seen that most of the transition countries did not aim to stabilize inßation
during the researched period.
A conclusion could be made that the monetary policy in transition countries was
more directed to correct deviations of the output from its trend than inßation from its
target.High credibility regimes lasted longer for almost all CEE countries with respect
to the output gap than with respect to inßation. Also calculated smoothed probabilities
for the high and low credibility regimes for inßation reveal that most of the transition
countries did not aim at stabilizing inßation.
The results show that the monetary policy in CEE was not in line with the objective
of price stability followed by ECB. Our Þndings can be compared with those reported
by Mouratidis (2003) for eight EMS countries. His Þndings suggest that monetary
authorities in all former EMS and currently Euro zone countries put more weight
on the deviation of inßation from its target, than on the output gap. Therefore, it is
arguable to what extent transition countries will be able to follow the ECB objective of
price stability. The need for further structural reforms in the new EU members can put
strong pressure on the ECB, once they join the monetary union, thereby undermining
its credibility. Economic costs are likely to increase as a result of the aforementioned
heterogeneity.
The results show, however, that there is convergence in the monetary policy objec-
tives with those of ECB during the last years, when the EU accession was envisaged.
This supports the argument that incentives matter for transition countries. Results
help in understanding the determinants of the central banks policy during transition.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper examines the stabilization policy of the central banks in eight Central
and Eastern European countries. We have investigated the issue of credibility, based
on the trade-off between inßation variability and output gap variability. The chapter
employs a Markov switching VAR model for empirical analysis of this questions. Based
on time series data, we test the probability of changes in credibility through time as a
function of inßation and output gap. The results show that there are different groups
of countries among CEE, concerning their credibility. In general, monetary policy
followed by the CEE countries during the ten years before becoming EU members,
was not consistent with the objective of price stability, introduced by the ECB. In the
latter case, monetary authorities had put more weight on the output gap stabilization,
than on the deviation of inßation from the target. These are due to either different
preferences concerning the monetary policy or to different economic structures, and
different degrees of credibility. These Þndings differ from results reported for the EMS
countries, concerning the same period. The result underlines the structural differences
and asymmetries between the new EU members and the euro area. Nevertheless, we
also Þnd a convergence in the stabilization preferences during the last years before EU
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accession. The results show that there is convergence in the monetary policy objectives
with ECB during the last years when the EU accession was envisaged. This implies
that for the new EU members gaining monetary and Þscal credibility - apart from
importing it  is a gradual process, which can be expected to develop, and thereby
reduce possible heterogeneity before the euro adoption.
Part III
Real Appreciation and Oil Prices in
Russia
Chapter 3
”Dutch Disease”: Does Russia
Have the Symptoms?
3.1 Introduction
Russia is one of the worlds primary producers of oil and gas after the United States
and Saudi Arabia. The country is estimated to hold between 6 and 13 percent of the
worlds proven crude oil reserves, and around 30 percent of the proven gas reserves. The
dramatic increase of the world oil prices since 1999 have boosted Russian oil exports.
Crude oil, oil products, and gas together account for roughly 50 percent of Russias
total export revenues, and for some 20 percent of Russias Gross Domestic Product
(GDP).
Despite of the current high world market oil prices, which bring signiÞcant revenues,
growth has dramatically slowed down. From 1995 to 1998, oil prices were relatively
low, and Russian GDP growth was largely negative. While growth became brießy
positive in 1997, it plunged again in 1998 as a result of the Russian Þnancial crisis,
which coincided with a large drop in oil prices. Following the crisis, both oil prices
and Russian growth rates recovered quickly. During the period 2000-2004, Russia
boasted GDP growth rates of around 7 percent, current account surpluses of 11 percent,
and Þscal surpluses of 2.5 percent on average. Given Russias dependence on oil and
gas, it does not seem surprising that there is a close relationship between oil prices
and Russian growth (Figure 3.1 ). Nevertheless, Russian growth has recently slowed,
suggesting that the relationship between Russian growth and oil prices is breaking
down. In both 2003 and 2004, Russias gross domestic product (GDP) still grew by
7.25 percent - sufficiently fast to fulÞll the goal of doubling GDP in ten years. However,
GDP growth has decelerated sharply since the middle of 2004, and the Ministry of
Economics projects 5.9 percent growth for 2005 as a whole, in spite of the fact that oil
prices have continued to soar and are projected to grow by more than 50 percent in
2005 1. If these projections materialize, this would constitute a clear break in the high
1The year-on-year GDP growth rate slowed from 7.5 percent in the Þrst half of 2004 to a provisional
5.5 percent in the same period of 2005. Additional possible reason for this slowdown may be the
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correlation between oil prices and Russian growth observed during the previous decade.
Given these stylized facts, the question arises as to whether Russia may be suffering
from a natural resource curse. The notion that there may be such a curse is based
on the empirically robust Þnding that resource-rich countries, on average, experience
lower growth rates than resource-poor economies (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001).
This Þnding has led economists to conclude that the blessing of natural resource
abundance may, in fact, turn out to be cursed.
One possible explanation for the natural resource curse is that the large and often
unexpected windfall revenues from natural resources tend to give rise to rent-seeking
behavior and a Þght over the distribution of these revenues. Such a Þght appears to
be very much present in Russia today.
While most observers would agree that rent seeking has played a role in Russia,
this chapter focuses on another explanation for the natural resource curse, i.e., Dutch
Disease. Brießy summarized, the Dutch Disease hypothesis states that the windfall
revenues resulting from an increase in natural resource prices, or from a discovery of
new natural resources, give rise to real exchange rate appreciation, which, in turn,
hurts the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector.
This chapter contributes to the debate by carefully deÞning the symptoms of Dutch
Disease, and then testing whether the Russian economy has the symptoms. We Þrst
provide a literature review, where we explain the link between Dutch Disease and the
natural resource curse. We then test for the main symptoms of Dutch Disease, which
include (i) a slowdown in manufacturing growth, (ii) an increase in the overall wage
level, and (iii) real appreciation. Concerning the latter, we investigate whether oil
prices were a main determinant of the observed real appreciation, after controlling for
other real exchange rate determinants, such as the productivity differential, government
consumption, net international reserves, and corruption.
3.2 Explaining The Natural Resource Curse
The natural resource curse hypothesis states that resource-rich economies grow
slower, on average, than resource-scarce countries. This hypothesis is based on the
observation that many resource-rich countries, such as Nigeria, Venezuela, Angola,
and Ecuador, have failed to prosper during the past few decades, while resource-poor
societies in Asia have enjoyed rapid economic growth. In a well-known paper, Sachs
and Warner (1995) report a robust negative relationship between real GDP growth per
capita and the ratio of resource exports to GDP in a sample of 97 developing countries
during the period 1970-1989. They Þnd that this negative relationship holds up for a
variety of measures of resource abundance, and even after controlling other possible
growth determinants, such as initial per capita income, trade policy, government effi-
existence of capacity constraints (Oomes and Dynnikova, 2005).
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ciency, and investment rates 2. Following the methodology of Sachs and Warner and
extending their basic chart to the year 2000, we still Þnd a clear negative relationship
between the share of primary exports in GDP in 1971 and GDP growth (Figure 3.2 )3.
Vast literature is looking for explanations of the differences in growth rates. Natural
resource abundance poses a difficult macroeconomic challenge to policymakers. Yet, for
many countries, in the long run, the blessing of the resource fortune turns out to be
cursed. The positive externalities of the newly discovered wealth are replaced by excess
inßation, unemployment, and loss of competitiveness. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian
(2003) Þnd empirically robust non-linear impact of poor institutions on growth in the
resource-rich societies. On the example of Nigeria, they argue that political reasons,
mainly corruption, are to blame for the poor long run growth4. Indeed, there are ex-
ceptions among resource-rich countries (for example Botswana and Indonesia), which
achieve rapid development and stable growth, despite of the adverse effects, attributed
to the resource revenues5. Among the reasons for their success are prudent macroeco-
nomic policy, hard budget constraints and reduction in the government debt burdens
(Acemoglu, at al. 2001).
Nonetheless, large ßow of resource revenues allows the national government to
stretch beyond its means, as well as to reduce the role of the private business. Cor-
ruption and misrule constraint market forces to operate without interference, resulting
in serious misallocation of resources. Finally, the lack of forward saving policy fails to
counteract pro-cyclicality of the government spendings. In summary, numerous stud-
ies have given several explanations for the poor growth performance of the resource
dependant countries: (1) socioeconomic reasons  (i.e. ethnical diversity, insufficient
infrastructure) (Easterly and Levine, 1997), (2) government policies and distortions
(Barro,1997), (3) institutions (Knack and Keefer, 1995, Hall and Jones, 1999, Ro-
drik, 1999), (4) geographical factors (Bloom and Sachs, 1998) (5) political instability
(Alesina et al. 1996), (6) inequality (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, Persson and Tabellini,
1994).
Yet, theoretical studies have focused on three main explanations for the natural
2Sachs and Warner (2001) show that the negative relationship also holds up when controlling for
omitted variables, proxied by lagged growth rates. They therefore conclude that the natural resource
curse is not just a statistical mirage that results, e.g., from the fact that natural resources may be the
only surviving sector in countries that have grown more slowly for other reasons. Similar empirical
results are reported in Gylfason and others (1999). In addition, Gylfason (2004) Þnds that natural
resource dependence is negatively correlated with trade, foreign investment, domestic investment,
equality, political liberty, education, and Þnancial depth.
3Primary exports are deÞned as the categories non-fuel primary products and fuels in the
United Nations Comtrade database.
4From 1965 to 2000 Nigeria has accumulated oil revenues of US$350 billion at constant 1995
prices. Nevertheless, the population living with less than one US$ per day have increased from about
36 percent in 1970 to just under 70 percent in 2000. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) provide
evidence that waste rather than Dutch Disease is the explanation for the Nigerias poor performance.
5Botswana has averaged annual economic growth of 8.7% over the past 30 years. Isham et al (2003)
provides excellent detailed country-case study, emphasizing the endogenously driven differences in the
institutional capacity to manage shocks, being detrimental for growth.
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resource curse  one political and two economical. The Þrst explanation is that natural
resource wealth gives rise to rent-seeking behavior. The second explanation is that
natural resource dependence implies terms of trade volatility. The third explanation is
that of Dutch Disease.
3.2.1 Rent-seeking
Political approach studies the political determinants of the slower growth. Weaker
economic growth performance is explained by a political economy rent seeking behavior
(Lane and Tornell, 1996, Mauro, 1995, Auty, 2001). The argument here is that the large
rents that can be obtained from natural resources create incentives for governments and
private agents to engage in rent-seeking behavior, voracity6, corruption7, or even civil
conßict8, thus crowding out of entrepreneurial activity and other pro-growth activities.
Incentives for rent seeking arise because it may be more beneÞcial for agents to engage
in unproductive activities (e.g., corruption, conßict) to appropriate the existing wealth,
than it is to engage in productive activities to create wealth. Countries rich of natural
resources beneÞt from of easy earned funds, and base their investment decisions on
bright terms of trade assumptions. They spend the resource revenues to Þnance current
consumption and do not take into account the uncertain future developments. However,
such economic behavior has strong political grounds alleviating the social pressure,
merging the interest of certain political groups and lobbies, granting political votes.
Due to political incentives public oil revenues are spent on social projects, inefficient
investment, or subsidies of inefficient industries. In addition, the Þght over the resource
revenues between the private and the public sector leads to higher uncertainty and
worse investment climate. Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) argue that the presence
of common-pool problems or uncertainty related to property rights over the resource
income leads to inefficient Þghts over existing resources and, thereby, may generate
lower growth. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), who call this the institutional
impact of natural resources, Þnd empirical evidence that some natural resources (in
particular, oil and minerals) exert a robust negative and nonlinear impact on growth via
their deleterious impact on institutional quality. In a similar study, Isham and others
(2003) Þnd that countries that export fuels, minerals, plantation crops, and coffee or
cocoa do worse across an array of governance indicators, even when controlling for
other potential determinants of governance.
6The voracity effect, coined by Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999), refers to a
more-than-proportionate increase in Þscal redistribution following a terms-of-trade windfall.
7On corruption, see, e.g., Mauro (1995) and Leite and Weidmann (1999). Gylfason (2004) Þnds
empirically that natural resource dependence is positively related with corruption.
8Collier and Hoeffler (2002) Þnd a strong and nonlinear effect of the share of natural resources in
GDP on the probability of civil conßict in a country.
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3.2.2 Volatility
A second explanation for the natural resource curse is that resource rents tend
to be volatile. This volatility arises, in part, from the fact that natural resources
typically have low price elasticities of supply. Volatility, in turn, has been shown
to be negatively correlated with growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995) and investment
(Aizenman and Marion, 1999), including investment in education (Flug, Spilimbergo,
andWachtenheim, 1996). Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) explain this negative effect on
growth by the volatility of real exchange rates, the government spending, as well as the
level of intra-industry trade. Large non-tradable sector makes relative prices stable even
though the resource sector generates signiÞcant demand volatility for nontradables.
However, the smaller the manufacturing sector, the more difficult it becomes for the
economy to absorb shocks by labor mobility. If the country looses its non-resource
tradable sector, the economy becomes much more volatile, because demand shocks for
nontradables will not be accommodated by movements in the allocation of labor9. In
the extreme case, if the oil sector does not employ any labor and the manufacturing
sector disappears, all shocks will have to be absorbed by expenditure switching and
unemployment, implying increased volatility, which, as argued above, implies lower
growth under Þnancial market imperfections.
3.2.3 "Dutch Disease"
The third explanation is that of Dutch Disease10. The deÞnition of the term
refers to a decline in the tradable export industries (de-industrialization) due to a
temporary boom in the resource sector, caused by an increase in the resource prices
or by technological progress11. The Dutch Disease hypothesis, going back to Corden
9The main Þndings in the paper are that (i) nontradables specialization increases relative price
volatility. (ii) due to Þnancial frictions the economy further specializes which reduces the tradable
sector. (iv) such specialization also reduces the investment in nontradables. As a result, the economy
will face higher cost of capital and low welfare.
10The asymmetric shock, which plagued the Netherlands and the fear that similar symptoms could
spread to Britain were Þrst reviewed by the magazine The Economist in 1977 under the term Dutch
disease. The term described how the windfall gas revenues paradoxically caused recession between
1970 and 1977 in the Netherlands. Two contradictory developments took place at the same time -
strengthening the external position but harming the national economy. The guilder appreciated by
16.4% and the current account surplus reached nearly $2 billion per year within 1972-76. At the same
time unemployment increased from 1.1% to 5.1% and employment in the manufacturing industry fell
by 16%. In addition, exploration led to relatively high productivity growth in the energy sector but
the wage inßation and the public expenditures also grew rapidly. Wages in the non-energy sectors rose
as well, but these were not corresponding to higher productivity growth. The rise in the unit labor
costs boosted inßation and resulted in a wage-price spiral. In addition, the windfall revenues for the
government were spent on improvements of the social security system. The natural gas revenues had
contracting effect on the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and the other export-orientated
industries. When the gas prices fell and the gas deposits started gradually to diminish, the Netherlands
went into deep recession.
11Although most likely, the booming sector is related to the natural resources, it is not always
necessary the case. Dutch Disease can be caused by a high volume of foreign exchange inßows in the
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(1982) and Corden and Neary (1984), implies that an exogenous increase in resource
prices or in resource output (for example, resulting from the discovery of new natural
resources, as in the original Dutch case that gave the disease its name) results in real
exchange rate appreciation and a decline in the manufacturing sector. It is not obvious,
however, that Dutch Disease can, indeed, explain the natural resource curse. During
times of high oil prices, it is only natural, and in fact optimal, for resources to move
out of the manufacturing sector, and into the oil and services sectors. If oil prices
were to stay high forever, it may well be optimal to specialize in oil and eliminate the
manufacturing sector altogether. So why would de-industrialization and specialization
in oil lead to lower growth? One reason why Dutch Disease may lead to lower growth
is that manufacturing sectors tend to be more competitive and innovative than other
sectors. Manufacturing companies produce tradable goods for the domestic market and
for exports. Their prices are determined on the international markets. First, due to the
absence of large rents, manufacturing Þrms typically are less concentrated and face more
competition than natural resource Þrms, which improves their efficiency. Second, due
to the nature of manufacturing process, there is more scope for technological progress
in manufacturing, than in resource extraction or in services. Finally, there tend to be
vertical and horizontal spillovers from technological progress in manufacturing. As a
result, even a temporary contraction in the manufacturing sector can have permanent
effects on growth12. Moreover, governments may protect industries that are inefficient
and otherwise may contract, which leads to resource misallocation and lower growth.
If manufacturing sector is crowded out, and there are no incentives for the resource
sector revenues to be invested productively, the social welfare is reduced and growth
may slow down.
Since 1960, the rate of technological change worldwide has been much higher in
manufacturing than in other sectors. In order to keep the competitive edge on the
other producers, manufacturing companies have higher incentives to invest in innova-
tions. In case of deindustrialization, the economy loses the gains stemming from
horizontal and vertical technological spillovers. In addition, companies cannot take
advantage of learning-by-doing effects and lose incentives to diversify and develop new
products. Krugman (1997) shows theoretically, that if industries are crowded out
(move abroad), it is difficult to bring them back and restore the equilibrium, once the
favorable conditions for raw material exports are exhausted.
Corden and Neary (1984) Þnd that the natural resources in the long run cause lower
form of international aid or loans. Younger (1992) shows on the example of Ghana, that since the
government is the recipient of these loans, it can increase the aggregate domestic demand and crowd
out the private manufacturing sector.
12In a theoretical model of learning-by-doing, Krugman (1997) shows that, once manufacturing
industries are crowded out and move abroad, it is very difficult to bring them back when the favorable
conditions for resource exports are exhausted. However, Torvik (2001) shows that, if both the tradables
and the nontradables sector can contribute to learning, and if there are learning spillovers between
the sectors, then a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run,
due to a shift in the steady-state relative productivity between the tradables and the nontradables
sector.
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external competitiveness, reduction in the manufacturing export - de-industrialization
and inßation (and/or nominal appreciation). Buiter and Purvis (1981) further analyze
three possible sources of de-industrialization namely monetary disinßation, positive
oil shock (or the Dutch Disease) and oil discoveries, to highlight the similarities between
the UK economy and the North sea oil. They present the Dutch disease, resulting from
the higher oil prices, as a transitional phenomenon with short-term impact on growth,
compare to the oil discoveries, which generate a permanent growth effect13. This chap-
ter follows their approach to study whether Russia experiences adverse effects due to
the high oil prices.
3.3 Theoretical Framework
We present a stylized model of a resource boom, which can explain the de-
industrialization and the disappointing growth results in Russia. The boom in the
resource sector raises the marginal factor productivity there, thus attracting mobile fac-
tors from the tradable to the booming and the non-tradable (service) sector. Increased
foreign exchange inßows boosted aggregate demand, resulting in higher relative price
of the non-tradables and a real exchange rate appreciation (Corden and Neary,1982
)14. In addition, as shown by Sachs and Warner (1999) the natural resources make
the economy less competitive in the manufacturing sector and reduce growth by taking
away the learning spillovers generated in this sector.
The theoretical hypotheses based on three-sector model, that has dominated the
literature and were inspired by the Dutch case are as follows:
 appreciation of the real exchange rate.
 output and exports decline (de-industrialization) in the manufacturing (non-
booming) sector;
 production of non-tradable (services) sector increases;
 increasing aggregate demand and import growth.
In addition, according to the Balassa-Samuelson model, countries with high pro-
ductivity growth in the tradable sector have appreciated exchange rate when:
 the relative price of non-tradables is determined by the productivity differen-
tials
 real wages depend on productivity in the tradable sector;
 deviations from PPP are due to the difference in the relative price of the
non-tradables.
13In Russia no new oil discoveries were made. The high oil prices generated investment boom
through collaboration with western investors for better exploitation of the existing deposits.
14For a detailed review, see the Appendix Box 3.1 Corden - Neary model.
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The basic predictions of the Corden and Neary (1984) model of Dutch Disease are
summarized in Table 3.1, and can be broken down into a resource movement effect and
a spending effect. For simplicity, it is assumed that the economy only produces three
types of goods: natural resources (which we refer to as oil), non-resource tradable
goods (which we refer to as manufacturing), and nontradable goods (which we refer
to as services). By deÞnition, tradable goods (oil and manufacturing) are subject
to international competition; hence, their prices are determined by world demand and
supply, and we assume that the country is small enough so as to not be able to inßuence
these prices. Services, on the other hand, are not subject to international competition,
and therefore their prices depend only on domestic demand and supply.
The resource movement effect only occurs if factors are sufficiently mobile and when
supply curves are upwards sloping. Given the increase in marginal factor productivity
in the oil sector, factor mobility implies that resources (in this case, capital and labor)
will move from the non-oil sector to the oil sector. Under these conditions, an increase
in the oil price raises the demand for labor in the oil sector, implying higher oil sector
wages. Because of this, labor will move from the manufacturing and services sectors to
the oil sector, and oil sector output will increase at the cost of a decrease in output and
employment in manufacturing and services. Corden and Neary (1984) refer to this fall
in manufacturing output as direct de-industrialization. The movement of labor out
of the services sector also leads to fall in the supply of services, leading to an excess
demand for services, and therefore an increase in the price of services. The price of
manufacturing goods does not change because it is given from abroad.
The spending effect occurs regardless of whether labor is mobile. Higher oil prices
generate higher wages and proÞts in the oil sector, thus raising aggregate demand. This
again raises the prices of services, but does not affect the prices of oil and manufacturing
goods. The result is an increase in the price of nontradables relative to tradables,
implying real exchange rate appreciation15. If labor is immobile (i.e. in the absence of
a resource movement effect), then the supply of services and the only effect of a shift
in demand is an increase in the relative price of services. If labor is mobile, however,
then an upward shift in the demand for services will lead to an increase in the supply
of services and the demand for labor in the services sector, thus pushing up service
sector wages. This will encourage workers to move from the manufacturing and oil
sector to the services sector, thus forcing manufacturing and oil Þrms to raise their
wages, as well16. Since they cannot compensate for this by raising their price levels,
they will see their proÞts squeezed and will have to downsize. The resulting drop in
manufacturing output and employment is referred to by Corden and Neary (1984) as
indirect de-industrialization.
15If the nominal exchange rate is Þxed, then this real appreciation will take place in the form of
inßation. However, if the nominal exchange rate appreciates sufficiently so as to eliminate windfall
proÞts in the oil sector, then the spending effect will not take place, but there would be an equivalent
amount of real appreciation, this time in the form of nominal appreciation.
16To keep things simple, it is assumed that skill levels in all sector are similar, so that, under perfect
labor mobility, wages in all sectors would always be equal in equilibrium.
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3.3.1 The Model
In this section, we present simple three sectors open economy model in order to
analyze the basic aspects of the Dutch Disease 17. The model highlights stylized facts
of the Russian economy in the light of temporary or permanent oil price shock.
The model follows De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) by estimating the role of produc-
tivity and terms of trade shocks in the determination of the real exchange rates. They
Þnd that the terms of trade shock affects the real exchange rate mainly through the in-
come effect. They argue on the sample of fourteen OECD countries from 1970 to 1985
that faster productivity growth in the tradable relative to the non - tradable sectors
results in real appreciation, which is an evidence of the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
We start with the standard expression of the real exchange rate:
q = s+ p− p ∗ (3.1)
where q is the log real exchange rate, s is the nominal exchange rate deÞned as unit
of domestic currency in terms of foreign currency, p and p∗ are the logs of the domestic
and the foreign prices. The domestic and foreign prices represent the weighted averages
of log prices of tradables and nontradables at home and abroad.
p = µpT − (1− µ)pN (3.2)
where µ and ν are the weights of the tradables in the overall price indices at home
and abroad
p∗ = νp∗T − (1− ν)p∗N (3.3)
Substituting (3.3) and (3.2) into (3.1) yields:
q = s+ µpT − (1− µ)pN − νp∗T − (1− ν)p∗N =
= s+ [µpT + (1− µ)pT ] + [(1− µ) pN − (1− µ)pT ]−
17Other models Corden and Neary (1982), Van Wijnbergen (1984), Krugman (1987), Matsuyama
(1992) and Gylfason et al. (1999) assume that productivity growth is driven by learning-by-doing. It
is generated in the tradable (T) sector as productivity in the rest of the economy is constant. Thus,
these studies involve models of unbalanced growth. Sachs and Warner (1995), on the other hand, have
balanced growth, as they assume that the learning beneÞts the traded and non-traded sector in the
same way.
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£
νp∗
T
− (1− ν)p∗
T
¤
+ [(1− ν) p∗N − (1− ν)p∗T ]
q = s+ pT − p∗T + (1− µ)(pN − pT )− (1− ν)(p∗N − p∗T ) (3.4)
From (3.4) follows that the real exchange rate includes the terms of trade,
the relative price of the domestic nontradables in terms of tradables, adjusted for the
share of the nontradables in the overall price index and the adjusted relative price
of the nontradables in terms of tradables abroad. We consider an economy, which
produces oil (O), non-oil trading (manufacturing) sector (M) and non-tradable services
(S) sector. Thus, two goods (O and M) are traded on the international market with
prices determined there. Wages in these two sectors reßect the labor productivity in
the tradable sector. The price of S is determined by the domestic supply and demand
in the home economy. Wages in S follow the wages in the tradable sector.Two sectors
use speciÞc factor capital (K) and one sector (S) uses only labor (L), where labor
is perfectly mobile between the sectors 18. The nominal exchange rate is the relative
price of two tradable goods PO/PM . The real exchange rate is the relative price of
the non-traded to traded goods Ps/PM . Since the prices of tradables are exogenously
determined on the world market, a rise of the relative price of services is equivalent to
real appreciation19. The sectoral production is given by a Cobb-Douglas function:
Yi = AiK
α
i L
1−α
i and YS = PsASLS (3.5)
where i = O,M and is the relative price of S in terms of M , where the price of
traded goods is normalized to one. It is assumed that the O and M sectors are capital
intensive.The producer maximizes the following proÞt functions with respect to labor:
Y
= AiL
α
i K
1−α
i − rKi − wLi
Y
= PsASLS − wLS (3.6)
The market clearing condition for the non traded goods market S yields:
18This assumption reßects the fact that the services are mainly labor intensive.
19In the simple Dutch Disease model currency devaluation has no impact on relative prices or
competitiveness, since domestic prices adjust instantaneously so that the real exchange rate remains
unchanged. In the real world,however, domestic prices are sticky, and overvalued exchange rates could
persist for years.
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ASLS = CS + gS (3.7)
where gS is the is the government consumption of nontradables. The total labor
demand is equal to the sum of the labor demand in the tradable and non-tradable
markets, which we obtain by the respective Þrst order conditions of (3.6)
LD = Ki
r(1− α)
wα
+
(CS + gS)w
ps
(3.8)
We maximize the utility of the representative consumer by assuming that the CES
utility function is in the form20:
max Ω =
£
λcθS + (1− λ)cθM
¤ 1
θ (3.9)
with θ < 1.
Imposing the consumers budget constraint:
pScS + pMcM = I (3.10)
and given that q = PS/PM, we obtain the Marshallian demand functions, where the
optimum consumption decision is given by:
CS = I
Ã
pS + pM
·
q(1− λ)
λ
¸ 1
1−θ
!−1
(3.11)
CM = I
Ã
pM + pS
·
q(1− λ)
λ
¸ 1
θ−1
!−1
(3.12)
20CO , CM and CS can be seen as types of goods, for which there exists a continuum of brands.
Therefore, CES function aggregates the consumption across brands for a particular brand x where
1< q is the elasticity of substitution between two brands produced in the same sector:
CO =
hR 1
0 (CO (x))
θ−1
θ dx
i θ
θ−1
CM =
hR 1
0 (CM (x))
θ−1
θ dx
i θ
θ−1
CS =
hR 1
0 (CS (x))
θ−1
θ dx
i θ
θ−1
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In equilibrium, the total labor demand is equal to the total labor supplied, which
includes the labor supplied for the production of nontradables and the labor supplied
for the tradables, whereas the labor supply of nontradables is equal to the consumption
of nontradables plus government purchases.
L = Ki
r(1− α)
wα
+
"
I
µ
pS + pM
h
q(1−λ)
λ
i 1
1−θ
¶−1
+ gS
#
w
ps
(3.13)
The labor market equilibrium condition shows the effect of the public and private
consumption on wages. Wages, in turn, have effect on the relative price of the non-
tradables and on the real exchange rate.
3.4 Dutch Disease in Transition Countries
As much research was devoted to the Dutch Disease in the resource-rich industrial
and developing countries, relatively less was the attention to transition countries. The
process of transition contains its own unique factors and effects, which need to be taken
into account when diagnosing the Dutch Disease. Rosenberg and Saavaliajn, (1998)
underline three speciÞc factors, reßecting the change from planned to market-driven
economy: (i) initial undervaluation of the real exchange rate; (ii) strong capital inßows;
and (iii) infancy of the Þnancial markets. All three must to be taken into account in
order to create clear understanding for the causes behind the economic slowdown in
transition. After the beginning of transition, the real exchange rate followed a U shape
 initially depreciating and possibly undershooting its equilibrium level. Afterwards,
the real RER started to appreciate due to the trade liberalization, productivity gains
i.e. the Balassa-Samuelson effect21, capital inßows and the increase of the admin-
istrated prices. Following in time increase in the world oil prices and the resulting
windfall revenues, additionally build on the nominal real appreciation, which is the
so-called Dutch Disease effect. The resource revenues also shift upward the level of
the equilibrium real exchange rate (RER). However, the Dutch disease effect maybe
stronger and result in exchange rate overshooting and loss of competitiveness.
Another surprising fact is that, in recent years, Russia has grown more slowly than
other members of the CIS (Figure 3.3 )22. During the period 2000-04, the Russian
21The Harrod Balassa -Samuelson effect features a situation at which the productivity growth in
the tradable sector outpaces those in the non-tradable sector. This results in higher wages in the both
sectors and higher relative prices of the nontardables. As a consequence the equilibrium exchange rate
appreciates (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1999 )
22We use the concept of the CIS-12, thus excluding the Baltic states. Besides Russia, the CIS-
12 includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
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economy grew by an average of 6.9 percent. This seems high, but the other eleven
CIS countries grew by 8.5 percent on average. This is not because the other CIS coun-
tries beneÞted more from high oil prices than Russia; in fact, even the oil importing
countries in the CIS grew faster than Russia during 2000-04: by 7.5 percent on average
(Nkusu, 2005). Two other former Soviet Union countries  Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,
also depend on natural resources, and already experience the Dutch disease effects on
the competitiveness of their non-oil tradables. Using autoregressive conditional het-
eroscedastic (ARCH) model Kutan and Wyzan (2000) Þnd that there are insigniÞcant
Balassa-Samuelson effects present in Kazakhstan. The Dutch Disease-type symptoms,
however, are statistically signiÞcant: ARCH indicates that an increase in oil prices
of 10 percent leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate of the tenge by 0.34
percent. Their results suggest that oil prices between 1996-2003 had considerable effect
on the real exchange rate23. Moreover, since the beginning of the market economy in
1992, the decrease in the manufacturing was stronger relative to the resource sector
and some sub sectors were completely crowded out. Hence, Kazakhstans current eco-
nomic development depends on the hydrocarbon sector and the international oil prices.
(Kutan and Wyzan, 2000, Rosenberg and Saavalainen, 1998)
Employment Þgures illustrate the effects of the natural resource boom on the for-
mer Soviet countries. Because the oil sector does not generate many new jobs, when
the non-oil sectors are crowded out and there is high initial unemployment rate, the
country suffers from even higher unemployment and painful adjustment costs. On the
basis of a cross-sectional regression analysis from 50 non-transition economies for 1995,
Raiser, Schaffer, and Schuchhardt (2004) create market economy benchmarks for the
structure of employment in transition economies. They compare the anticipated sec-
toral structure of employment at a given gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and
the actual structure of employment in individual countries. The authors Þnd evidence
of signiÞcant Dutch Disease effects for Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Russia. Hence, a
relevant question is to what extent it is optimal for these economies to specialize in
favor of the natural resource sector. In the case of Kazakhstan almost all of the FDIs
(since its independence approximately $10 billion) are directed the sector with highest
marginal proÞt, the oil and gas industries (EIA, 2002).
Stiglitz (2003) points out that the Dutch Disease problem is of particular concern
for Azerbaijan, which resource wealth is limited and will be enough for roughly 20
years. The discoveries of new oil reserves led to strong increase in the share of oil in
the total exports - to over 80 present in 2004. Oil production is projected to increase
seven times, starting in 2005 when the new oil and gas are developed - from 175,000
to 1.25 million barrel per day by 2010. The revenues from oil exports are expected to
grow about 65 percent in 2005, and by over 128 percent per year during 200609. Yet,
the resources will be depleted by 2024, therefore a key challenge for Azerbaijan is to
manage wisely its fortune. If the revenues are used for supporting the non-competitive
industries and for social measures, when the resources are depleted, the economy will
not be able to sustain its growth and its public sector expenditures. Wakeman, et
23Although, Westin (2005) points out that due to the high rouble weight, the real effective exchange
rate of the two countries did actually depreciate in response of the rouble real appreciation.
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al (2004) recommend Azerbaijan to use the oil money for investments rather than
for consumption and to protect the non-oil competitiveness in order to generate new
employment and achieve economic growth.
3.5 Evidence of Dutch Disease in Russia
3.5.1 De-industrialization
The main symptoms of Dutch disease are decrease in the manufacturing output,
exports and employment (i.e de-industrialization), and increase in the production and
wages of the services sector, appreciation of the real exchange rate and overall slower
pace of economic growth. The symptoms appear mostly in countries with high export
shares of raw materials, and become stronger as the world market price of these raw
materials increases. Because of the huge inßow of foreign currency revenues, the do-
mestic currency appreciates. The cheap foreign currency is favorable for the importers,
who become highly competitive and crowd out domestic producers. Thus, domestic
producers lose their competitive advantage, which leads to stagnation in the manufac-
turing industries. Higher proÞtability of the resource industry leads to concentration
of the production in that sector and in a small group of services related to it. As labor
tends to move to the sectors with the highest proÞtability, there is also a decline in the
industrial employment.
Exogenously driven high resource prices (or new discovery of natural resources)
result in real exchange rate appreciation, thus reducing competitiveness and slowing
down industrial output and employment, which is vital for growth24. The dramatic
increase of the world oil prices since 1999 have boosted Russian oil exports and brought
signiÞcant windfall revenues. Currently, the share of oil and gas in the Russian exports
accounts for more than Þfty percent. However, there are risks similar to those in the
Netherlands in 1970s, as the high dependence on commodities makes Russia vulnerable
to sudden changes in the world oil prices. At the same time, the large windfall revenues
are associated with upward pressure on the exchange rate. In addition, inßation may
exceed the target of 8.5 to 10 percent in 2005 and together with the real wage growth
and the pressure for Þscal loosing may hamper the competitiveness in the non-oil
sector. In 2004, Russias gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 7.1 percent, and was
mainly driven by the strong private consumption growth. Industrial production grew
by 7.3 percent. According to the federal statistics service, however, the overall growth
fell to 5.2 percent in 2005 compared with 7.6 percent in 2004. The industrial sector
value added rose only by 0.6 percent compare with growth at 7.4 percent in the Þrst
quarter of the last year. The manufacturing sector, which represents larger share of the
industrial value added went down by 0.4 percent as the natural resource sector grew
by 3 percent. Notwithstanding, the Þnal consumption growth speed up modestly.
The low level of competitiveness, apart from the resource-based industries, is among
24Sachs and Warner (2001) provide empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis.
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the main problems of the Russian industrial development and a primary source of
concern. While the dominant industries  oil and gas, metallurgy and agriculture are
growing at a slower pace, other sectors like manufacturing risk crowding out effects
because cannot compete with the relatively better quality and getting cheaper import
goods and cannot keep up with the rising input costs. Currently authorities preserve
industrial competitiveness by not allowing the rouble to appreciate. This monetary
policy is regarded as a way to support the domestic industries, to reduce volatility
and to create stable investment climate in Russia. However, this could also be a way
to avoid the necessary restructuring of the manufacturing sector, which has been less
competitive compare to, for example, Central European countries due to the inherited
from the Soviet past low productivity and high labor costs. Additionally, the 2004
labor productivity growth is lagging behind the wage increase in all sectors except
telecommunications. Despite of all these warning signals, authorities doubt that there
is Dutch Disease in Russia. The explanation is that several non-oil sectors suffer
from the loss of competitiveness, but others do not. Sectors, directly witnessing the
impact of the consumption boom, namely extractive industries, consumer and banking
services, are still performing well. Nevertheless, instead of Þnancing sectors with low
productivity and relaying on the oil revenues, the government must seek to diversify and
speed up reforms in the traditional industries, as well as to develop new internationally
competitive industries.
In order to test, whether Russia has the main symptoms of Dutch Disease, we use
sector-level data to compare the growth rates in output, employment, and real wages
across Russian sectors. Our sectoral data is based on the Russian Federal State Statis-
tics Services industrial classiÞcation system that was in force until December 2004.
Using this classiÞcation system, we deÞne Russias resource sector as the fuel sector,
which consists of oil extraction, oil processing, gas, and coal. We deÞne manufac-
turing, as consisting of all industrial sectors excluding the fuel sector, which gives
us a list of nine sectors: electricity, ferrous metals, non-ferrous metals, chemical and
petrochemical, machinery, forestry and woodworking, light industry, and food. Fi-
nally, we deÞne the services sector, as consisting of construction, communication,
transportation, and trade.
The Þrst symptom of Dutch Disease, de-industrialization, appears to be clearly
present. Rather than interpreting de-industrialization strictly, as negative manufac-
turing growth, we interpret the concept broader, as a decline in the share of the
manufacturing sector. That is, we consider de-industrialization to occur when the
manufacturing sector is growing at a slower rate than the other sectors. Indeed, as
the top left of Figure 3.4 shows, manufacturing output growth was very high in 1999
and 2000, following the large depreciation of the rouble in 1998. Since 2001, however,
manufacturing output growth was consistently below that in other sectors, implying a
fall in the share of the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the top right panel shows that
manufacturing employment growth between 2000 and 2004 was not just decelerating,
but even negative. Figure 3.5 breaks down manufacturing growth by sub sector, and
shows that the slowdown in manufacturing growth has occurred more or less across
all sectors. Comparing the period 1997-2000 with the period 2001-2004, we Þnd that
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only the fuel sector, the food sector, and the electricity sector experienced an increase
in their output growth. A growing share of exports is concentrated in the oil and gas
sector. Energy exports have increased to about 50 percent of total exports and to
almost 20 percent of GDP (see Figure 3.6). All other manufacturing sectors experi-
encing substantially slower growth during 2001-2004, when oil prices were high. An
exception is the food industry where the volume of imported food is small and the
used imported components beneÞt from the exchange rate appreciation. In addition,
the manufacturing industries in Russia are not prepared to produce tradable, interna-
tionally competitive goods. The manufacturing industry makes products that cannot
compete on equal terms on the world markets and the market is dominated by raw
materials and semi-processed products with low added value. We also Þnd evidence
that the share of the services sector has increased, suggesting that the spending effect
has been more important in Russia than the resource movement effect. As the top left
panel of Figure 3.4 shows, the growth in services did not just exceed the manufacturing
growth, but, since 2002, has also outpaced the growth rate in the fuel sector, implying
an increase in the relative size of the services sector. The top right panel shows that
employment growth in the services sector has been positive since 2000, and exceeded
employment growth in the other sectors in the years 2002 and 2004.
Critiques contend that deindustrialization is not necessarily malignant for Russia
and is a natural consequence of the market mechanisms. Deindustrialization is regarded
as a market economy response and reßects the low competitiveness in the manufactur-
ing sector. The message is that further specialization in the oil sector and increased
oil exports at the current high prices are the best policy advice for Russia (assuming
that oil prices will not increase further). To the contrary, this chapter argues that the
manufacturing sector is vital, because it has relatively higher rate of technical change
and Russia will lose its prospects for technological leadership if de-industrialization
continues. Currently manufacturing sector employs the biggest share of the working
age population. If more enterprizes close down because of failure to beat competition
with the cheap imports, more people may become jobless and start relying on social
beneÞts. Spending the natural resource money on covering social costs was one of the
main reasons for spreading the disease in the Netherlands in 1960s. Those employed
in the rest of the economy may get higher wage, additionally contributing to higher
inßation. Moreover, how to spend the oil revenues is a crucial question with a decisive
importance for the future of the Russian economy. The Þght over the oil revenues with
the private sector gives the state a leading role upon the investment decision. It is
questionable, however, to what extent such decisions will be market driven and will
reßect the ongoing reforms. The past experience of soviet planning shows inefficient
and economically unjustiÞable projects when the state invested public money.
While the Þrst symptom de-industrialization does seem to be present, it is diffi-
cult to conclude from this statistical analysis that the observed patterns are, indeed,
the result of resource movement or spending effects. In fact, there may be other rea-
sons why the manufacturing sector has shrunk and the services sector has expanded,
beyond the sheer fact of the still incomplete transitional adjustment in the Russian
manufacturing sector. Employment and output in the Russian manufacturing may be
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contracting as a result of a global de-industrialization. Many advanced industrial na-
tions show diminishing shares of their manufacturing sectors. For example, a similar
pattern has been observed in the United States and other advanced industrial countries
that are not necessarily resource-rich. As McKinnon (2005) notes, there are three main
reasons why manufacturing sectors are expected to shrink over time, relative to ser-
vices. First, opportunities for technological progress are much greater in manufacturing
than in services. Second, there is evidence that, as households become richer; demand
naturally shifts away from goods toward services. Finally free trade and outsourcing
result in manufacturing industries being continuously replaced as a consequence of in-
ternational competition. Controlling for this effects is not possible in a study for a
single country with short time series, but may be possible in a cross-country study;
hence, we leave this as a suggestion for further research.
Russias booming oil sector, however, may facilitate shrinking the output and em-
ployment in the manufacturing sector well beyond those of the advanced industrialized
countries. In the long run, as services are not subject to international trade, Russias
trade deÞcit may increase together with loss in jobs due to the contraction of the man-
ufacturing sector. Labor productivity and wages are one-Þfth of those prevailing in the
advanced countries. Therefore global de-industrialization may further aggravate the
problems and eventually cause lower growth in addition to possible Dutch disease
effects.
Previous studies have found that the spending effect is stronger in Russia compare
to the resource moving effect. Westin (2005) argues that the growth of the non-tradable
sector is mainly related to the spending effect but there are no signs of resource moving
effect i.e. labor moving from the services to the resource sector. Using two PPP mea-
sures, Westin shows that the post-1998 rouble is undervalued and concludes that there
is a room for further appreciation. This conclusion, however, should be considered with
caution because detailed employment data is available only up to 2002 and the author
is using proxies to average certain sectors and prices, which may distort the picture.
Gurvich (2004) Þnds that from 6% to 11% every year is reallocated from the oil sector
to the tradable sector by the mechanism of the transfer pricing. This reduces the tax
burden on the oil and gas sectors. If taken into account, the share of the resource
sector in GDP would be up to 21% in 2003. Also the vulnerability to international
price changes is decreasing as the tendency that growth has increased above Þve per-
cent only when hydrocarbon prices have increased, is diminishing. Nevertheless, the
main indicators for the role of the oil sector in the Russian economy have been stable
or decreasing in 2000-2003. The reason is the export contraction due to the rouble ap-
preciation, which is a symptom of the Dutch Disease hypothesis. Furthermore a study
done by the World bank (2004) Þnds that natural-resource and export-oriented indus-
tries are increasing their share in the total industrial output, rather than decreasing it,
so that exposure to risk of external price shocks is currently increasing.
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3.5.2 Wage Growth
As for the second symptom, there is clear evidence of high real wage growth in
all sectors since 2000, which is consistent with both the resource movement and the
spending effect. As the bottom left panel of Figure 3.4 indicates, the sharpest increase
in real wages occurred initially in the fuel sector, likely as a result of soaring oil prices
in 2000, which could have given rise to either a resource movement or a spending effect,
or both. However, wage growth in the other sectors was also rapid and quickly caught
up with fuel sector wage growth, as predicted by the Dutch Disease hypothesis. In fact,
in 2002 and 2003, wages in manufacturing and services rose even more rapidly than in
the fuel sector. Though, real wage growth did not differ much between sectors since
2002. This is true even for productivity-adjusted wage growth, which is equivalent
to the growth in unit labor costs, depicted in the bottom right panel of Figure 3.4.
According to our calculations (which are based on several assumptions, missing data,
and therefore should be interpreted with caution), unit labor cost growth was close
to zero in all sectors since 2002, and was even slightly negative in 2004, suggesting a
slight improvement in competitiveness.
Inßation is already soaring in Russia due to the huge budget surplus (US$ 26.33
billion) and the consumption boom. The government inßation target of 8.5 percent
for 2005 is well below the inßation Þgures of 11.7 percent in 2004, but is expected
to remain in double digits, which may encourage the Russian authorities to tolerate
further nominal rouble appreciation. Spending the windfall revenues in the economy
through Þscal loosening in the form of social spending and tax cuts is a direct way
to fuel inßation. Meanwhile, foreign currency reserves grew rapidly in 2004 bringing
Russia up to the worlds seventh position. Thus, the budget balance has signiÞcantly
beneÞted from the high oil prices. This additionally contributes to the inßation and
adds up to the strong domestic currency. Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Rus-
sia reached $ 11.7bln which is the highest level of FDI since reforms began in 1992.
However they are still low as a percent of GDP . In addition, the foreign portfolio
investment were 17 percent less than in 2003 following the Yukoss affair, which re-
sulted in lost investors conÞdence and US$7.8 billion capital outßow from Russia in
2004. This affair involved the arrest in October 2003 of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former
CEO and principal owner of Russias largest private oil company, Yukos, on charges of
tax evasion and embezzlement, which eventually gave rise to the sale of Yukos largest
production unit, Yuganskneftegaz, to state-owned oil company Rosneft. This effective
renationalization of a successful private company undoubtedly damaged the invest-
ment climate, and even led to a signiÞcant slowdown in oil production growth that
cannot be only explained by supply disruptions caused by the change in ownership25.
Recent evidences suggest that Russias growth may be slowing down, as the in-
creased taxes over the oil industry hurt future investments. International Energy
Agency forecasts Russian oil output to rise 3.8 percent in 2005, less than half the
25Since mid-2004, when it became clear that Yuganskneftegaz was going to be sold, the annual rate
of oil production growth in Russia slowed down signiÞcantly, from 11 percent in 2003 and 9 percent
in 2004 to only 2.5 percent in the Þrst half of 2005.
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average during the past Þve years and the lowest since 1999. Russian oil output rose
9 percent in 2004 to 9.2 million barrels a day and reached a 11 percent record in
2003. In addition to the capacity constraints, the current economic policy favors the
establishment of state-controlled conglomerates in the natural resource sectors, which
discourages market competition and investments. The state has expanded its role in
the oil sector through export quotas and access tariffs to the state-owned pipeline sys-
tem. Another possible reason for the slowdown in oil production growth is the increase
in oil taxation: oil export duties were raised in August 2004, and the mineral extraction
tax was raised in January 2005. With a strong government control over the oil industry
and a lack of diversiÞcation, the country risks drying out its main source of wealth and
economic growth. Additional spur to growth is the poor access to investment Þnancing
due to the underdeveloped banking sector. Therefore sound Þscal policy is especially
necessary in order to provide agents with effective tax system which does not hinder in-
vestment in the resource sector. By increasing its consumption, the government might
speed up the short term growth but could not continue in the long-run without struc-
tural reforms and improvement in the overall investors climate. Reforms in utilities
and health care rather than social spendings would contribute to a sustainable growth
and overall economic stability.
3.5.3 Real Appreciation
While the Russian real effective exchange rate has appreciated substantially in
recent years, this cannot necessarily be regarded as evidence of the Dutch Disease. As
Figure 3.7 shows, the level of the real exchange rate is positively correlated not only
with oil prices, but also with the productivity differential and government consumption.
In addition, there may be an effect on the real exchange rate from changes in net
international reserves or the level of corruption. Thus, we need to control for all these
factors in order to establish whether the effect of oil prices on the real effective exchange
rate is signiÞcantly positive.
One main alternative reason for real appreciation is the fact that Russian produc-
tivity has grown faster than that in advanced economies. Indeed, Figure 3.7 shows a
clear correlation between the real exchange rate and the productivity differential with
the U.S. and the Euro area. This is a commonly observed phenomenon for developing
and transition economies, and is referred to as the Balassa-Samuelson effect26. Accord-
ing to the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, the real exchange rate should appreciate in
line with the relative productivity differential. If productivity growth in the trad-
ables sector exceeds productivity growth in the nontradables sector, prices of Russian
nontradables will tend to rise over time, while prices of Russian tradables will not (as-
suming they are determined abroad). This would imply a rise in the overall price level,
but it does not yet imply real appreciation: if Russian trade partners were to experi-
ence the same relative productivity growth, the price levels in trade partner countries
would rise at the same rate as Russian prices, and the inßation differential would be
26See, e.g., Krajnyák and Zettelmeyer (1998), Égert (2002), and Oomes (2005)
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unaffected. However, if Russian trade partners experience lower relative productivity
growth than Russia, which has generally been the case, then there would be a positive
inßation differential, and the real exchange rate would appreciate.
The real exchange rate is also expected to increase with government consumption.
The intuition behind this is that, unless governments consume only imported goods,
an increase in government consumption is likely to lead to a rise in the relative price
of nontradables, and therefore to real appreciation. Of course, one could argue that
government spending will eventually have to be Þnanced through higher taxes, which
would offset the effect on real appreciation through a decline in disposable income and
a fall in the private demand for nontradables. However, as Edwards (1989) Þnds, the
Þrst effect is likely to dominate the second effect, and this is generally conÞrmed by
empirical studies 27.
The relative price level in Russia (measured as the distance to PPP) is still be-
low the level given Russias relative income level (measured as PPP GDP per capita
relative to the euro area) in comparison to other transition economies (Figure 3.8).
Although the real exchange rate is still remains under its estimated equilibrium level,
the undervaluation is small and it has depleted the positive effect on exports of the
Russian currency devaluation in 1998 (see Figure 3.9 ).
According to the theory, the Dutch disease is accompanied by inßationary pres-
sures and an exchange rate appreciation as a result of inßow of revenues from the
export of natural resources. The Russian authorities keep the increase in the money
supply under control by transferring the excess revenues into the stabilization fund and
constraining the rise in the administrative prices. Russias Stabilization Fund (SF) was
established from the taxes on companies windfall oil proÞts to guard against drop in
the world oil prices. It amounted RUR 106.33bln on January 1, 2004, when was set
up and rose to RUR 768.45 bln ( approx. US$28 billion) on April 1, 2005. According
to the forecasts, the accumulated resources are likely to exceed one trillion roubles by
the end of 2005. The harmful consequences of massive windfall revenues bring in a
strong upward pressure on the exchange rate but do not result yet in exchange rate
appreciation. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is balancing two monetary objec-
tives  stable nominal exchange rate and low inßation. The authorities make all the
efforts to restrain inßation within the range of 8.5-10 percent and the real effective
exchange rate appreciation below 8 percent. On the one hand, suppressing the rouble
appreciation beneÞts the non-oil exporters but is done at the expense of the domestic
market producers actively using import components. On the other hand, spending the
oil revenues inside the country would provoke inßation and therefore result in nominal
salaries and pensions being decreased. In addition, taxes are paid in roubles, which
requires exporters to sell their currency holdings inducing further appreciation. Inßa-
tion is running ahead of the target and the strong real exchange rate hurts Russias
economic competitiveness. In 2004, inßation in Russia reached 11.7%, which was above
27In an important cross-country study, Froot and Rogoff (1991) found that the real exchange rate
appreciates more in countries with a high growth rate of government consumption. Égert, Halpern, and
MacDonald (2004), Table 5, list ten more papers that Þnd a positive effect of government consumption
on the real exchange rate, and only two papers that Þnd a negative effect.
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the official government target of 10.0%. As Standard&Poors (2005) and IMF (2004)
argued, the real appreciation of the rouble is unavoidable if authorities want to lever-
age inßation. The question is how it will take place - through nominal appreciation
or through higher inßation. Finally, Russia could beneÞt from a stronger real rouble
rate, which would stimulate restructuring and increase competitiveness. Nevertheless,
the persistently high inßation Þgures and the steady real exchange rate appreciation
suggest that the policy of balancing two economic targets is no longer fruitful.
Thus far, opinions are divided as to whether the Russian economy has been suffer-
ing from Dutch Disease. A detailed analysis by Westin (2004), based on data through
2003, concluded that, despite the existence of some Dutch Disease symptoms, Russia
had not yet contracted the full-blown disease. More recently, however, Standard and
Poors (2005) warned that Russia is fast becoming a classical victim of Dutch Dis-
ease, and Latsis (2005) argued that Russia has all the classical symptoms of Dutch
Disease. Finally, even high-ranked Russian government officials, including the Minis-
ter of Economy and the Economic Advisor to the President, have argued that Russia
runs the risk of contracting the disease, or has already contracted it28.
3.6 Empirical Tests and Results
3.6.1 Cointegration
Below we use cointegration and vector error correction (VEC) technique to assess
the determinants of the real appreciation in Russia. Our empirical estimates represent
the long-run sustainable path of the real exchange rate conditional on the time-series
evolution of its fundamentals. The notion of equilibrium is an essential concept in eco-
nomics, which includes 1) internal equilibrium  tradable versus non-tradable balance
based on the Balassa-Samuelson effect and 2) external equilibrium based on the net
foreign asset approach and a balanced current account. The equilibrium could also be
deÞned, as a long run steady state.
Many economic time series follow nonstationary behavior. A linear combination
of two or more series, however, can be stationary. Such series are said to be coin-
tegrated. If a vector process is cointegrated, then the time series share "common
trends". The cointegration relationship βb4i yt is interpreted as a stable long-run equi-
librium among the variables. Any deviations given by the stationary process zt = β
b4yt
are of temporary nature and are expected to disappear over time. Assuming that yt
is a m-dimensional nonstationary vector I(1) with m > 2, there could exist r linearly
independent cointegration vectors βb4i , i = 1, ...r with 0 < r < m, such that
βb4yt = zt (3.14)
28For the statements of Russian government officials, see http://www.rg.ru/2005/06/03/illarionov-
ekonomika.html and http://www.polit.ru/documents/332657.html (in Russian).
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where zt is a r dimensional stationary vector process, β
b4 is m× r matrix of cointe-
gration vectors and r is the cointegration rank. If two series are following an equilibrium
relationship, even though they may be non-stationary, in the long run they will move
closely together and the difference between them will be stationary. Hence, if non-
stationary variables are cointegrated, the regression provides meaningful information
about their long-run relationship29. In the previous chapters, time series by differen-
tiating were transformed into stationary. Differenced series, however, cannot provide
information about the long-run behavior of the economic time series. They provide
only description of short run interdependence. Testing for cointegration is a useful
method to test if variables converge to a time varying equilibrium in the long-run 30.
The empirical literature on cointegration analysis distinguishes between two main
estimation methods: single equation and system methods. Maddala and Kim (1998)
present several approaches for cointegrated analysis. Single equation method esti-
mates one speciÞc cointegrating vector, in comparison to the systems methods, where
the number of cointegrating vectors is determined in the process of estimation. Real
effective exchange rate is estimated in a vector error correction model (VECM) based
on the Johansen procedure(1991). Among the systems methods, Johansen maximum
likelihood procedure is the most widely applied in the literature for estimation and
testing the number of cointegrating vectors in the cointegrating systems. It consists of
estimation of error correction system of a VAR model.
∆xt =
Y
xt−1 +
k−1X
j=1
Γj∆xt−j + µ+ bzt + ²t (3.15)
where xt is an n-dimensional column vector, µ a vector of constants, zt a vector of
deterministic (exogenous) variables, such as seasonal dummies and intervention dum-
mies, and t e denotes the vector of white noise disturbances. In out setting, the variable
vector consists of four variables, Γj represents the short-run dynamics and the lagged
level term, and
Y
xt−1 is the error correction term of stationary linear combinations
of the x variables. Phillips (1991) proves that this approach produces coefficients that
are unbiased, symmetrically distributed and the standard Chi-square tests are valid for
hypothesis testing.
Using a Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) model, we estimate the sta-
tistical long-run relationship between the real exchange rate and its fundamentals.The
cointegration technique is a standard way in the literature of estimating equilibrium
29Testing for cointegration is also a useful way to avoid spurious regressions. Granger and Newbold
(1974) showed that if a variable I(1) is regressed on another I(1) variable, the regression can be
spurious. If this is the case, the residuals should be non-stationary I(1). If however the residuals are
stationary there is no spurious regression problem and no long-run information is lost.
30The test for cointegration consists of estimating the cointegration regression and obtaining the
residuals and applying the unit root test. The hypothesis that the residuals have a unit root is a
hypothesis that there is no cointegration.
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exchange rates, also for transition economies with available short data sample and poor
data quality. Studies using Johansen cointegration include Egert (2002), Golinelli and
Orsi (2002) , Jazbec (2002) and Lommatzsch and Tober (2002) among others (as cited
in Egert, 2004).
Our benchmark speciÞcation of the VEC model includes the following variables 31:
 the log of the real exchange rate (REER)
 the log of the productivity variable (PRD_DIFF)
 the log of the oil prices (OIL_PR)
 the log of the government consumption (GOV1)
 the log of the net international reserves (NIR)
 the log of the corruption variable (COR)
The real exchange rate variable is deÞned as the CPI-based REER, the labor pro-
ductivity variable is deÞned as the ratio between the indices of industrial output and
employment, the productivity differential is deÞned as the ratio of Russian labor pro-
ductivity to the equally weighted Euro area and US labor productivity (where labor
productivity is measured as industrial output per worker). The oil prices are monthly
Urals crude oil prices published by Bloomberg. We use one government variable  the
government consumption deÞned as the ratio of the general government non-interest
expenditures and the nominal GDP. Net international reserves are deÞned as the gross
international reserves (incl. gold) minus the liabilities to the IMF. Corruption is in-
terpolated by the yearly corruption index for Russia published by the Transparency
International We include also a dummy for the period August  October 1998, which
coincides with the Russian Þnancial crisis. Our empirical results report evidence of
stable cointegration relationships between the real exchange rate, the oil prices, the
productivity differential, government consumption, net international reserves (NIR),
and the corruption index. The expected effects of all of these variables on the equilib-
rium exchange rate are summarized below, where the sign according to the theory is
given in brackets:
reer = f(oil_pr, prd_diff , gov1, NIR, cor) (3.16)
( + ) ( + ) ( + ) (−) (−)
We have ten years of monthly data, covering the period January 1995-December
2004, although we use shorter sample periods in our regressions. The data description,
31Besides the above listed variables, we also have tested with several other variables including: the
log of the terms of trade measured as a percentage change of the export to import ratio (TOT) the
log of the government variable (GOV), the log of the deßated oil prices (OILPR_DEF), the log of
the corruption index (COR_IDX),the log of the net foreign assets (NFA), the log of the net foreign
assets, including bank assets (NFA_BNK), the log of the administrated electricity prices (PPI_ELC),
the log of the consumer price index of inßation (CPI_SRV). However, all the above variables did not
produce stable cointegration relationship with the real exchange rate.
Dutch Disease: does Russia have the symptoms 74
including the sources and the data correlation matrix, is given in Table 3.2 and Table
3.3. In order to test for the order of integration, we perform Augmented Dickey Fuller
(ADF) test whether a variable follows a unit-root process, whereby a constant is in-
cluded. The null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root, and the alternative
is that a stationary process generated the variable. The test results in Table 3.4 show
that all variables have been non-stationary, integrated in order one - the ADF fails to
reject the null hypothesis for the presence of unit root in levels for each of the series.
The series are trend-stationary in their Þrst differences. The number of autoregressive
lags in the ADF test and the choice of the best model were determined according to
the Akaike information and Final prediction error criterion. Nielson (2001) shows that
the likelihood information criterion can be used regardless of the assumption for the
characteristic roots, i.e. the characteristic roots of the autoregression can be stationary,
as well as nonstationary. The test is valid only if the errors in the regression are white
noise. This implies that it is necessary to augment the test regression with enough
lagged differences to ensure that the residuals are serially uncorrelated. Note, that
ADF test is sensible to the number of included lags and/or constant and trends. Table
3.4 shows that all variables are nonstationary, implying that it is legitimate to search
for a cointegration relationship 32.
The results of Johansen cointegration tests in Table 3.5 provide evidence that a
unique cointegrating vector exists between various combinations of the variables.Table
3.6 summarizes our estimated cointegrating vectors, with the coefficient for the real
exchange rate normalized to one. Our baseline estimate, obtained by minimizing the
Akaike and Schwartz information criteria, contains all Þve variables, and is reported
in the most-right right-most column (regression 4 for the period April 1997December
2004). All coefficient estimates in this equation are highly signiÞcant and have signs
that are in line with theory.
Despite the difficulty of estimating a long-run relationship for a sample period of less
than ten years for an economy in transition, our baseline estimates seem unbiased and
robust. As Table 3.6 shows, all residuals are well- behaved, in that there is no evidence
of serial correlation, non-normality, or heteroscedasticity. With some exceptions, the
baseline coefficient estimates reported above are also generally robust to the exclusion
of certain variables and to a lengthening of the sample period (starting in February 1996
rather than April 1997)33. The estimates provide evidence that higher oil prices imply
real appreciation, as predicted by the Dutch Disease hypothesis. Since all variables
are in logs, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. This means that a one
percent increase in the oil price, according to our baseline estimate, leads to 0.73
percent real appreciation. If the sample period is lengthened to include most of 1996,
the estimated oil price elasticity increases to 1.06, but in that case not all variables
32That is, the null hypothesis of a unit root in levels generally cannot be rejected (when a sufficient
number of lags is included), while the null hypothesis of a unit root in differences can be rejected.
33The question of structural break was not addressed here due to relatively short sample length
and the well-behaved residuals of the model,which show that the variation in the data is explained by
the included variables plus the two crisis dummies. Further points to include are the bootstrapped
p-values of the sample-split and the break-point Chow tests.
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are signiÞcant. When the cointegrating vector is estimated without the productivity
differential and the corruption index, the coefficient estimate for the oil price declines
to 0.35, which is still high. For example, it suggests that the increase in the Urals
oil price by 25 percent in 2004 (from $27.3 to $34.3 per barrel) would, all else equal,
have led to 0.35*25 or almost 9 percent real appreciation. In fact, real effective ruble
appreciation in 2004 was less than that (7.5 percent according to the IFS measure),
possibly owing to reserve accumulation and increased corruption, as suggested below.
In addition, the estimates suggest that the real exchange rate appreciates with increases
in government consumption and the productivity differential. A one percent increase in
either government consumption or the productivity differential leads to approximately
2 percent real appreciation. This is an even stronger effect than the effect of oil prices,
and suggests that the authorities policy of saving a large part of the windfall oil and
gas tax revenues in a stabilization fund has been effective in reducing real appreciation.
The coefficient estimates for the productivity differential are not very exact, and vary
between 0.68 and 2.99 depending on the sample period and which other variables are
included. Nevertheless, they suggest that part of the real appreciation may be explained
by the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
We also Þnd evidence that pressures on the real exchange rate are eased by NIR
accumulation, which has important policy implications. In particular, a one percent
increase in NIR is estimated to reduce the level of the real exchange rate by 0.22 percent.
The policy implication of this is that the Central Bank can engineer somewhat of a real
depreciation by buying up foreign exchange, and thus increasing its reserves. While
this contradicts the notion of the long-run neutrality of money, it is consistent with
the Þnding of a low long-run pass-through from the nominal exchange rate to inßation
(e.g., Oomes and Ohnsorge, 2005, estimate the pass-through for Russia at 0.5). That
is, while foreign exchange purchases by the central bank obviously will be inßationary
(assuming they cannot be fully sterilized), our estimates suggest that the obtained
reduction in nominal appreciation is not fully translated into higher inßation; hence,
there will be an effect on the real exchange rate. However, since our sample period
covers less than ten years of data, it is possible that our sample period is simply too
short to detect long-run money neutrality.
Finally, we Þnd some evidence that corruption can help to reduce real appreciation
pressures. The estimated baseline elasticity is -1.63, but this is estimate does not seem
to be very robust, as it ranges from a positive (but insigniÞcant) value of 0.42 to -3.24.
This instability in the estimate could be the result of the problems inherent in mea-
suring corruption. Our proxy, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI), consists of annual data only and is generally considered more useful for
cross-country studies than for time series analyses34. Nevertheless, it seems intuitive
that the effect should be negative, because a corrupt investment climate is likely to
34The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiles the corruption
surveys and expert assessments available for each given country and pools them into a single measure
for corruption, assigning the same weight to each source. However, the observations may not be
comparable over time, because the number of underlying sources changes every year (i.e., it is not a
balanced sample), and there have been frequent methodological improvements.
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lead to capital outßows, and therefore may give rise to exchange rate depreciation (e.g.,
Wei and Wu, 2001). Interestingly, a negative effect of corruption would imply that the
rent seeking behavior induced by higher oil prices may, to some extent, offset the Dutch
Disease effects.
We do not Þnd any evidence that the real exchange rate has been overvalued in
recent years. Figure 3.10 plots the difference between the actual real exchange rate
and its long-run equilibrium level. Interpreting these deviations as a measure of
misalignment, we see that the real exchange rate was overvalued from the end of 1997
until the August 1998 crisis, after which it remained undervalued until the end of 2000.
There was another brief period of overvaluation from the end of 2000 until the end of
2001, followed by a period (2002-2003) during which the real exchange rate was roughly
in equilibrium. Interestingly, our estimates suggest that, if anything, the real exchange
rate was undervalued, rather than overvalued in 2004, thus contradicting the Dutch
disease hypothesis.
If the slowdown in the Russian manufacturing sector is, indeed, the result of exces-
sive real appreciation, which is a question that remains to be answered, then limiting
real appreciation may be important to reduce the effects of Dutch Disease. Our esti-
mates suggest that foreign exchange interventions (reßected in reserve accumulation)
may help somewhat in this regard, but likely only to a limited extent. More effective
ways to reduce real appreciation pressures would include Þscal consolidation (i.e. low-
ering the ratio of government consumption to GDP) or an increase in corruption. The
latter strategy, however, will likely be counterproductive, in that it would limit Dutch
Disease, but would worsen the natural resource curse.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyzed if Russia has Dutch Disease symptoms and what is the
impact of the high oil prices. A shift in the oil prices trend would have strong economic,
as well as political consequences for Russia. Capitalizing on resources could speed up
Russias economic development. It could also deter the economic diversiÞcation and
endanger the current Þnancial stability by increasing the risk of economic and political
crises. The three main symptoms we have tested for include (i) a decline in the share
of the manufacturing sector (de-industrialization), relative to the services sector; (ii)
an increase in the overall wage level, and (iii) an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
Regarding the Þrst symptom, we Þnd clear evidence that output and employment
have decreased more rapidly in the manufacturing sector than in the services sector. In
particular, our sectoral data show that the manufacturing sector has grown more slowly
than other sectors since 2001, while manufacturing employment growth has fallen. We
also Þnd evidence that the share of the services sector has increased, suggesting that
the spending effect has been more important in Russia than the resource movement
effect.
The second symptom appears to be present as well, in that there is clear evidence
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of high real wage growth in all sectors since 2000. This is consistent with both the
resource movement and the spending effect, but could naturally be explained by other
factors as well (e.g. de-shadowization of wages and rapid productivity growth).
Finally, there is evidence that oil prices have pushed up the real rouble exchange
rate. Based on cointegration techniques, we found that a one percent increase in the
Urals oil price leads to a 0.73 percent appreciation of the real exchange rate, although
the estimated elasticity ranges from 0.35 to 1.06. These estimates were derived while
controlling for other real exchange rate determinants. We found that the level of
the real exchange rate is positively correlated with Russias productivity differential
and government consumption, while it is negatively correlated with net international
reserves and corruption.
However, we do not Þnd evidence that the real exchange rate has been overvalued.
While there was a brief period of overvaluation in 2001, according to our estimates, the
real exchange rate was roughly in equilibrium during 2002-2003, and may even have
been undervalued during 2004. While there may thus be evidence for Dutch Disease (in
the sense that higher oil prices have given rise to real appreciation), it is not clear that
this real appreciation has been responsible for the observed slowdown in manufactur-
ing growth. In order to establish this connection, further sector-level or even Þrm-level
research would be needed to determine the effects of real appreciation on individuals
Þrms or separate sectors. The symptoms studied are real exchange rate appreciation,
decline in the manufacturing sector and boom in the services sector. So far, evidences
are mixed but Dutch Disease symptoms seem to be present in Russia. Based on coin-
tegration and vector error correction technique we Þnd that current real appreciation
depends signiÞcantly on oil prices and government consumption and affects negatively
growth. Moreover this result is robust even when controlling for corruption and the
Balassa-Samuelson effect. Also there is increase in services output and employment.
Yet, one of the main symptoms de-industrialization does not seem to be in place.
There is a slowdown in some, but not all manufacturing industries. The reasons are
low factor mobility in the economy and the short period in which Russia is beneÞting
from the high international oil prices. Nevertheless, the risk of Dutch Disease exist
and its hedging will be a challenge for the authorities in the in the future. Prudent
and transparent macroeconomic policies are the key for a successful management of
the Russias oil wealth. We conclude that, while Russia does appear to have most of
the symptoms, it does not yet have the full-ßedged Dutch Disease. Although we Þnd
evidence of a shrinking manufacturing sector, an expanding services sector, and rapid
real wage growth, we do not yet Þnd evidence of an overvalued real exchange rate.
Nevertheless, given that oil prices have continued to soar in 2005, and are projected to
remain high, the risk of Dutch Disease certainly exists, and warrants close monitoring.
Furthermore, restructuring, diversiÞcation and improvement of current institutions and
administrative mechanisms could help Russia achieve faster economic growth.
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Table 1.1: ERM II participation and euro adoption by the new Member States 
Source: European Commission Convergence Report, National central banks 
Country 
 
ERM II participation 
 
 
Euro adoption 
 
Estonia 
 
Participates since 28 June 2004 
 
1 January 2007 (Estonia wants to be 
“technically ready” for euro adoption by mid-
2006, but has not planned actual euro entry 
before 2008) 
 
Lithuania 
 
Participates since 28 June 2004 1 January 2008  
Slovenia 
 
Slovakia 
 
Participates since 28 June 2004 
 
Participates since November 2005 
1 January 2007 
 
1 January 2008 
Cyprus 
 
Participates since 2 May 2005 Euro entry envisaged “as soon as possible” 
likely 1 January 2008 
 
Malta Participates since 2 May 2005 Official target date and fiscal consolidation 
path would suggest 1 January 2008 
 
Latvia Re-pegged from SDR to euro on 1 
January 2005. Application for ERM II 
entry was planned in close connection 
with re-pegging, but has been delayed. 
Participates since 2 May 2005 
 
  
1 January 2008 
Czech 
Republic 
Possibly during 2008-2009 (based on 
2011 euro entry scenario) 
“Around 2009/2010”. Convergence 
Programme foresees meeting deficit criterion 
in 2008-9, consistent with 2011 entry. 
Decision to adopt euro is based on broader 
assessment of “readiness to join the euro 
area”.  
 
Hungary Not specified. 
 
2012/2014 appears most likely target date 
(although aiming for 2010 has not been ruled 
out by the authorities) 
 
Poland Possibly during 2008/9, depending on 
progress with fiscal consolidation and 
pension fund accounting along the lines 
of the CP  
 
Official target date has yet to be set, although 
could allow euro adoption in 2012.  
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Table 1.2: Current accounts in CEEC (as percent of GDP)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Economist intelligence country data 2002 
 
Source: IFS, EC 
 
Table 1.3: Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEE) – economic 
indicators 2000-2001  
 
 
 
 
 
R 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Datastream, IFS, WIIW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
External  
debt/GDP
External
 debt/Exports FDI /GDP
Current 
Account/
GDP
Bulgaria 86.4  148.3 8.3 5.9
Czech 42.8 56.2 9.1 4.8
Estonia 61.4 64.6 6.4 6.8
Hungary 67.3 97.3 2.6 3.9
Latvia 65.9  144.0 5.6 6.8
Lithuania 42.9 95.1 3.3 6.0
Poland 42.9  214.5 5.9 6.3
Romania 27.0 81.7    2.7 
 10.7 
3.7
Slovakia 56.3 76.5 3.7
Slovenia 34.3 58.1 0.2 3.3
avg. 
CEECs 52.7 103.6 5.5 5.1
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Table 1.4: Volatility in CEEC countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Maastricht criteria in CEEE 
 
 
Source: Datastream 
 
 
Table 1.5: Progress towards Maastricht (2004/2005 data) 
 
Country Inflation (June 
04 – June 05) 
Government 
deficit (%GDP) 
Government 
debt (% GDP) 
Maastricht 
criteria met 
Maastricht 
reference value 
2.3 -3.0 60.0  
Cyprus 2.5 -4.1 71.9 0 
Czech Republic 2.1 -3.0 37.4 4 
Estonia 4.1 1.8 4.9 3 
Hungary 5.0 -5.4 60.4 0 
Latvia 7.0 -0.7 14.3 3 
Lithuania 2.7 -2.5 19.7 3 
Malta 2.4 -5.2 75.0 1 
Poland 3.8 -6.8 47.7 1 
Slovakia 4.5 -3.3 43.6 2 
Slovenia 3.0 -1.9 29.4 3 
Source: Eurostat and Fitch Ratings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP Terms of 
trade**
Real 
effective 
exchange 
rate**
Real  
interest 
rate**
Gov’t 
revenue/G
DP
CEECs* 4,10 4,40 12,66  6,34 2,31
Latin America 3,74 8,70 18,00 13,18 2,19
Emerging Asia 4,11 5,92   8,65   2,52 1,82
Advanced 
countries
2,09 3,73   5,90   2,07 1,02
*1993-2001
**Only Czech republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania
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Table 1.6. CEEC exchange rate regimes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: De jure classification according to the IMF. Fix: currency board, conventional peg, narrow band: 
Intermediate:tightly managed, broad band; Float: managed float, free float 
 
Table 1.7:Correlation of GDP and prices between acceding countries and EU countries 
 
1996.1-2002.4 1996.1 – 1999.4 2000.1-2002.4  
GDP Prices GDP Prices GDP Prices 
Czech Republic 0,11 -0,15 -0,31 0,32 0,48 0,41 
Estonia 0,18 0,18 0,22 0,86 0,65 0,71 
Hungary -0,07 -0,01 0,51 0,91 -0,36 0,25 
Latvia 0,17 0,19 0,32 0,95 0,26 0,15 
Lithuinia -0,27 0,20 -0,06 0,92 -0,65 0,36 
Poland 0,55 -0,04 0,11 0,92 0,81 -0,07 
Slovak Republic -0,28 -0,16 -0,18 -0,28 -0,82 -0,26 
Slovenia 0,48 0,58 0,31 0,78 0,63 0,31 
Denmark 0,45 0,30 0,32 0,04 0,45 -0,28 
Sweden 0,43 0,67 0,66 0,33 0,33 0,62 
United Kingdom 0,76 0,20 0,37 0,05 0,95 -0,14 
Accession countries 0,11 0,10 0,11 0,67 0,13 0,23 
Non-Monetary Union 0,55 0,26 0,45 0,14 0,58 0,07 
Source: EFN autumn report (2003) 
Fix Intermediate Float 
Stabilisation phase Czech Rep. Cyprus Bulgaria 
1990 - 1994 Estonia Slovenia 
Hungary Romania 
Latvia     
Lithuania  
Malta 
Poland 
Slovakia 
Transition phase Bulgaria    Czech Rep. Slovenia 
1995 - 2000 Estonia Cyprus Romania 
Latvia Hungary 
Lithuania Poland     
Malta Slovakia   
Preparatory phase Bulgaria Cyprus     Czech Rep. 
2001  - ERMII Estonia Hungary   Poland 
Latvia Slovakia 
Lithuania Slovenia 
Malta 
Romania 
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Table 1.8: Correlation of supply and demand shocks between candidate countries 
and EU countries 
 
Supply Shocks Germany France EMU UK 
 a)* b)** a)* b)** b)** a)** 
Bulgaria n.a 0.13 n.a -0.29 -0.03 n.a 
Czech Rep.  -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.13 0.04 -0.14 
Estonia 0.08 0.34 -0.05 -0.06 0.25 -0.15 
Hungary 0.28 -0.10 -0.02 0.65 0.46 -0.30 
Latvia -0.07 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.30 0.16 
Lithuania -0.16 0.00 -0.31 -0.17 -0.11 -0.04 
Poland 0.00 -0.04 0.07 -0.17 0.08 0.17 
Romania n.a -0.08 n.a -0.02 0.02 n.a 
Slovakia -0.04 0.11 0.26 -0.04 0.05 -0.03 
Slovenia 0.02 -0.04 0.28 -0.20 0.15 0.28 
 
Demand Shocks Germany France EMU UK 
 a)* b)** a)* b)** b)** a)** 
Bulgaria n.a -0.17 n.a 0.12 0.03 n.a 
Czech Rep.  0.10 -0.30 0.09 0.11 -0.15 0.03 
Estonia 0.05 -0.15 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.09 
Hungary -0.40 -0.01 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.52 
Latvia 0.11 -0.09 -0.21 -0.16 -0.49 -0.11 
Lithuania 0.33 0.32 0.18 -0.24 -0.49 -0.03 
Poland 0.14 0.24 0.07 0.30 0.28 0.23 
Romania n.a -0.05 n.a 0.08 0.03 n.a 
Slovakia 0.04 -0.29 -0.31 -0.27 -0.05 -0.10 
Slovenia 0.03 0.14 0.29 0.36 -0.18 0.10 
Source: a) Horvath (2002b). Notes: * Computed with quarterly GDP data over 1993:1-
2000:3 (Hungary 1995:1-2000:3). Bold figures indicate significance at 5% level 
 b) Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) Notes: ** Computed with quarterly GDP data over 
1994:1-2000:4 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary 1995 -2000, Baltic Republics 1996 – 2000, 
Romania 1992 - 2000). 
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Table 1.9:Correlation of supply and demand shocks between EU countries and 
the aggregate of the Euro area and Germany  
 
. Country Supply shocks Demand shocks 
 Euro area Geramany Euro area Geramany 
Austria 0.38 0.48 0.08 0.33 
Belgium 0.53 0.18 0.00 0.21 
Finland 0.30 0.17 0.06 -0.19 
France 0.69 0.44 0.30 0.35 
Germany 0.66 1.00 0.18 1.00 
Greece 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 
Ireland -0.14 -0.12 0.13 -0.14 
Italy 0.52 0.25 0.57 0.27 
Netherlands 0.47 0.11 0.04 0.29 
Portugal 0.45 0.23 0.09 0.28 
Spain 0.22 0b .35 0.16 0.35 
Denmark 0.18 0.30 0.13 0.09 
Sweden 0.24 0.00 0.09 0.08 
UK 0.21 0.12 -0.13 -0.07 
Source: Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) 
Table 1.10: Standard deviations under alternative monetary rules 
 Standard 
deviations 
Flexible wages 
and prices 
Inflation 
targeting 
Taylor 
rule  
Taylor rule  
(CPI) 
Exchange rate 
rule 
Baselane 
Output 1.6 2.4 1.1 1.7 5.1 
Inflation 2.0 1.3 1.5 1.3 0.5 
Real ex. rate 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.7 1.5 
 
Real int rate 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.6 2.1 
Price flexible 
Output 1.6 2.4 1.6 1.8 3.8 
Inflation 2 1.3 1.8 1.5 2.1 
Real ex.rate 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 
 
Real int. rate 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4 
Wage flexible 
Output 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.3 
Inflation 2 1.2 1.7 1.5 0.5 
Real ex.rate 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.8 1.3 
 
Real int. rate 2.6 2.6 2.9 2.6 2.1 
Source: Devereux (2002) 
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Table 1.11:Data description and regime-specific dummies 
Country  Variable name Dummy Begin date End date 
all Asian crisis Dumasia 1997:9 1998:4 
all Russian crisis dumrussia 1998: 5 1999:1 
all Argentina crisis Dumarg 2001:9 2002:5 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Fixed 
Bands 
Managed float 
Infl. targeting 
Dumcz 
0 
1 
2 
Dumczinf=1 
 
1994:1 
1996:2 
1997:5 
1998:1  
 
1996:1 
1997:4 
2003:12 
2003:12 
Hungary  
Peg  
Crawling peg 
Crawling band 
Infl. targeting 
Dumhu 
0 
1 
2 
Dumhuinf=1 
 
1994:1 
1995:4 
2001:5 
2001:5 
 
1995:3 
2001:5 
2003:12 
2003:12 
Poland  
Peg 
Bands 
Float 
Infl. targeting 
Dumpl 
0 
1 
2 
Dumplinf =1 
 
1994:1 
1995:5 
2000:4 
1998:9 
 
1995:4 
2000:3 
2003:12 
2002:11 
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Table 1.12: Time series properties of the data 
Time series ADF Phillips-Perron Order of integration 
CZ        y 
d.y 
p 
d.p 
q 
d.q 
-3.474**(c,t) 
-17.143***(c) 
-2.486 (c,t) 
-9.659***(c) 
1.515 (c,t) 
-8.028*** 
-4.803*** 
-18.764*** 
-2.694 
-9.650*** 
-2.252 
-8.214*** 
    I(0)** 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
HU         y 
d.y 
p 
d.p 
q 
d.q 
-3.783**(c,t) 
-18.518***(c) 
-2.220(c,t) 
-9.504***(c) 
-2.103(c,t) 
-9.855***(c) 
-6.571*** 
-24.016*** 
-2.237 
-9.498*** 
-2.267 
-9.853*** 
    I(0)** 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
PL          y 
d.y 
p 
d.p 
q 
d.q 
-2.262(c,t) 
-12.706***(c) 
-3.156*(c,t) 
-11.564***(c) 
-2.181(c,t) 
-8.028*** 
-2.897 
-13.138*** 
-3.242* 
-11.593*** 
-2.297 
-7.832*** 
I(1) 
I(0) 
  I(0)* 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
ES          y 
d.y 
p 
d.p 
q 
d.q 
-3.573**(c,t) 
-14.030***(c) 
-2.578(c,t) 
-9.458***(c) 
-2.165(c,t) 
-14.675*** 
-4.705** 
-14.890*** 
-2.598 
-9.457*** 
-2.238*** 
-16.269*** 
    I(0)** 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
SL          y 
d.y 
p 
d.p 
q 
d.q 
-3.864**(c,t) 
-16.325***(c) 
-2.995(c,t) 
-9.879***(c) 
-7.864***(c,t) 
-14.322*** 
-5.418*** 
-20.476*** 
-2.972 
-10.020*** 
-7.882*** 
-17.833*** 
     I(0)** 
I(0) 
I(1) 
I(0) 
I(0) 
(0) 
Source: Model estimates 
Notes: d. is the first difference operator, y denotes the relative output, p the relative 
prices and q the real exchange rate. The asterisks  indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis 
at the 10%(*), the 5%(**) and the 1% (***) level. The critical values of  ADF test statistic is -
3.540(**) and for the PP test is -2.890(**). The brackets indicate the inclusion of a trend (t) and 
/or a constant(c)  
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Table 1.13:Granger causality Wald tests  
Country Equation Excluded F Prob > 
F 
Equation Excluded F Prob > 
F 
Equation Excluded F Prob > 
F 
CZ 
0.2969 0.8792 0.2567 0.9048 0.2975 0.8788 
HU 0.9543            0.4369   1.7884       0.1385 0.0694                0.9910
PL 0.9611                       0.4332 1.9533                      0.1089 4.0020      0.0050 
SL 1.4204    0.2341 0.2486                        0.9098 1.8827     0.1208 
ES 
 
 
∆y 
 
 
∆p 
1.3695     0.2512 
 
 
 
∆p 
 
 
∆y 
1.0877     0.3678 
 
 
∆q 
 
 
∆y 
0.8773           0.4811 
CZ 
1.5728 0.1888 2.4375 0.0531 2.0362 0.0964 
HU 0.6408      0.6348 0.5210        0.7205 1.5771              0.1877 
PL 4.0917 0.0044 0.3939 0.8125 4.6541      0.0019 
SL 0.3559 0.8392 0.1055      0.9803 0.8005      0.5281 
ES 
 
 
∆y 
 
 
∆q 
1.4096      0.2376 
 
 
 
∆p 
 
 
∆q 
2.0867      0.0895 
 
 
 
∆q 
 
 
∆p 
1.7231 0.1523 
CZ 
0.9064 0.5152 1.2539 0.2784 1.1585 0.3336 
HU 0.7018   0.6890 1.1527           0.3372 0.9136               0.5093
PL 2.5768  0.0143 1.2836 0.2628 4.3081      0.0002 
SL 0.8412 0.5691 0.2268      0.9851 1.1608      0.3322 
ES 
 
 
∆y 
 
 
 ALL          
1.3588      0.2263 
 
 
 
∆p 
 
 
 ALL          
1.7199      0.1052 
 
 
 
∆q 
  
 
ALL          
1.4534 0.1864 
Source: Model estimates 
Notes: The null hypothesis that x does not Granger-cause y is rejected if the test statistic is 
higher than the 5% critical value. We find that the lagged values of the variable x have 
explanatory power for any of the variables in the system for all the countries except for Poland. 
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Table 1.14:Forecast error variance decomposition  
1.14.1 Czech Republic 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Step Output REER Prices Output REER Prices Output REER Prices 
1 1 .018421 .00112 0 .981579 .004315 0 0 .994565 
2 .973273 .027608 .006258 .019757 .966725 .004491 .006971 .005667 .98925 
3 .964474 .026025 .005862 .022603 .949043 .059886 .012922 .024933 .934252 
1.14.2 Hungary 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Step Output REER Prices Output REER Prices Output REER Prices 
1 1 .001726    015499 0 .998274  .000089 0 0  .984412 
2 | .970514  | .002148  | .024648 .008192 .954243 | .015195 | .014742 | .04361 .960157 
3 958272 | .002297 | .029925 .008771 | .94947 | .014742 .032957 | .048233 | .955332 
1.14.3 Poland 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Step Output REER Prices Output REER Prices Output REER Prices 
1 1 .000838 .07016 0 .999162 .000335 0 0 929506 
2 .924323 .115081 .072566 .041965 .881687 .002919 .033712 .003231 .924516 
3 .848956 .121994 .130839 .120101 .837098 .003018 .030943 .040908 .866143 
1.14.4 Slovenia 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Step Output REER Prices Output REER Prices Output REER Prices 
1 1 .043974   026648 0 956026  .018355  0 0 .954997 
2 .95720  .068215  .027686     .003609  .931728 .019867 .039189  .000057  .952447 
3 .956912     .07307      .028544     .003942     .91283      .02155      .039146     .014101     .949906    
1.14.5 Estonia 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Step Output REER Prices Output REER Prices Output REER Prices 
1  1          .006243 .003011     0 .996989      .014567          0 0 .97919     
2 .952626      004001 .006695     .039255     .995389     .054945     .008119     .00061      .938359   
3       .924594    .007208     .006631     .066058     .962553     .054032     .009348     .030238     .939337    
Notes: (1) Forecast error variance decomposition due to supply shock, (2) Forecast error 
variance decomposition due to demand shock, (3) Forecast error variance decomposition due to 
nominal shock  
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Table 2.1: Countries and data source 
 
 
Country Data Period Source 
  From To  
Croatia 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1994(2) 2004(6) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Czech 
Republic 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1994(2) 2004(6) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Germany 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1994(2) 2004(2) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Hungary 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1994(2) 2004(6) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Lithuania 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1997(2) 2004(6) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Poland 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1994(2) 2003(12) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Romania 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1994(2) 2003(4) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Slovakia 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1995(8) 2004(6) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Slovenia 
Industrial Production, 
CPI 
Money Market Rate 
1994(2) 2004(6) 
 
International Financial Statistics 
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
 
 12
Table 2.2:  Regime switching model: industrial production and interest rates  
 
Classification Croatia Czech Republic 
 IP                    IR IP                           IR 
Mean (High credibility)          
Mean (Low credibility)  
-0.0093         0.0845 
 0.0065         0.1096  
 0.0061                 0.0371 
 0.0133                 0.1453  
Std. Err (High credibility)  0.0079           0.5337  0.0100                  0.3266  
Std. Err (Low credibility)  0.0082           1.9768  0.0062                  1.7838  
Transition Probailities    
(High cred. - High cred.)  0,9186 0,9488 
(Low cred. - Low cred.)  0,9349 0,7903 
(High cred. - Low cred.)  0,0814 0,0512 
(Low cred. - High cred.)  0,0651 0,2097 
Regime properties  N.obs   Prob.       Dur  N.obs  Prob.  Dur  
High credibility  
Low credibility  
 57.5     0.44    2.29 .               
65.5     0.56     15.35  
100.8   0.80    19.55           
22.2     0.20    4.77  
LR Linearity test  72.42**  121.69**  
 
Table 2.2: (cont`d) Regime switching model: industrial production and interest rates 
 
Classification Hungary Lithuania Poland 
 IP            IR IP            IR IP           IR 
Mean (High credibility)  -0.0130          0.0094   -0,0094        -0,1526  -0.0119      0.0176  
Mean (Low credibility)  -0.0198         -0.1428   0.0078         0.9188    0.0081    -0.0117  
Std. Err (High credibility)  0.0114           0.0537   0.0124         0.9416    0.0079     0.0993  
Std. Err (Low credibility)  0.0063           1.1248   0.0149         2.1153    0.0451    0.2804  
Transition probailities     
(High cred. - High cred.)  0,9712 0,8065 0,9695 
(Low cred. - Low cred.)  0,3205 0,2564 0,2376 
(High cred. - Low cred.)  0,0288 0,1935 0,0305 
(Low cred. - High cred.)  0,6795 0,7436 0,7624 
Regim e properties  N.obs   Prob.       Dur  N.obs  Prob.  Dur  N.obs   Prob.       Dur  
High credibility 
 Low credibility  
118.5    0.96     35.50   
   4.5      0.04     1.45 
73.4      0.88       40.71  
 13.6     0.12          5.41      
112.3  0.97        32.74                          
4.7      0.03         1.31  
LR Linearity test  280.21**  149.11*  66.11** 
 
Table 2.2: (cont`d) Regime switching model: industrial production and interest rates 
 
Classification Romania  Slovakia  Slovenia 
 IP            IR IP            IR IP           IR 
Mean (High credibility)  -0.0029        -0.0657  -0.0012         -0.0035  -0.0025        0.0158  
Mean (Low credibility)  0.0094          0.0300  -0.0001         0.1509  -0.0056        0.0308  
Std. Err (High credibility)  0.0227          0.2145  0.0045            0.0915  0.0048          0.1769  
Std. Err (Low credibility)  0.0068          0.1207  0.0081           0.2928  0.0024           0.5641  
Transition Probailities     
(High cred. -High cred.)  0,4178 0,9439 0,9533 
(Low cred. - Low cred.)  0,9345 0,7433 0,7540 
(High cred. -Low cred.)  0,5822 0,0561 0,0467 
(Low cred. - High cred.)  0,0655 0,2567 0,246 
Regime properties  N.obs     Prob.      Dur  N.obs   Prob.     Dur  N.obs     Prob.     Dur  
High credibility  11.1        0.10        1.72  86.4         0.82    17.83  103.5      0.84      21.40  
Low credibility  97.9       0.90      15.26  18.6        0.18      3.90  19.5        0.16        4.06  
LR Linearity test  30.79**  36.07**  43.75** 
 
Notes:  
Non-linear, bivariate heteroscedastic Markov- switching model with regime dependent mean. Number of  
regimes 2, number of lags 3. Results obtained using Ox ; IP – industrial production, IR- interest rate differential  
* indicates that the null hypothesis of linearity has been rejected at 1% level  
** indicates that the null hypothesis of linearity has been rejected at 5% level 
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Table 2.3:  Regime switching model: inflation and interest rates 
 
Classification Croatia Czech Republic 
       CPI                    IR    CPI                          IR 
Mean (High credibility)  -0.0037                    0.0724  -0.0064                     -0.0339  
Mean (Low credibility)  -0.0026                    0.1331 -0.0060                     -0.0263  
Std. Err (High credibility)  0.0015                     0.6969 0.0034                       0.2106  
Std. Err (Low credibility)  0.0005                     2.6959  0.0005                       1.0256  
T ransition Probailities    
(High cred. - High cred.)  0,9036 0,6675 
(Low cred. - Low cred.)  0,7156 0,7907 
(High cred. - Low cred.)  0,0964 0,3325 
(Low cred. - High cred.)  0,2844 0,2093 
Regime properties  N.obs     Prob.  Duration  N.obs   Prob.  Duration  
High credibility  91.8    0.75          10.37  47.5      0.39      3.01  
Low credibility  31.2    0.25            3.52  75.5       0.61      4.78  
LR Linearity test  78.36**  192.96**  
 
Table 2.3: (cont`d) Regime switching model: inflation and interest rates 
 
Classification Hungary Lithuania Poland 
 CPI            IR CPI            IR CPI               IR 
Mean (High credibility)  -0.0033    -0.0234  -0.0001      -0.3145  -0.0096       -0.0092  
Mean (Low credibility)  -0.0020     0.0158  -0.0001       0.1799  -0.0091        0.0181  
Std. Err (High credibility)  0.0015       0.1228  0.0021        0.5055  0.0137         0.0879  
Std. Err (Low credibility)  0.0007       0.0430  0.0008         1.5949  0.0010         0.1164  
Transition Probailities     
(High cred. - High cred.)  0,3314  0,6891  0  
(Low cred. - Low cred.)  0,7723  0,8811  0,8933  
(High cred. - Low cred.)  0,6686  0,3109  1  
(Low cred. - High cred.)  0,2277  0,1189  0,1067  
Regime properties  N.obs  Prob.  Dur.  N.obs   Prob.  Dur.  N.obs   Prob.  Dur.  
High credibility  31.0    0.25      1.50   23.5     0.28       3.2  11.3     0.09      1.00  
Low credibility  91.0    0.75      4.39  63.5     0.72       8.41  105.7    0.90       9.37  
LR Linearity test  43.97**  30.06**  238.15**  
 
Table 2.3: (cont`d) Regime switching model: inflation and interest rates 
 
Classification  Romania  Slovakia  Slovenia  
 CPI            IR CPI            IR CPI               IR 
Mean (High credibility)  -0.0565      -0.0987  -0.0068       -0.0011  -0.0068       -0.0030  
Mean (Low credibility)  -0.0537       0.0238  -0.0072        0.0070  -0.0070        0.3121  
Std. Err (High credibility)  0.0529         0.1917  0.0051         0.1056    0.0007        0.1929  
Std. Err (Low credibility)  0.0043         0.1206  0.0008         0.1575    0.0034        0.4831  
Transition Probailities     
(High cred. - High cred.)  0,2804  0,3208  0,8838  
(Low cred. - Low cred.)  0,9016  0,8491  0,2438  
(High cred. - Low cred.)  0,7196  0,6792  0,1162  
(Low cred. - High cred.)  0,0984  0,1509  0,7562  
Regime properties  N.obs     Prob.  Dur.  N.obs     Prob.  Dur.  N.obs     Prob.  Dur.  
High credibility  13.3    0.12      1.39  19.1       0.18    1.47  106.7    0.87      8.61  
Low credibility  95.7    0.88     10.16  85.9       0.81    6.63  16.3      0.13      1.32  
LR Linearity test  200.78**  101.02**  100.62**  
 
Notes:  
Non-linear, bivariate heteroscedastic Markov- switching model with regime dependent mean. Number of  
regimes 2, number of lags 3. Results obtained using Ox (Krolzig ,2004);  CPI – consumer price index , IR- 
interest rate differential  
* indicates that the null hypothesis of linearity has been rejected at 1% level  
** indicates that the null hypothesis of linearity has been rejected at 5% level 
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Table 2.4: Regime switching model coefficients in selected countries  
 
Hungary Slovakia Czech Republic 
Countries/ Coefficients 
    IR                    IP IR               IP IR               IP 
(L1) α11   α12  (High cred.) 0.175            -0.024 0.264          -0.006 -0.031         0.000 
Standard  Error (0.089)         (0.013) (0.083)       (0.004) (0.094)     (0.001) 
(L2) α11   α12   0.181            -0.002 -0.021           0,006 -0.043         0.001 
Standard  Error (0.090)         (0.013) (0.087)        (0.004) ( 0.078)     (0.001) 
(L3) α11   α12   -0.136            0.014 0.003             0.002 -0.097          0.001 
Standard  Error (0.090)         (0.013) (0.084)        ( 0.004) (0.078)      (0.001) 
(L1) α21   α22   -0.842             0.276 -2.996          0.423 -9.954           0.416 
Standard  Error ( 0.584)       ( 0.085) (2.220)       (0.096) (5.172)        (0.082) 
(L2) α21   α22   -0.118             0.270 0.575            0.040 6.778             0.194 
Standard  Error ( 0.600)        ( 0.086) (2.383)       (0.101) (5.695)        ( 0.089) 
(L3) α21   α22   1.145                0.331 -2.367           0.190 5.271              0.182 
Standard  Error (0.585)           ( 0.086) (1.935)        (0.083) (5.096)          (0.080) 
(L1) α11   α12  (Low cred.) 3.366            -0.101 -0.435         0.078 0.660           -0.002 
Standard  Error (1.060)        (0.150) (0.382)        ( 0.017) (0.185)        (0.005) 
(L2) α11   α12   -2.010            0.236 -0.590             0.010 -0.773            0.002 
Standard  Error (1.480)        (0.201) (0.222)        ( 0.097) (0.162)         ( 0.003) 
(L3) α11   α12   9.868            -0.220 2.245             -0.101 1.402            -0.000 
Standard  Error (0.719)         (0.101) (0.370)         (0.016) (0.190)          (0.003) 
(L1) α21   α22   -20.146         1.122 -19.794          2.023 -126.136         -0.750 
Standard  Error (4.824)         (0.684) (7.430)        ( 0.329) (33.566)        ( 0.603) 
(L2) α21   α22   36.589           -1.035 -18.002          -0.438 128.775           -0.441 
Standard  Error (5.580)          (0.794) (5.157)          (0.226) ( 34.858)        (0.585) 
(L3) α21   α22   2.853               0.536 52.285            -1.316 -59.038              0.948 
Standard  Error (4.821)           ( 0.683) (6.702)           (0.294) ( 51.462)          (0.845) 
 IR          CPI IR               CPI IR               CPI 
(L1) β11   β12  (High cred.) -0.119      -0.002 -0.126   0.006 -0.728         0.001 
Standard  Error (0.203)   (0.003) (0.242)   (0.003) (0.212)     (0.001) 
(L2) β11   β12   0.324         0.001 -0.127  -0.019 -0.618         0.000 
Standard  Error (0.165)   (0.002) (0.222)   (0.003) (0.269)    (0.001) 
(L3) β11   β12   0.142        0.004 -0.879   0.017 -0.413        0.001 
Standard  Error (0.183)   (0.002) (0.336)   (0.004) (0.208)     (0.001) 
(L1) β21   β22   38.49       -0.156 -28.608   1.240 -1.755         0.522 
Standard  Error (18.044)    (0.270) (13.30)   (0.179) (124.37)   (0.255) 
(L2) β21   β22   -33.00          0.932 8.424      -0.356 -1556.127     0.437 
Standard  Error (23.889)    (0.300) (15.31)    (0.204) (658.19)      (1.421) 
(L3) β21   β22   -29.67          0.412 12.911      -0.031 855.312          0.861 
Standard  Error (24.448)   (0.288) (10.95)   (0.147) (433.37)      (0.990) 
(L1) β11   β12  (Low cred.) 0.221       -0.001 0.312        0.001 0.185         0.000 
Standard  Error (0.097)     (0.001) (0.124)   (0.002) (0.086)     (0.001) 
(L2) β11   β12   0.187        -0.000 0.086        0.003 -0.357        -0.000 
Standard  Error (0.089)     (0.001) (0.125)   (0.002) (0.086)  (0.001) 
(L3) β11   β12   -0.099       0.002 0.252         0.001 0.091          -0.000 
Standard  Error (0.087)    (0.001) (0.123)   (0.002) (0.090)      (0.001) 
(L1) β21   β22   2.251     0.511 2.134         0.700 -3.118          0.902 
Standard  Error (5.82)    (0.073) (7.74)     (0.108) (28.086)    (0.080) 
(L2) β21   β22   -2.674    0.121 -2.295      -0.018 -5.210          0.019 
Standard  Error (6.23)    (0.080) (9.40)     (0.125) (37.662)     (0.101) 
(L3) β21   β22   4.669     0.118 4.202         0.038 36.930         -0.036 
Standard  Error (5.68)    (0.075) (7.03)      (0.093) (26.423)    (0.0702 
Notes:  
Estimation of equations (1.16) and (1.17) in the text with regime dependant coefficients. Selected countries. 
Number of  regimes 2 (High and Low cred.), number of lags 3 (L1,2,3). Standard errors in parentheses.  IP – 
industrial production, IR- interest rate differential, CPI – consumer price index. Coefficients (α11 , α12 )  and (β 
11 , β 12 )  indicate lagged IR values, (α21,   α22) lagged IP values, and   (β 11 , β 12 )  lagged CPI values. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of Dutch Disease Symptoms 
 
 
Output Employment Wage Price
Resource movement effect
oil sector + + + given
manufacturing sector − − + given
services sector − − + +
Spending effect
oil sector − − + given
manufacturing sector − − + given
services sector + + + +
Combined effect
oil sector indeterminate indeterminate + given
manufacturing sector − − + given
services sector indeterminate indeterminate + +  
 
 
Table 3.2. Data Description and Sources 
 
VARIABLE SOURCE FREQUENCY DESCRIPTION
Real effective exchange rate IFS Monthly CPI-based index, 1995=100.
Oil price Bloomberg Monthly Urals crude oil price per barrel.
Government consumption IMF, IFS Monthly, 
Quarterly
General government non-interest expenditure 
(monthly) in percent of GDP (quarterly, 
interpolated).
Productivity differential Rosstat, Eurostat, U.S. 
National Census bureau
Monthly The ratio of Russian labor productivity to the 
unweighted average of Euro area and U.S. 
labor productivity (where labor productivity 
is measured as industrial output per worker).
Net international reserves IFS Monthly Gross international reserves (including gold) 
minus liabilities to IMF.
Corruption Transparency International Annual Survey-based index (interpolated).
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Table 3.3. Correlation Matrix 
 
Real effective 
exchange rate
Oil price Government 
consumption
Productivity 
differential
Net 
international 
reserves
Corruption 
index
Real effective exchange rate 1.00 0.14 0.44 0.13 0.56 0.32
Oil price 0.14 1.00 -0.09 0.77 0.74 0.28
Government consumption 0.44 -0.09 1.00 -0.13 0.21 0.42
Productivity differential 0.13 0.77 -0.13 1.00 0.68 0.42
Net international reserves 0.56 0.74 0.21 0.68 1.00 0.41
Corruption index 0.32 0.28 0.42 0.42 0.41 1.00
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Table 3.4 Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Unit Root Tests 
 
lag t-adf beta lag t-adf beta
4 -2.552 0.062 4 -4.057 ** -0.599
3 -2.834 0.067 3 -4.242 ** -0.594
2 -2.200 0.050 2 -4.644 ** -0.597
1 -2.123 0.049 1  -6.613 ** -0.733
0 -1.491 0.035 0  -7.954 ** -0.704
4 -1.902 0.099 4 5.201 ** 1.496
3 -2.106 0.106 3 6.288 ** 1.537
2 -1.925 0.094 2 6.942 ** 1.412
1 -2.353 0.113 1 10.252 ** 1.484
0 -2.879 0.134 0 13.287 ** 1.217
4 -2.708 -0.128 4 -5.917 ** -1.307
3 -2.876 -0.133 3 -5.961 ** -1.144
2 -2.367 -0.108 2 -5.593 ** -0.969
1 -2.642 -0.117 1 -8.251 ** -1.132
0 -2,932 * -0.123 0 -11.761 ** -1.089
4 -2.130 0.019 4 -7.861 ** -3.048
3 -2.320 0.200 3 -7.789 ** -2.499
2 -2.689 0.224 2 -9.089 ** -2.203
1 -3,633 * 0.296 1 -12.952 ** -1.993
0 -5,621 ** 0.428 0 -17.748 ** -1.477
lag t-adf beta lag t-adf beta
4 -2,240 -0.077 4 -3.999 * -0.945
3 -1,828 -0.064 3 -4.079 ** -0.890
2 -1,437 -0.051 2 -5.640 ** -1.095
1 -1,748 -0.061 1 -10.131 ** -1.457
0 -2,131 -0.074 0 -13.361 ** -1.216
lag t-adf beta lag t-adf beta
4 -1.747 -0.053 4 -4793 ** -1.062
3 -1.733 -0.051 3 -5.373 ** -1.048
2 -1.721 -0.049 2 -6.222 ** -1.035
1 -1.710 -0.048 1 -7.642 ** -1.022
0 -1,699 -0.046 0 -10,840 ** -1.011
∆ln (net international reserves)
ADF tests for unit root in levels
1
ADF tests for unit root in differences
2
ln (oil price) ∆ln (oil price)
ln (productivity differential) ∆ln (productivity differential)
ln (net international reserves)
ln (government consumption) ∆ln (government consumption)
1 
The regression includes a constant and a trend. The critical values of the ADF t-statistics are -3.45 for the 5 
percent level and -4.04 for the 1 percent level (MacKinnon,1996 one sided p-values). The null hypothesis is that 
of a unit root in levels,  i.e., rejection of the null means that the variable is stationary in levels. The symbols * and 
** denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
2
The regression includes a constant and a trend. The critical values of the ADF t-statistics are -3.45 for the 5 
percent level and -4.04 for the 1 percent level (MacKinnon,1996 one sided p-values). The null hypothesis is that 
of a unit root in differences, i.e., rejection of the null means that the variable is stationary in levels. The symbols * 
and ** denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively.
ln (corruption index) ∆ln (corruption index)
1995:M1-2004:M12 1995:M1-2004:M12
ln ( REER) ∆ln ( REER)
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Table 3.5. Johansen Cointegration Tests 
 
rank       λ trace  prob. λ max  prob.   λ trace  prob. λ max  prob.
r = 0         50.99 [0.025] * 33.86 [0.007] ** 49.76 [0.032] * 30.05 [0.024] *
r ≤ 1          17.13 [0.630] 12.19 [0.529] 19.71 [0.443] 14.73 [0.309]
r ≤ 2          4.94 [0.815] 4.70 [0.780] 4.99 [0.810] 4.36 [0.820]
r ≤ 3          0.24 [0.623] 0.24 [0.622] 0.63 [0.428] 0.63 [0.428]
rank       λ trace  prob. λ max  prob.   λ trace  prob. λ max  prob.
r = 0         60.35 [0.002] ** 44.57 [0.000] ** 59.01 [0.003] ** 43.60 [0.000] **
r ≤ 1          15.77 [0.728] 8.35 [0.881] 15.41 [0.753] 11.21 [0.627]
r ≤ 2          7.42 [0.529] 6.75 [0.520] 4.20 [0.886] 3.83 [0.876]
r ≤ 3          0.67 [0.411] 0.67 [0.411] 0.37 [0.544] 0.37 [0.544]
rank       λ trace  prob. λ max  prob.   λ trace  prob. λ max  prob.
r = 0         75.63 [0.016] * 38,19 [0.014] ** 90.43 [0.000] ** 47,90 [0.000] **
r ≤ 1          37.45 [0.327] 21,90 [0.225] 42.53 [0.144] 29,49 [0.028] *
r ≤ 2          15.54 [0.744] 9,66 [0.776] 13.04 [0.890] 8,07 [0.899]
r ≤ 3          5.89 [0.709] 4,87 [0.759] 4.97 [0.813] 4,68 [0.781]
rank       λ trace  prob. λ max  prob.   λ trace  prob. λ max  prob.
r = 0         126.95 [0.000] ** 58.92 [0.000] ** 136.02 [0.000] ** 61.27 [0.000] **
r ≤ 1          68.03 [0.069] 28.81 [0.179] 74.74 [0.019] * 35.34 [0.033] *
r ≤ 2          39.22 [0.252] 20.56 [0.304] 39.40 [0.245] 25.36 [0.094]
r ≤ 3          18.65 [0.518] 13.94 [0.370] 14.05 [0.838] 10.11 [0.734]
1996:M02–2004:M12 1997:M04–2004:M12
(2) (2)
(1)
Notes: Estimations include four lags, a restricted constant, and two dummies for September and October 1998 to 
control for the large real depreciation following the Russian financial crisis in August 1998. The symbols * and 
** denote significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. The numbers (1) through (4) refer to 
the estimated cointegration equations reported in a separate table.
(3) (3)
(4) (4)
(1)
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Table 3.6. Estimated Cointegrating Vectors 
 
First observation 1996:02 1997:04 1996:02 1997:04 1996:02 1997:04 1996:02 1997:04
Last observation 2004:12 2004:12 2004:12 2004:12 2004:12 2004:12 2004:12 2004:12
Number of observations 107 93 107 93 107 93 107 93
Ln (oil price) 0.35 0.38 1.06 0.73
standard error (0.13) (0.14) (0.25) (0.21)
Ln (government consumption) 1.71 1.80 1.14 1.14 2.00 2.20 2.02 2.22
standard error (0.32) (0.38) (0.17) (0.19) (0.35) (0.28) (0.37) (0.30)
Ln (productivity differential) 1.56 1.77 1.75 2.99 0.68 1.92
standard error (0.46) (0.63) (0.46) (0.60) (0.45) (0.67)
Ln (NIR) -0.17 -0.20 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.09 -0.30 -0.22
standard error (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Ln (corruption) -1.25 -3.24 0.42 -1.63
standard error (0.53) (0.57) (0.56) (0.61)
LM test for serial correlation 0.66 0.48 0.95 0.95 0.07 0.40 0.34 0.36
Jarque-Bera normality test 0.55 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.33 0.34 0.11 0.36
Heteroskedasticity test 0.24 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.67 0.11 0.39 0.61
Akaike information criterion -5.58 -5.60 -5.51 -5.55 -5.49 -5.54 -5.51 -5.48
Schwartz information criterion -5.08 -5.06 -5.01 -5.00 -4.89 -4.88 -4.81 -4.72
Log likelihood 318 280 314 277 317 281 322 282
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the real effective exchange rate. All regressions include four lags, a constant, and 
two dummies for September and October 1998 to control for the large real depreciation following the Russian financial crisis 
in August 1998. Coefficient estimates in bold are significant at the 5 percent level. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Figure 1.1 Real and nominal exchange rates – currency board countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Real and nominal exchange rates – crawling pegs 
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Figure 1.3 Real and nominal exchange rates – managed float 
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Figure 1.4: Structural VAR - impulse response functions
 
1.4.1.a. Czech Republic 
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Note: The first permanent shock is assumed to have a long-run impact on all three 
variables in the system. The transitory shock is assumed to have no long-run effect on any 
of the variables (since transitory shocks do not persist). (i) Response of relative output, 
real effective exchange rate and prices to supply, shocks; (ii) Response of relative output, 
real effective exchange rate and prices to demand shocks; (iii) Response of relative 
output, real effective exchange rate and prices to nominal shocks 
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(a) Response of relative output to supply, demand and nominal shocks (b) 
Response of real exchange rate to supply, demand and nominal shocks (c) Response of 
relative prices to supply, demand and nominal shocks 
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1.4.1c.   
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Note: ─ pegged regime, ----- inflation targeting i) Response of relative output, real 
effective exchange rate and prices to supply, shocks in pegged regime and in inflation 
targeting; (ii) Response of relative output, real effective exchange rate and prices to 
demand shocks in peg and in inflation targeting; (iii) Response of relative output, real 
effective exchange rate and prices to nominal shocks in peg and inflation targeting 
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1.4.2a. Hungary   
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Note: The first permanent shock is assumed to have a long-run impact on all three 
variables in the system. The transitory shock is assumed to have no long-run effect on any 
of the variables (since transitory shocks do not persist) (i) Response of relative output, 
real effective exchange rate and prices to supply, shocks; (ii) Response of relative output, 
real effective exchange rate and prices to demand shocks; (iii) Response of relative 
output, real effective exchange rate and prices to nominal shocks 
 
1.4.2b.(a) (b) (c)
-.
5
0
.5
1
0 5 10 15
step
cirf of dlndhuipad -> dlndhuipad
cirf of dlnhureerad -> dlndhuipad
cirf of dlndhucpiad -> dlndhuipad
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 5 10 15
step
cirf of dlndhuipad -> dlnhureerad
cirf of dlnhureerad -> dlnhureerad
cirf of dlndhucpiad -> dlnhureerad
 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
0 5 10 15
step
cirf of dlndhuipad -> dlndhucpiad
cirf of dlnhureerad -> dlndhucpiad
cirf of dlndhucpiad -> dlndhucpiad
 
 
(a) Response of relative output to supply, demand and nominal shocks (b) 
Response of real exchange rate to supply, demand and nominal shocks (c) Response of 
relative prices to supply, demand and nominal shocks 
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1.4.2c.  
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Note: : ─  pegged regime, -----inflation targeting (i) Response of relative output, real 
effective exchange rate and prices to supply, shocks in pegged regime and in inflation 
targeting; (ii) Response of relative output, real effective exchange rate and prices to 
demand shocks in pegged regime and in inflation targeting; (iii) Response of relative 
output, real effective exchange rate and prices to nominal shocks in pegged regime and in 
inflation targeting 
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1.4.3a Poland. 
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Note: (i) Response of relative output, real effective exchange rate and prices to supply, 
shocks; (ii) Response of relative output, real effective exchange rate and prices to demand 
shocks; (iii) Response of relative output, real effective exchange rate and prices to 
nominal shocks 
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(a) Response of relative output to supply, demand and nominal shocks (b) 
Response of real exchange rate to supply, demand and nominal shocks (c) Response of 
relative prices to supply, demand and nominal shocks 
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1.4.3c.  
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1.4.4a.Slovenia   
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Note: The first permanent shock is assumed to have a long-run impact on all three 
variables in the system. The transitory shock is assumed to have no long-run effect on any 
of the variables (since transitory shocks do not persist) (i)Response Response of relative 
output, real effective exchange rate and prices to supply shocks; (ii) Response of relative 
output, real effective exchange rate and prices to demand shocks; (iii) Response of 
relative output, real effective exchange rate and prices to nominal shocks 
1.4.4b. 
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(a) Response of relative output to supply, demand and nominal shocks (b) 
Response of real exchange rate to supply, demand and nominal shocks (c) Response of 
relative prices to supply, demand and nominal shocks 
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1.5 Baysian VAR - impulse response functions 
 
1.5.1 Czech Republic  
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1.5.2 Hungary- Bayesian VAR 
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1.5.3 Poland - Bayesian VAR 
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            1.5.4.Slovenia- Bayesian VAR 
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 2.1.1 Hungary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Fit for the MSMH(2)-VAR(3) model and filtered and smoothed probabilities:high 
credibility regime (regime 1) and low credibility regime (regime 2) for industrial production (IP) and 
interest rate differential (IR) in various countries 
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2.1.2 Croatia 
 
 
2.1.3 Romania 
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2.1.4 Lithuania 
 
 
2.1.5 Slovakia 
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2.1.6 Slovenia 
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2.1.7 Czech Republic 
 
 
2.1.8 Poland 
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Figure 3.1 Russia: Real GDP Growth and Urals Oil Price 
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Figure 3.2 Primary Exports and GDP Growth per Capita 
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Figure 3.3 GDP Growth in Russia and the CIS, 1995-2004 
 
 
CIS-12 
excluding 
Russia Russia
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook.
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Russia: Sectoral Economic Indicators 
 
 
 
Employment Growth by Sector
(Annual percent change)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
FUEL MANUFACTURING SERVICES
Real Wage Growth by Sector
(Annual percent change)
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
FUEL MANUFACTURING SERVICES
Unit Labor Cost Growth by Sector
(Annual percent change)
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
FUEL MANUFACTURING SERVICES
Output Growth by Sector
(Annual percent change)
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
FUEL MANUFACTURING SERVICES
 
 40
Figure 3.5 Russia: Industrial Growth Rates By Sector (in percent) 
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Figure 3.6 Russia: energy exports 
 
Source: IMF (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Energy and Non-Energy Exports
(In percent of total exports)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Non-energy
Gas
Oil Products
Crude Oil
Energy and Non-Energy Exports
(In percent of GDP)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Non-energy
Gas
Oil products
Crude oil
 
 41
Figure 3.7: Russia: Real Effective Exchange Rate and Its Determinants 
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Figure 3.8 Relative prices and relative income levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF (2005) 
 
Figure 3.9 Estimated real exchange rate overvaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF (2005) 
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Figure 3.10 Russia: Estimated Real Exchange Rate Misalignment 
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